Pakistan may portray as insignificant the thawing of its relations with Israel, but all indications are to the contrary, writes Abdallah Al-Ashaal On 1 September, the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Israel met in Istanbul, marking the first-ever open talks between officials of the two countries. According to the Israeli foreign minister, it was Pakistan that requested the talks following two years of secret meetings. Pakistan maintained that its purpose was to encourage Israel to follow through on its disengagement from Gaza towards a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian question, leading to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who shook hands with Israeli PM Ariel Sharon at a reception during last week's United Nations summit, was keen to stress that no one should take offence at this step as Islamabad pledged not recognise Israel before such a settlement is reached. Tel Aviv regarded the Pakistani move as normal, albeit somewhat later than it had anticipated. It also took the occasion to urge other Arab and Islamic nations to normalise relations with Israel, arguing that Israel should be rewarded for its cooperation and that to persist in the boycott for no reason would not serve the Palestinian cause. A spokesman for the Israeli prime minister's office said that the recent meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers was the first fruit of Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza. President Musharraf also asked to meet Prime Minister Sharon on the fringes of the UN conference on UN reform. According to the Israeli press, Pakistan initiated the "play" for purposes of its own, although it serves Israeli interests as well. Pakistan believes that conciliation with Israel is the shortest route to winning American approvals. However, Israeli commentators stress, establishing diplomatic relations with Israel is not synonymous with friendship. Pakistan and India have diplomatic relations but remain adversaries. Nor would conciliation between Israel and Pakistan reduce the level of bilateral military relations between Israel and India, they add. In brokering the Pakistani-Israeli meeting in Istanbul, Turkey was not a disinterested party. Its most immediate motives were to defrost relations with Washington and strengthen its ties with Israel. In the longer range, Turkey seeks to act as the mediator in the so-called dialogue of civilisations between the Islamic world and the West and, in general, to serve as the bridge between the West and the Arab and Islamic world in all fields. Turkey is undoubtedly well qualified for the role. It is a secular state and appears bent on remaining so, its secularism being its strongest -- if not sole -- card for admission into the EU. The primary reason that the EU has wavered so long over admitting Turkey resides in that Islamic dimension of the culture and history of a country that had been the seat of the Islamic caliphate for five centuries. Turkey is also a strategic ally of Israel. This factor was a strong determinant of Syria's shift in strategy following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Damascus realised that hostility to Turkey would not win it any points in the Arab world, while it would only aggravate the risks to itself, caught as it was between the jaws of a Turkish-Israeli vice. It therefore moved to extricate itself by pushing for reconciliation with Ankara so as to create a realm of mutual interests in areas remote from the realm of Turkey's strategic alliance with Israel. Meanwhile, whatever pressures had been exerted on Turkey from the Islamic world for its early recognition of Israel -- and, later, its strategic alliance with the same state -- have long since abated. It is widely recognised that Ankara was acting in accordance with its commitments to NATO, into which it had been originally recruited as a key component of Truman's strategy for Soviet containment. A third factor in Turkey's favour as a civilisational bridge is the product of the current trend towards normalisation in Israeli-Arab relations and stronger than ever US-Israeli relations. Turkey now holds the post of secretary-general of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference; a position Ankara's candidate won in the first ever elections held by this nearly 35-year-old body. The Pakistani meeting with the Israeli foreign minister triggered widespread outcry at home, which was joined by the parties headed by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sherif. Pakistan is also still gauging the reaction of Arab and Islamic countries before it determines its next move. If, indeed, Pakistan has no intention of recognising Israel until a Palestinian state is created, as President Musharraf has claimed, why risk all the potential opposition? What was the point of the Istanbul meeting when the only difference between it and its predecessors over the past two years was the fact that it was made public? Or is there a difference -- this being that the Istanbul meeting presages normalisation with Israel -- and, if so, what does Pakistan have to gain from this? President Musharraf has encountered stronger opposition before; when he lent his country as a base for the US invasion of Afghanistan, surviving in the course of providing that service two assassination attempts. Perhaps, therefore, he felt that he could easily weather the opposition over the meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers in Istanbul. In all events, Musharraf must have operated on several premises. The first was that the key to currying favour with the US was to warm up to Israel, to whom Washington now more than ever lends an attentive ear. The second was that Pakistan was not so much hostile to Israel as it was supportive of Palestinian-Arab causes and that this support was not reciprocated in equal measure by Arab support for Pakistan in its claims over Kashmir and its rivalry with India. The third was that a move on the part of Pakistan to normalise relations with Israel would not overly upset the Arab world, as Egypt had taken the initiative in this regard more than a quarter of a century ago. Such considerations converged with the new realities in the region that have pushed the question of Kashmir into the background in favour of a geo-strategic policy for securing Islamabad's status as a regional power. Like Pakistan, Israeli and American officials tried to play down the Pakistani-Israeli rapprochement. News was "leaked" to the effect that Pakistan had cleared the Istanbul meeting in advance with the Palestinians and other Arab governments. Palestinian sources deny this and criticised the meeting harshly. Nabil Shaath charged that Pakistan had rewarded Israel prematurely and encouraged it to expand its settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinian official is correct. Arab opinion at this moment is strongly divided over whether sustaining the boycott against Israel or moving towards normalising relations with it would better induce it to respond to Palestinian demands. The question itself is naïve. The boycott remains a powerful means for exerting psychological pressure on Israel whereas Israel is certain to interpret any moves towards conciliation as at least tacit approval of its policies towards the Palestinians. It is doubtful in sum that Pakistan stands to benefit greatly from its recent overtures towards Israel. Pakistan's relations with the US have so far not needed Israeli intermediaries and it is unlikely that the US will be any more inclined than it has been to support Islamabad against India. It is therefore difficult to understand why Musharraf has been so intent on this policy. It will only play into the hands of Israel, offering it an important avenue to penetrate the Islamic and Arab world while rewarding it for its scheme to annex Jerusalem and at least a large chunk of the West Bank. Also, by weakening the Arab and Palestinian position, Pakistan's image will suffer greatly in the Arab world where the Arab people will harbour strong resentment against Pakistani officials' willingness to barter away the potential leverage of their "Islamic nuclear bomb". It was no coincidence that the meeting between the Pakistani and Israeli foreign ministers took place in the erstwhile seat of the Islamic caliphate on the annual commemoration of the Prophet's midnight journey to the seven heavens from Jerusalem. Given Israel's designs on the Holy City, Pakistan's choice of place and time for that meeting does not augur well. Pakistan may have wished to signal that it still stands firm behind the Palestinian cause, but we fear instead that its signals of encouragement to Israel are much stronger. The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister .
