Exchanges between Detlev Mehlis and the Syrian foreign minister suggest that Mehlis is more concerned with antagonising Damascus than uncovering the truth behind Al-Hariri's murder, writes Hassan Nafaa* I arrived in Syria the day before President Bashar Al-Assad gave a speech at Damascus University outlining his views on the crisis that has been escalating since the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1636. I had a chance to observe the reaction of the Syrian people to the daring speech, and was keen to know the reaction of ordinary Syrians to the statements made by Al-Assad. Surprisingly, rather than the concern and worry I had expected I found defiance. Mine was not, of course, a scientific survey of public opinion, and I am writing on the basis of the exchange of casual remarks with some of the young people I ran into in the hotel and in shops and restaurants around town. And the impression I gleaned from those conversations is that the people of Syria are standing behind the leadership. They may have reservations about the pace of political reform but in the face of US threats they are supporting the government. Al-Assad's obvious indignation struck a chord with average Syrians, angry at US arrogance and the provocations of some Lebanese officials. Syrians clearly reject the Libyan scenario. They needed reassurance from their president that Syria was not going to bow down before the threats and Al-Assad delivered that reassurance. He may have sounded too defiant to outsiders but not to his own people. I was intrigued when the Syrian president said he had intended to address the nation in a week's time but had to speak earlier because of developments. What developments? As I leafed through non-Syrian papers I discovered that Al-Assad was referring to barely veiled threats made by Detlev Mehlis, head of the international investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri. Syrians interpreted the remarks as a sign that Mehlis is part of a conspiracy against Syria, and came to the conclusion that he is more interested in insulting Syria than in uncovering the truth about Al-Hariri's assassination. On 4 November Mehlis sent a letter to the Syrian foreign minister, Farouk Al-Sharaa, demanding that six Syrian officials, five suspects and one witness, appear before the international investigating committee at its headquarters in the Monteverdi Hotel in Beirut. Mehlis specified the dates of the hearings and suggested that the men in question be handed over at the Lebanese- Syrian border. In other words Mehlis had suggested that Syrian officials be placed in the custody of Lebanese security services and escorted to Beirut. Mehlis also made known that he wanted to question Al-Sharaa over the case, suggesting the encounter take place in Geneva on 23 or 24 November. In his reply to Mehlis, Al-Sharaa reminded the German judge that the Syrian president had ordered a special judicial committee to be formed under Attorney-General Ghada Murad. The committee has been instructed to interrogate Syrian citizens on all matters related to Mehlis's mission and cooperate with the international committee and the Lebanese legal authorities. Murad had sent Mehlis a letter inviting him to visit Syria to discuss cooperation and suggesting a protocol outlining their mode of cooperation be signed. Mehlis appeared to take little interest in Al-Sharaa's reply. He wrote to the Syrian foreign minister to say he had taken note of the formation of the Syrian legal committee and would welcome any information the Syrian government might want to share with the international committee. But, he added, this did not alter the demands made earlier by the international committee which remained the only authority entitled to set the date and venue for hearings as per UN Security Council resolutions. Mehlis issued an implicit ultimatum to Syria, saying that unless his demands were met by 10 November he would refer the matter to the Security Council. Mehlis's letter, which gives the Syrians 48 hours to deliver the suspects, prompted President Al-Assad to bring forward the date of his speech in which he rejected Mehlis's ultimatum. The US and France are waging an offensive through the UN Security Council while Syria is on the defensive and alone. The coming days will show whether the Syrians are willing to escalate matters further. It is hard to predict how far the confrontation will go. For the time being each side has its strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the Western strategy is in its reliance on international legitimacy as represented by the UN Security Council. Resolution 1636 shows that the Security Council is united behind Mehlis. But such claims to international legitimacy are not above suspicion -- one need only recall the situation faced by Iraq to realise this. Syria can credibly claim that the US and France are trying to use the Al-Hariri case to pursue unrelated political goals. This is hardly far- fetched -- Resolution 1559, after all, was adopted before Al-Hariri's assassination, and the US has persistently tried to force a change in Syria's position on Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria can cast doubt on the probity of both the UN and the US. It can remind the world of the weapons of mass destruction Iraq was accused of stockpiling, and of the information fabricated by the US to justify its invasion. Is there more justification for an international committee to question Syria's involvement in Al-Hariri's murder than for Syria to question the intentions of the US and the international committee? I wonder. Zahir Al-Siddiq, one of the witnesses on whom Mehlis depends in his report, is a known criminal and perjurer. In addition Louay Al-Saqqa, a Syrian national currently serving a prison sentence in Turkey, says that he was offered $10 million in return for falsely testifying that he had met Assef Shawkat who asked him to find an Iraqi suicide bomber to kill Al-Hariri. The strength of the Syrian strategy lies in its opposition to US policy in the region. US provocations can easily play into Syria's hands. Nor is it difficult for Damascus to claim that Syrian interests have damaged more than any other by Al-Hariri's assassination. That Syria's foreign policy has the support of the Syrian public does not mean the public has no reservations about the regime's over-reliance on security forces. Damascus's handling of Lebanese security matters is not something the Syrians can boast about, and there is no shortage of people who believe Syria is becoming defiant because it has something to hide. The US and France have the means to pressure Syria. Meanwhile, Syria has the means to hold out in the hope that the regional and international situation may change. Syria has strong allies in Lebanon and Iran, and Damascus can influence the situation in Iraq, Palestine, and the Arab world. The US, already embroiled in Iraq, is unlikely for the moment to embark on a military adventure in Syria. But Syria must not overplay its cards since ultimately there are no guarantees as to what Washington will and will not do. It is perhaps time Damascus formed a high-level committee to manage the crisis politically, economically and militarily. Syria must prepare for all eventualities. The crisis will not be resolved until Washington's wider agenda is separated from the Al-Hariri case. Everyone -- and I include Syria -- is interested in knowing who killed Al-Hariri. If Mehlis really wants to find out who was behind Al-Hariri's assassination he should agree to interrogate Syrian suspects outside Lebanon. Of course Mehlis can continue to interrogate Lebanese defendants and wait until an international court subpoenas the Syrians. For now, though, Mehlis appears more interested in antagonising the Syrians than uncovering the truth behind Al-Hariri's murder. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
