Lacklustre return

Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (623)
Lacklustre return
Al-Ahram : A Diwan of contemporary life The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty reinstated the status quo that had reigned in Sudan. For perspective, Professor Yunan Labib Rizq revisits the storyline of the military presence in the African country under bilateral rule
The section of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty pertaining to Sudan (specifically paragraph three of Article 11) included an agreement on there being "British and Egyptian soldiers under the command of the governor general to defend Sudan, in addition to Sudanese soldiers." The final paragraph of the same article provided further details: "In view of the Egyptian government's desire to send soldiers to Sudan, the governor general will consider the number of Egyptian soldiers required. Immediately upon the treaty coming into force, the Egyptian government will send an august Egyptian officer whom the governor general will be able to consult concerning this matter."
After the British occupation forces entered the Egyptian capital on 13 September 1882, Khedive Tawfiq issued a decree dissolving the army. At the stroke of a pen, the ruler of Egypt crossed out the history of the modern Egyptian military force that had been established by Muhammad Ali and began to construct it anew with different characteristics.
These new features included limiting the number of its forces to 6,000 despite Ottoman firman allowing up to 18,000. The new military was to be under British leadership with a few non-Egyptian, or better put, non-peasant officers. Finally, these forces were not to undertake military missions but rather were charged with upholding internal security.
Until that time there had been no real threat to Egypt, particularly after the revolutionaries in the south had succeeded in wiping out the Egyptian presence in the Sudan. These revolutionary followers of Al-Mahdi were given different names: they called themselves Al-Ansar, Egyptians called them Mahdists, and the British and Europeans in general called them Dervishes. Egyptian historians concur that the English aided the "Dervishes" in succeeding at their mission, particularly after they compelled Egyptian forces to leave Sudan in 1885. Legists described this exit as abandonment and not evacuation, therefore asserting the event's temporality. The occupiers agreed, fearful that Sudan would become a no-man's land that would entice the European powers splitting up the African continent at that time to encroach upon it.
Yet less than four years passed before a new situation was created, when the Ansar forces approached Egyptian territory in 1889 under the leadership of Abdel-Rahman Wud Al-Najumi. This manoeuvre had been prepared for by the British leadership by increasing the number of Egyptian forces and including Sudanese volunteers. This hybrid force, in addition to the British forces, succeeded in defeating the Mahdist campaign in Toshka.
Starting with this event, the Egyptian army began to acquire limited additional features appropriate to the latest circumstances -- British leadership and forces with a cavalry and artillery, and a steady increase in Egyptian forces, predominantly infantrymen and bearers of light weapons, as well as Sudanese forces. The army's activity was not limited to thwarting possible new invasions by the Ansar forces, however, but rather extended to restrain European forces in areas surrounding the southern valley either through agreements or confrontation. The Italians were in Eritrea to the east with their eye on Kassala and the surrounding regions, which led to fierce battles with the Ansar. This encouraged the British to relieve their allies by sending Egyptian forces to Dongola, which was occupied in 1896.
Then there was Leopold II, the "King of Belgium and Lord of the Free Congo," who coveted the Lado barrier in southern Sudan. The British government agreed to this on the condition that the occupation be temporary and last only until Egypt regained those regions.
Finally, there was the fierce neighbour France, which at that time aimed to implement a colonial project to control an area stretching the width of the continent it called the African belt. It thus sent forces to the upper Nile in 1898 under the leadership of Captain Marchand. These forces reached a point called Fashuda, which was a deliberate destination due to the Nile's extremely narrow breadth there making the French think that if they could gain control of it they could put pressure on the British presence in Egypt. The British of course rejected such aspirations and rushed to send the Egyptian army under the command of Lord Kitchener to the south, where it clashed with and defeated the forces of the caliph in Karrary, thus putting an end to the Mahdist state. It then advanced toward the French encampments where a famous confrontation took place that almost led to a European war had it not been for France's 11th hour retreat.
This incident ended with the majority of the new Egyptian army remaining in Sudan and only a limited force present in Egypt to maintain security. This set up can be deduced from several facts. Firstly, the sirdar, the supreme commander of this army, also became at that time the governor general of Sudan and remained so for a full quarter of a century, starting with the signing of the agreement on bilateral rule in 1899 and ending with the assassination of Sirdar Sir Lee Stack in 1924. Secondly, most of the major administrative offices of the army were transferred to Khartoum, most importantly the administration of military intelligence, which was called Cairo Intelligence before regaining Sudan and then was renamed Sudan Intelligence. This administration was essentially formed of Britons and some Levantines who were carefully selected among non-Muslims, the most famed of which were Noam Shaqir Bey and Samuel Attiya Bey.
