Africa is the nub of UN reform as countries jostle for a seat on the Security Council, writes Nihal Fahmy* The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is more important than ever to Africa. Decisions that will be made, particularly concerning matters of intervention in ongoing conflicts, will be easier to implement if rendered legitimate through democratic processes. Yet, after nearly 12 years of mostly fruitless discussion, the UN stands deadlocked as it frantically attempts to restructure its most powerful political body. The UNSC reflects the global power structure of 1945, when most of today's nations were still under colonial rule. In 1965, under pressure from a growing membership, the UN added four new elected members to the council, bringing its total membership to 15. But the five principal World War II allies clung to their privileged status. They remain "permanent" and have the power of veto. The veto-wielding permanent members (P5) prevent many issues from reaching the council's agenda and they often bar widely agreed-upon and much-needed initiatives. Despite 10 elected members, the Security Council remains geographically unbalanced and seriously unrepresentative. For more than a decade, the UN General Assembly has debated UNSC reform but has been unable to reach agreement. At the heart of this stalemate lies a conflict over claims to new permanent seats. The P5s prefer to keep their own monopoly. Many other states oppose the creation of new permanent seats, insisting that the council should be enlarged with mere elected members. There are three resolutions on the table. The Group of Four -- Brazil, Germany, India and Japan -- (G4) resolution, the African Union (AU) resolution, and the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) resolution, led by Pakistan and Italy. The UFC (also called the "coffee club") is a spirited campaign of a group of around 40 "like- minded" countries against expanding the number of permanent members and instead calling for enlarging the council by adding non- permanent seats. The AU resolution, calling for the council to be expanded to 26 members, differs from the G4 text by giving the proposed six new permanent members veto power, and Africa an extra non-permanent seat. The G4 resolution calls for a 25-member council that would add six permanent seats without a veto and four non- permanent seats. The G4 plan envisions one permanent seat each for its members and two for Africa, with Africa getting one non- permanent seat and sharing another with other developing nations. In the extraordinary AU summit in Addis Ababa, the 53-member AU decided to stick to their demand for veto-wielding permanent seats, against the G4 formula proposing a 15-year freeze on such vetoes. Since both AU leaders and G4 members have admitted that they cannot get the requisite two-thirds vote in the 191- member General Assembly without each other's support, the AU decision means its resolution, as well as that of the G4, will probably not get the necessary 128 votes, the first stage in enlarging the council. Consequently, the Security Council must vote to amend the UN Charter to allow modifications to take place, with any of the current five permanent Council members -- China, France, Russia, the UK and the US -- able to veto it. From within the UN Secretariat, there are two models relating to the reform of the UNSC, laid down by the UN secretary-general in his report In Larger Freedom and based on the UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. These models were recommended to reflect the four global regions: Africa, Asia/ Pacific, the Americas and Europe. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto, and three new two-year term seats, bringing the total to 24. Africa would have two non-veto permanent seats and four two-year non-renewable seats. The balance of power would still tip in Europe's favour as the UK, France and Russia would retain their veto powers as would the US and China. Africa would still be the only region without veto power. Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non- permanent (and non-renewable) seat. All the regions would get two four-year renewable-term seats. Although Africa would get the most (four) of the two-year non-permanent seats, Europe and the Americas gain most, as they each get two four-year renewable-term seats. Additionally, all regions will have at least one member with veto power, except Africa. African countries have rejected both of these models and insisted instead that Africa must have two new permanent members on the Security Council with the veto privilege. According to them, it is either this or nothing. Though Africa would like to see the elimination of the veto entirely, until that happens it wants the same veto rights as the five current permanent members. With a direct claim to veto power, the African Union draft proposal on the reform of the Security Council, which is not gradualist, has little hope of being passed. Another problem with the African plan is that they can't choose among their three main contenders, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt. This explains the push for a compromise position of two permanent members plus two other African members on a rotating, non-permanent basis. Meanwhile, some Western nations are resisting expanding the UNSC to include permanent seats for African countries, especially if those seats include veto power. At issue here is the risk of having on the council countries that may become unstable, even someday collapsing, or that cannot contribute either funds or troops to UN missions. Africa itself is deeply divided along regional and linguistic lines as countries scramble for coveted seats. Senegal is the latest African country to put forth its name for a permanent seat. Other African countries jockeying for position include Kenya and Libya. The AU is deadlocked as to which of its member states to endorse. In creating this leadership vacuum, the AU is leaving the selection of who will represent Africa on the expanded UNSC to be determined by foreign busybodies and regional power struggles. According to the report of the high-level panel on UN reforms, the new members of the UNSC must have contributed "most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically", particularly through contributions to UN assessed budgets and participation in mandated peace operations. Other conditions are that new members should represent the broader UN membership, increase the democratic and accountable nature of the council, and should not impair its effectiveness. Regarding troop contributions for peace- keeping efforts, Nigeria is ranked seventh, South Africa is 10th, Senegal 12th, Kenya 13th and Egypt 49th. Taking the past into consideration, Kenya claims the distinction of being the second top African troops contributor to all UN missions. South Africa, Kenya, Senegal and Nigeria have all played crucial roles in promoting and maintaining peace and security in their respective regions. South Africa's record in promoting peace on the continent includes playing leading roles to end conflicts in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and most recently in Ivory Coast. Nigeria earned praise for its leading role in peace-keeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Egypt, for its part, has played a central role in the crisis of Darfur. Regarding the question of democratic role models, most contenders have contributed positively to an emerging African tradition in peace, justice and governance. South Africa was the first country to disarm its nuclear arsenal and has broken through barriers to give Africa permanent access to the Group of Eight most industrialised countries. Both Senegal and South Africa have commendable records on democratic transition. Kenya also, in December 2002, underwent a democratic process that saw the defeat of an incumbent ruling party and peaceful handover of power to a coalition of opposition parties. Libya and Egypt, on the other hand, are not known to practise universally accepted democracy. As for Nigeria, its April 2003 national elections were generally deemed valid, though the country ranks as the world's most corrupt nation on Transparency International's corruption index. Nigeria has also refused to sign international conventions, such as the 2003 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Regarding the question of being representative of Africa, there has been much debate concerning what it means to represent Africa. Nigeria, as the most populous African country, seems to win on the basis of numbers; it claims that one in every five blacks are Nigerian along with one in every four Africans. Yet, seven out of eight Africans do not live in Nigeria. What is needed are selection criteria not based on national size and composition. A country representative of Africa has to see itself as African first and seek to promote the interests of the whole continent equally. Egypt, for example, had very strong pan-Africanist orientation during Gamal Abdel-Nasser's rule but has since paid more attention to Middle Eastern issues. Many Africans also resent how Egyptians regard themselves as being "non-Africans". Libya, on the other hand, has a strong claim to represent Africa as Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, is widely regarded as the father of the AU. Regarding the question of financial contributions to the UN, since 1996, South Africa has consistently paid its UN dues on time. Between 1991 and 2004, Egypt paid its dues on time six times, Libya twice, Senegal once. As of 16 December 2004, South Africa, Senegal, Egypt, Nigeria and Libya had paid their full dues to the UN regular budget. While Nigeria has always paid late, Kenya has been chronically delinquent. Aside from timely remissions, there remains the issue of financial capability. Though not listed as a UN selection criteria it clearly cannot be ignored and may end up as a de facto criterion unless adequate provision is made to empower poor countries. Among qualities expected of a country to be an active and productive member of the council are financial resources to enable it to staff its New York and Geneva UN missions with adequate highly qualified people. The resources needed are enormous. In this rivalry, South Africa is widely seen as a favourite to fill one of the permanent seats set aside for Africa should the UN adopt Model A. South Africa has credibility other contenders do not have. South Africa accounts for nearly 40 per cent of Africa's economy, while Nigeria, with its vast oil reserves, is saddled with a national debt of $34 billion. Egypt's $2 billion annual aid from the US has caused uneasiness that it is an incentive to yield to a US agenda rather than promote Africa's interests. Libya, despite its oil wealth is still recovering from the UN isolation that ended in 2003. Kenya has a weak economy and is presently bogged down in domestic politics. Senegal's late entry will adds to difficulties it experiences in selling itself on a continent where it is seen as a French proxy. These three seem to be positioning themselves as regional picks should Model B be adopted. South Africa's emergence as the clear favourite has not been well received by Nigeria. Nigeria launched a desperate campaign dismissing South Africa and Egypt as not "black enough" to represent Africa. The AU, meanwhile, has not only failed to pick candidates for potential African seats on the UNSC, but has also been unable to forge a consensus on how Africa should be represented. This indecision is only likely to increase the nasty undertones among those countries campaigning for a seat. In the game of numbers the G4 has 32 countries, the AU 53. Altogether the two groups have 85 countries -- still a shortfall of 43 -- G4-AU deal could only have brightened prospects of a common resolution getting the 128 votes required to pass muster in the General Assembly. How the latest round of UNSC reform campaigning will end is unknown. A look at the history of its reforms may give a hint as to its future direction: gradual development through extensive consultation. The principle of discussion and consensus has always been underlined in decision-making. On the other hand, reforming the council essentially means redistributing power. Due to different ideas among members about changes in international politics, it is very difficult to reach a consensus. Without consensus, reform could weaken or divide the council. Until now, the principles and aims of the UN Charter hold sway, which is why many member states oppose radical change. So should the guiding strategy be one of "all or nothing" or "half a loaf is better than none"? * The writer is professor of international organisations at the American University in Cairo.
