Talk about reconciliation is empty until the division between the illegal occupation and legitimate resistance is recognised as the core rift in Iraq, write Abdul-Ilah Al-Bayaty and Hana Al-Bayaty In view of the present situation on the ground in Iraq, one wonders if Amr Moussa's effort to organise a "national reconciliation conference" is meant to save the so-called "political process" or instead to replace it. Indeed, what is called the political process has been and is in fact a strategy to legitimise and normalise the occupation, building a weak and divided state to replace the former sovereign Iraq. But this "political process" suffers since its inception from three major handicaps that prevent it from successfully building any kind of legitimate state. First of all, as this process is based upon the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) drafted by civil administrator Paul Bremer, it is void of any legal grounding. Indeed, from an international law perspective, the pre-emptive war against Iraq and the subsequent occupation are illegal. Iraqi sovereignty and Iraq's peoples' right to resist is protected by the UN Charter, The Hague Treaty of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions. These documents concede that laws passed under occupation are made by and for the occupation, not an independent state, and cannot in any way become permanent. An occupying power cannot change the social, economic or political make-up of the occupied country and cannot link this country to any agreements or treaties that exceed the occupation. By approving UN Security Council Resolution 1483, which describes it as an occupying power, the US committed itself to the duties and constraints as set out under international law. In addition, none of the so- called steps of the political process -- the transfer of powers, January's elections for a constituent assembly or the referendum on a permanent constitution -- was able to lend it any legitimacy. All were boycotted by the Iraqi anti- occupation movement and gave no palpable results in improving the situation in terms of security, general services such as access to water, electricity and employment, or justice for the Iraqi people. This absence of legality and legitimacy reinforces those who claim that the former Iraqi sovereign state remains the legal and legitimate state. According to international law, as the Iraqi former government did not declare defeat and the Iraqi army did not capitulate, and that no free and fair elections were yet conducted and cannot be under occupation, Iraqi sovereignty is guaranteed by its former state apparatus. The latter has been dissolved by Paul Bremer therefore Iraqi sovereignty is protected by the military and civil movements who resist the occupation. Secondly, the political process based on sectarian and ethnic affiliations orchestrated by the United States has annulled the concept of citizenship -- the basis of any modern state. It annulled sovereignty, destroyed its heritage and memory and took over its wealth in an attempt to divide the country and destroy its Arab and Islamic geopolitical and civilisation-based affiliations. Through this process, the occupation has tried -- and continues to try -- to replace Iraq by a subordinate state based on ethnic and sectarian identity: a state of parties, race and religious references rather than a state of equal and free citizens. Those participating in the American political process no longer accept the existence of one people in Iraq constituting the totality of the state's citizens. However, the chaos, destruction and ruptures it created will not allow it to establish a state that enjoys the respect of Iraqis, let alone establish a constitutional democratic polity. This process can indeed create political feudalism, local corrupted bourgeoisies, sectarian militias led by warlords, generalised corruption, but not a unified democratic entity based on citizenship. Thirdly, the so-called political process, instead of bringing stability to Iraq, is and will be the cause of increasing instability in the region. Indeed, on the one hand, the Kurdish parties are working to create a Kurdish entity in the north, unrestrained by the central government. This will be a destabilising factor for Iran, Turkey and Syria, and is opposed by the majority of Arab Iraqis. On the other, the Shia religious forces are trying to build a Shia semi-state in the south, governed by the concept of "Wilayat Al-Fakih" (Rule of the Jurist -- a laden concept which puts religious authority above nationalism), similar to and allied with Iran. This will be a destabilising factor for the whole Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia. It is opposed by most Arab countries. In reality, if there isn't a strong unified Iraq, peaceful and cooperative with its immediate neighbours, there will be no stability in Iraq or in the region. As was rightly observed by Saud Al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, this may result in a civil and regional war. It might be, as many indications show, an option for the US to destroy the fragile equilibrium of the region, and justify its presence as a balancing power (as did the British empire in the 20th century), but it is opposed by the main regional powers. It is for these reasons that the anti-occupation movement, civilian and military, refused and still refuses to take part in this process, for this process is against the interests of the Iraqi people. After two years of occupation, and considering the current situation, it is obvious that the anti- occupation movement, whatever it is labelled as and whatever its background, has defended the interests of the Iraqi people. This movement sprang from the idea of a unified state of its citizens. It seems vain to try to draw some "Sunnis" to participate in this process or the coming elections. The self-appointed "Sunni representatives" are not recognised by the Sunni community, as the latter refuses to be defined along sectarian lines. Anyway, if elected, it seems unlikely that they will be able to change any aspect of the illegitimate constitution, but rather that they are used to legitimising it. For example, following the January elections, in a disingenuous attempt to portray as represented all sections of Iraqi society, some Sunni ministers were appointed to the government. The Sunni minister of defence, Saadoun Al-Dulaimi, participated in the planning and support of a large scale military action to crush Tel Afar, and before launching attacks on the following cities, he threatened Al-Qaim, Haditha and Fallujah, to destroy their houses on the heads of their children, which in itself constitutes a war crime under international law. How can the anti- occupation movement believe that participating in the elections will change anything? How can the participation of Sunnis change the ethnic and sectarian basis of the political process? Despite Amr Moussa's declaration that the occupation should end, and while (according to a recent poll commissioned by the British military), 82 per cent of Iraqis want all occupation forces removed from their country, less than one per cent feel occupation forces have improved security, and 45 per cent openly admitted to feeling that attacks against US forces are justified; the different Iraqi forces which cooperate with the occupation and agreed to take part to the reconciliation conference, issued a joint call to the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the occupation. Resolution 1546 stated that except on the Iraqi government's request, the current date for the end of the occupation was set for December 2005. It seems obvious that these forces are not ready to change their policies and respect the Iraqi people's interests. Although they declared that they are ready to reconcile with the Sunni community of the population, they are currently waging, alongside US forces, an attack of unprecedented scale since the siege of Fallujah in the Al-Anbar province. In this context, are Amr Moussa's efforts to organise a successful reconciliation conference worth it? Even delaying the date of the conference until the results of the next elections seems to indicate that these groups are willing to manipulate the results and transform this meeting into a well-intentioned conference with no practical agenda. This is even more evident when one understands that the two main players that will decide the future of Iraq -- the occupation and the growing resistance -- will be absent from the meeting. This absence portrays the conflict in Iraq as one being among Iraqis, while the actual conflict is between the illegal occupation and the unalienable right of the Iraqis to independence, sovereignty and democracy. Abdul-Ilah Al-Bayaty is an Iraqi political analyst based in France, Hana Al-Bayaty a member of the Brussels Tribunal Executive Committee.