The military situation in Sudan remained stable under the planning of the Foreign Office in London and the British commissioner headquarters in Cairo until the 1919 revolution. It seemed as though what was happening in the northern Nile Valley was not having a strong influence on the south, but this appraisal turned out to be inaccurate. During the 20 years that had passed since Sudan had been regained, Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers had been permitted to freely mix, in addition to the Sudanese effendis who mixed with their Egyptian colleagues in the Egyptian government administration.
Before long, then, it was as though a "revolutionary epidemic" had infected Sudanese soldiers and intellectuals, and by 1924 this fever had turned into a massive movement with the soldiers and intellectuals serving as its pillars. A low- ranking Sudanese officer in the Egyptian army, Second Lieutenant Ali Abdel-Latif was the founder of what was called the White Flag League that took on the burden of resisting British presence. The Railway Division, an army division charged with protecting the railway, began to mobilise, leading the British forces to disarm them and group them in Atbara in preparation to exile them. In the league, the movement's leadership was assumed by the Sudanese officer Lieutenant Muhammad Saleh Jabril and in Darfur Lieutenant Muhammad Effendi Allam.
Events climaxed following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo and the British government's seizing the opportunity to rid itself of the Egyptians in Sudan, first and foremost the armed forces. Yet this did not take place without bloodshed. Some sections of the Sudanese 11th division clashed with British forces to bar them from implementing orders, resulting in major losses of life on both sides.
The British wanted this scene, which took place on 27 and 28 November 1924, to be the end of the Egyptian military presence in Sudan, but the Egyptians begged to differ.
BRITISH POLICY aimed at removing the Egyptian army from Sudan took on several aspects. Firstly, the Sudanese divisions known as the "black" divisions were permanently separated from the rest of the Egyptian army. They remained in the southern valley and formed what was called the Sudan Defence Force. It was not long before the southerners were selected from this force for what was called the "equatorial division." Secondly, the posts of governor general and commander of the Egyptian army were separated, thus banishing the title of "Supreme Commander of the Egyptian Army and Governor General of Sudan" to history.
As for the Egyptians, they viewed the removal of Sudanese divisions from the Egyptian army as an offence to the army's history stretching back to its establishment during the era of Muhammad Ali. It had always depended on members from both ends of the Nile Valley, and this is perhaps what drove the cabinet of Ahmed Ziwar, which succeeded the government of Saad Zaghlul, to request from the High Mandate headquarters in Cairo the annual payment of LE750,000 for the maintenance of the Sudan Defence Force. The British complied on the principle that had governed Sudan since 1899 -- Egypt defends and Britain rules. Yet the British did not view their approval for these funds as an implicit agreement on Egyptian forces returning to Sudan.
This very return, however, remained a primary concern of the subsequent Egyptian governments, and formed a central topic of the negotiations that took place between 1927 and 1936.
In the negotiations conducted by Abdel-Khaleq Tharwat Pasha with the British Foreign Secretary Mr Chamberlain (1927-1928), the primary demand of the Egyptian prime minister was reinstating the status quo prior to 1924, that is, returning the Egyptian army to Sudan. The British response was that all the London government could guarantee was the protection of Egyptian water interests in the south in return for the continuation of the agreed upon Egyptian assistance to Sudan. It further attempted to strip this assistance of its military nature, considering it assistance to the good governance of Sudan so that it would not pose a threat to Egypt.
In the Muhammad Mahmoud-Henderson negotiations that took place two years later, Article 12 of the proposal put forward by the Egyptian prime minister provided that "British- Egyptian rule of Sudan continue in accordance with the conditions of the current agreements or any future amendments agreed upon by the two contracting parties. The rights and powers of the two parties will remain as stipulated by the above mentioned agreements and will be undertaken, de facto, by the governor general of Sudan appointed by those agreements. Egyptian battalions are permitted in Sudan to guard the governor general and may include an Egyptian officer and his staff." In contrast, the proposal put forth by the British negotiators ignored this final point altogether.
In the Nahhas-Henderson negotiations held that same year, the Egyptians put forth their understanding of Article 13, which also addressed the Sudan issue. Their take was that Egypt's rule over Sudan should remain complete and that the two contracting parties should actively administrate Sudan on a joint basis. In following, an Egyptian deputy to the governor general should be appointed, as well as Egyptian staff to cooperate with the British staff in administrating Sudan. Finally, Egyptian soldiers should return to Sudan following the signing of the treaty, and no restrictions should be placed on Egyptians with regard to emigration, ownership of property, or trade.
Mr Maffee, the British governor general of Sudan, responded that in the case of implementing the treaty in the same friendly spirit as that surrounding the negotiations, the British government would be prepared to sympathetically consider the return of Egyptian battalions to Sudan when the British forces withdrew from Cairo. It was this response that the Egyptians considered a "lacklustre return" for its forces to Sudan, and thus that round of negotiations failed after crashing into the Sudan hurdle.
The two sides waited another six years before signing the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which guaranteed a return of Egyptian forces to Sudan. This in fact began to be carried out immediately upon the signing of the treaty, and Al-Ahram followed these events with a series of news items and articles.
AS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1936 TREATY provided for the dispatch of an "august Egyptian officer" to Khartoum to agree on the arrangements for the Egyptian forces' return to the south, in April 1937, Major General Ibrahim Khairi Pasha, deputy minister of the military, arrived at the head of a small military delegation. After the governor general greeted him and they exchanged pleasantries, he expressed his hope that there would be practical assistance from the Egyptian army "to defend the English-Egyptian territory of Sudan."
On the occasion of the Egyptian delegation's arrival, a Sudanese newspaper in Khartoum made an issue of the locations the Egyptian military battalions would camp in upon their imminent return to the country. The paper opined that they should station themselves in the same cities they had stayed in previously, "which would help to ingrain the notion that the two cities in which the Egyptian army previously stationed are the most enthusiastic about welcoming the new forces and more knowledgeable than others of its needs and the means of commercial and other dealings with its members."
A news item published by Al-Ahram on 12 May about the return of the deputy minister of the military to Cairo revealed that he was accompanied by three individuals: Lieutenant Colonel Abdel-Raziq Barakat Bey, Abdel-Azim El-Dawleti, and Lieutenant Muhammad Neguib, the same individual who the world would be acquainted with the morning of 23 July 1952 as the leader of the revolution and who became the first president of the Egyptian Republic.
Khairi Pasha responded to the questions of an Al-Ahram representative by setting the date for the return of Egyptian forces to Sudan in the winter so as to prepare travel arrangements that would require some time and because the governor general of Sudan was planning to travel home to consult with his government on matters related to this return. Khairi praised the marvelous reception he received from the Sudanese. As for the military forces present in Sudan, he confirmed that they were two English battalions and eight Sudanese battalions and were well armed and trained.
An analytical article published in Al-Ahram about the goals of the visit of the deputy minister of the military mentioned that the mission of the first delegation was to determine the size of the army that would return to Sudan "and that this number be in conformity with the goal of sending the army, that is, to realise Egypt's prestige and honour, and not to be so little as to be characterised as filling a component of the treaty and nothing more."
Al-Ahram 's analytical article added that matters were simplified by the fact that the "Egyptian barracks in Sudan are plentiful and most of them are either empty of soldiers or only house a few. This claim is neither an assumption nor a fancy, for the size of the Egyptian army that was stationed in Sudan in 1924, including the Sudanese divisions, was approximately 20,000 soldiers. They resided in well-built barracks and when this army left Sudan, its place was not taken. In fact, the British decreased the number of Sudanese divisions in 1924."
To assure that readers would not think that British forces had increased and used these barracks, the author of this article ascertained that those forces had their own barracks and that their size had not increased over the years except by one battalion.
As for the second mission of that delegation, it revolved around determining the locations in which the Egyptian army would be stationed in Sudan. The article's author believed there was an Egyptian consensus that a large proportion of the returning forces should station at the Egyptian barracks in Khartoum and that the primary goal of the Egyptian army's return to Sudan would not be met "unless this condition is fulfilled completely."
During that period there was widespread discussion of the objectives of returning the Egyptian army to the southern half of the Nile Valley. Was it a symbol of dominion as had been the prior case? Or was it to be one of the tools of a defence system comprising Sudanese and British forces? These debates were taken up by all of the newspapers, not just Al-Ahram.
One of these papers, Al-Baseer, which supported the Wafdist government, wrote that there is no difference between considerations of dominion and those of defence. "The duty of defence is derived from dominion, or one of its outcomes. Yet while one bloc may be sufficient as a symbol of dominion, thousands and thousands may not be enough for defence."
Al-Baseer added that neither dominion nor defence was the crucial point, but that honour was. It described honour as "the point of medial balance between the minimum of dominion and the typical amount of defence. The cabinet's decision made a point of taking the most important Sudanese cities, at the head of which is Khartoum, as a headquarters for Egyptian soldiers, as opposed to the palace for Egyptian soldiers some had desired. It also took care to illustrate that there are other units that will accompany the two battalions determined to be sent to Sudan to undertake reconnaissance, air defence, and technical measures followed by modern armies."
At the same time, frantic communications were taking place between Sir George Stuart Symes, the governor general of Sudan, Sir Miles Lampson, the British ambassador in the Egyptian capital, and officials in the British Foreign Office, with the goal of restricting the influence of the Egyptian forces' return to Sudanese territory. This fact was later revealed in confidential British documents and was sensed by the Egyptian papers.
Most of these papers expressed their concern over the delay in implementing the treaty's clause pertaining to the return of the Egyptian army to Sudan, a delay that had surpassed one year. The papers loyal to the government interpreted the delay as a result of the difficulty of immediately sending sections of the Egyptian forces at a time when Italian forces were amassing on Egypt's western border.
Other newspapers wrote that the matter should not be limited to a symbolic return of Egyptian forces merely to stay in their barracks, but that it rather necessitated a reinstatement of the status quo prior to their ousting in 1924. This measure would require firstly dissolving the Sudan Defence Force and reintegrating it into the returning Egyptian army. It would also necessitate cutting off the LE750,000 worth of assistance the Ziwar government had approved for this force given that it would be dissolved.
Yet it appears that in Egypt at that time matters were developing in favour of British policies in that the Egyptian forces' return to Sudan would be honorary more than functional despite the wish of many Egyptians to restore the situation prior to 1924. The British had learnt their lesson from the outcome of integrating Egyptians and Sudanese in a unified military force and were not prepared to be burnt once again.
Matters continued to develop in a manner beneficial to London's policy. A multifaceted conflict flared up between the Wafdist government and Abdeen palace and the Nahhas government showed leniency with the conditions for the return of Egyptian forces to Sudan. In the view of the London government, the treaty's paragraphs related to Sudan charged the governor general with "looking into the number of soldiers required" without providing any rights to the Egyptian government.
It is therefore no surprise that in the following weeks Al-Ahram 's coverage of the Egyptian forces' return to Sudan took on more of a celebratory rather than practical tone.
On the front page of the 3 December 1937 issue was a large photograph under the headline, "Upon the return of the Egyptian army to Sudan -- dispatching two officers and 20 soldiers to undertake preparatory measures -- an important meeting at the prompting of the commander of the British forces." The photograph pictured the minister of the military Hamdi Seif El-Nasr Pasha, the cabinet deputy Ibrahim Kheiri Pasha, and the officer who had been appointed to command the Egyptian forces heading to Sudan, Admiral Ahmed Attiya Bey, in addition to the commander of the seventh battalion, which was preparing to travel to the south, Commander Muhammad Mandour Bey, and Lieutenant Muhammad Neguib Effendi.
A news item published in another Sudanese newspaper which had close ties to government circles in Khartoum noted that there was an intention to distribute the Egyptian forces returning to Sudan between the majority (three blocs) to remain in Port Sudan and the minority (two blocs), which would go to Khartoum. This confirmed earlier Egyptian fears that most of the Egyptian forces would remain on the margins, distanced from the centre of influence at the capital.
Despite this, an air of celebration continued to surround the departure of Egyptian forces. Splendid farewell parties were thrown each time some of the forces travelled to the south, no matter how few. These festivities spread their celebratory contagion to Sudan whenever a branch of the army arrived, again, no matter how small. These celebrations reached their peak when five training planes at EgyptAir flew to Khartoum in early December to add to the auspiciousness of the occasion.
Through studied British policies and changed circumstances due to the English administration's encouragement of the separatist movement in the southern valley following the appearance of the Umma Party and some loyalist groups, some Sudanese viewed the Egyptian presence in the capital and in Port Sudan not as a symbol of the "unity of the Nile Valley" but rather a symbol of Egyptian colonialism. Unfortunately this sense was shored up by the policies of some Egyptian circles, and thus the return of those forces to southern territory was "lacklustre" indeed.