Reviewing contention that could threaten Egypt's national security, Diaa El-Din El-Quosy wades deep into the Nile's troubled waters The River Nile is one of the few shared rivers around the world that witnessed a large number of agreements, treaties, letters of understanding and memoranda starting since the discovery of the river's origins and lasting for two or more centuries covering a time span over which most of the Nile Basin countries were under occupation until they all won their independence. Two of the most debatable agreements were the 1929 and 1959 treaties. The 1929 agreement was signed between Great Britain as an occupying power of Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and Egypt, which was a newly independent country. In this treaty, Great Britain declared that none of the occupied countries would install structures that might reduce the natural flow of the Nile to Egypt, or even to reduce the water level which at that time was 52 billion cubic metres per year divided between Egypt and Sudan at 48 and four billion cubic metres per year respectively. The purpose of Great Britain was not to support Egypt's interest as much as to guarantee an adequate water supply to the cotton farms of the Nile Delta that exported to textile factories in Yorkshire, Manchester and Liverpool. The 1959 treaty between Egypt and Sudan was signed just before the construction of the High Dam in Aswan. The agreement was to divide the flow that used to go to the Mediterranean as losses -- about 32 billion cubic metre per year -- between the two countries: 14.5 billion cubic metres for Sudan; 7.5 billion cubic metre for Egypt, and the remaining 10 billion cubic metres left for evaporation from the Aswan High Dam lake (Lake Nasser). The result of the 1959 agreement was that the Egyptian quota became 55.5 billion cubic metres per year; the Sudanese quota became 18.5 billion cubic metres per year. The 1959 agreement left the door open for any Nile Basin country to complain against the proposed division and stated that the two signature countries would consider whatever stemmed from the riparian countries and rearrange the situation accordingly. However, none of the countries concerned filed official complaints. Egypt and Sudan kept taking their quotas from the Nile for decades before the latest controversy about the quotas erupted in May 2009. In 1967 a number of Nile Basin countries started a programme aiming at the identification of the hydrological features and meteorological conditions of the Nile Basin in a project named "HYDROMET". A large number of rain gauges were installed in key points of the Nile Basin. Monitoring of these gauges continued for five years and the project was extended for another five years. Late in the 1970s, the partners realised that they had enough hydrological data to develop simulation models capable of describing the effect of changing any of the prevailing conditions on the surface runoff inside the Nile Basin. That project was named "TECONILE" and continued until the 1990s. In 1999, and for the first time in history, the nine River Nile countries formed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). A number of donor and lending countries represented by the World Bank generously allocated funds for the implementation of the two projects: the first, a shared benefit project agreed upon by two or more countries of the riparian group; the second, a shared vision project that reflects the ability of the partners to transfer the cooperative effort from one generation to the other. Only Eritrea accepted to be an observer to the NBI meetings, the other eight countries divided into southern Nile partners -- the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda -- plus Egypt and Sudan. The Eastern Nile countries included Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. During the years 1999 (from the evolution of NBI) to 2009, expenditure in the NBI reached $250 million, donated by the US, Britain, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and others. A framework agreement slowly developed and indicators showed that 90 per cent of the items of the treaty met approval by all parties. The items that were not unanimously agreed upon were left for upcoming meetings. On 22 May 2009 a meeting was held in Kinshasa and for the first time things went out of control, the Sudanese delegation leaving the meeting in anger. Seven upstream countries insisted on the cancellation of the water security item that reflected the need to respect the historical right of Egypt and Sudan in their quotas as stated in the 1959 agreement. Second, they proposed to discuss the division of quotas amongst all countries and agreed on new quotas. Third, they called to transfer this item to the annex of the treaty and to postpone its discussion to a later stage. The Egyptian and the Sudanese parties replied by a three item request to: issue a clear statement ensuring the historical right of Egypt and Sudan in their quotas as spelled in the 1959 agreement; that upstream countries should agree to announce their will to install control structures in sufficient time, and to give Egypt and Sudan the right to veto any items of the framework agreement or to insist on unanimous agreement, rather than by majority. Such division in place, the Kinshasa meeting closed in disagreement. The parties then met in Alexandria in July 2009 and the meeting was as unsuccessful as the previous one. The only agreement was to allow for a period of six months during which consultations between the parties might furnish a better understanding. The end of the six months period witnessed a widening of the gap between upstream and downstream countries. On 11 April 2010 experts met in Sharm El-Sheikh. No obvious agreement resulted. On 14 April, Nile Basin ministers met for 17 continuous hours that ended at four in the morning with a declaration signed by upstream countries stating that these countries would open the door for signing a framework agreement and the establishment of a Commission for the Nile Basin countries on 14 May 2010. A period of 12 months will be given to allow any country to join. On Friday 14 May, four countries -- namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda -- signed the treaty. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi did not attend the meeting. Kenya blessed the treaty and stated that it would sign later. It was said that the Kenyan prime minister would visit Egypt on 22 May for further consultations and in an attempt to narrow the gap between upstream and downstream countries. Egypt and Sudan were left to find their own solutions. The two countries still have a number of important cards. President Hosni Mubarak and President Omar El-Bashir sent messages to their counterparts in the Nile Basin countries calling for the resumption of negotiations. Egypt and Sudan could try to break upstream countries into moderate and extremist groups. The disagreement of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Kenya is a relative success in this respect. Moreover, Egypt and Sudan could call on the support of the World Bank and donor countries and call for the funding of projects in the Nile Basin only when approved by all nine Nile Basin countries. Further, they could exert pressure on countries that invest in upstream countries, especially if the investment is in water projects. Requesting Arab development funds (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi) to slow down their assistance to upstream countries is also an option. As is to draw the attention of the world community to the danger of tension in the Nile Basin and any disruption to the natural flow of the Nile downstream. The available international law supporting Egyptian- Sudanese interests should be emphasised and brought to the attention of international organisations. Lastly, Egypt and Sudan should start immediately to design projects to capture losses in the Sudd area. Projects like Gongeli, Mashar, Bahr Al-Ghazal, Bahr Al-Zaraf, and Bahr Al-Gabal might save tens of billions of cubic metres that can be divided between the two countries.
