The UN at 60 is in a sorry state, in need of systematic overhaul, writes Ayman El-Amir For an international institution like the United Nations, reaching the age of 60 is a momentous event representing the first way station beyond maturity and towards longevity. The international organisation is crossing this watershed mark now, hobbled by embarrassing scandal, misgivings, a record of ineptitude, mixed results and a total lack of future direction. On 14 September, United Nations General Assembly began its 60th anniversary session in the presence of 170 kings, presidents and heads of state. This pageantry could hardly disguise the fact that the world organisation had climbed down to the lowest point in its history and needs to be overhauled. If there were any credibility to the slogan, rehashed by United Nations' apologists, that the world organisation would have had to be invented if it did not exist, now would be the time for the UN to be re-invented. During its 60-year history the UN was carried away by its own rhetoric beyond the boundaries of credibility. It donned the mantle of the idealistic principles of the Charter to dress up its weaknesses, presenting itself as the panacea for world woes when it could hardly put its own house in order. Being an intergovernmental organisation of diplomatic state representatives, the UN, including the Secretariat, has become less transparent and more elitist. By adopting a secretive style of management, back-channel deals and absence of accountability, the UN administration made possible a corruption scandal of the magnitude of the oil-for-food programme abuse. If it were not for the hue and cry raised in the US Congress about mismanagement, profiteering, bribery and kickbacks involving senior UN officials, the now full-blown scandal would have been swept under the carpet on the 38th floor office of the secretary-general. In issuing its final investigative report, Paul Volker's Independent Enquiry Commission came as close as it could possibly get to implicating the secretary-general himself. Kofi Annan, whose son, Kojo, is a key figure in the scandal, had only the protection of "insufficient evidence" of direct involvement. Still, many people around the world who hold the UN in high esteem do not believe that the investigation went far enough. Scandals are the hallmark of weak administrations that place self-interest above mission. The UN is in need of a major change. It is not that reform had not been tried before. In the opinion of long-time UN observers, the world organisation has repeatedly undergone reform, but only enough to stay the same. In 1986, the General Assembly voted a sweeping reform package that included, among other measures, a mandatory reduction of the number of senior staff by 35 per cent and other professional staff by 25 per cent. When Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali took over in 1992 he fired, within the first six weeks of his one-time term, 22 assistants and undersecretary-generals, giving them only a two-week notice to leave. US Congress cheered him as a most diligent reformer, only to see almost all those eliminated high-level posts crawl back to the Secretariat before Boutros- Ghali's term came to an end. Reforming the United Nations is not simply a matter of reducing the number of bureaucrats, but of boosting the power, effectiveness and integrity of both the Secretariat and the intergovernmental machinery, and the working relationship between them. Past attempts at reform got bogged down because they targeted only the Secretariat while the atrophied intergovernmental bodies remained immune to change. Nepotism, lack of independent accountability mechanisms, and an incorrigible "revolving door" interest peddling between the Secretariat and member states are part of the malaise that has seriously undermined the UN in the past decade. If the reform of the Secretariat is to be taken up again, it should start with reforming the way the secretary-general is selected. The process of electing the secretary-general, who is supposed to lead the executive branch of the organisation for 10 years, is the most secretive and least democratic process of all. Unless there are sharply conflicting views within the Security Council, the issue is usually resolved by secret ballot in a matter of days. Sure enough, this would involve intensive lobbying, trade-offs and, sometimes, furtive intrigues. By comparison, headhunting for the president of Harvard University can take a couple of years and would cost a few million dollars. It would seem that the international community places less premium on the selection of the secretary-general of the world body than Harvard does on finding a president. The UN 60th anniversary's global summit, running from 14 to 16 September, has a daunting agenda of global priorities. Expansion of Security Council membership is still a contentious issue that remains unresolved, both at the regional and international levels. The African region, whose three leading aspirants for the proposed two permanent seats on the council are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, remains divided and the issue will probably be decided by a vote in the 191-member General Assembly, if not postponed for further negotiations. Members of the African Union have all but abandoned the idea of insisting on the right of veto power in the council, considered by the five permanent members as a non-starter. However, there is a silver lining in the act of increasing Security Council membership from the current 15 to 26, even without the new permanent members enjoying the power of veto. While the five permanent members will retain their exclusive privilege of blocking any Security Council resolution they oppose, it will be more laborious for them to collect the two-thirds majority they need to pass resolutions. In the present Security Council composition, nine positive votes, including the five permanent members, are all that is needed to pass a resolution. If the proposed expansion is approved, any resolution will require the positive votes of 16 out of 26 members to pass. The implication of the system was clearly demonstrated when, for four weeks in February-March 2003, the US, the UK and Spain exerted arduous pressure to collect six additional votes to support a Council resolution authorising the invasion of Iraq, but failed. The lesson learned is that an expanded Security Council could be an effective counter-balance to the paralysing veto power. Combating the global phenomenon of terrorism, reduction of poverty, saving millions in Africa and elsewhere from the scourge of HIV/AIDS, strengthening the capacity of human rights monitoring bodies, the development of a post-conflict peace-building mechanism, regulating the unilateral use of force, reviving the concept of collective security and unconditional commitment to the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change are part of a tall order of priorities on which the heads of states and governments of the 60th anniversary summit will pronounce in their final declaration. Like the 50th anniversary celebration and the "Millennium Summit" which followed, such star-studded events and their declarations do not do much for the advancement of the United Nations. A telling story now is that there is a strong trend in the US to scrap the Millennium Development Goals that were approved by the Millennium Summit in 2000 with so much fanfare. Eloquent statements are made and disappear. When the illustrious company has dispersed, commitments are easily forgotten. Only a reformed and progressive intergovernmental machinery and a truly independent, competent and effective Secretariat, with an enabled, untainted and selfless leadership, can hold member states of the world organisation to promises made to future generations of the 21st century.
