That the course of the current dispute over Nile water should have come as such a surprise to Egypt points to a major part of the problem, writes Abdel-Moneim Said Whether we look at Egypt as the gift of the Nile, or as the gift of the Egyptians who created a great civilisation along the banks of that river, peril looms over our historic water source. After millennia of the certainty that its abundant waters would flow freely from source to mouth, we were jolted awake by a clamouring to alter the laws and treaties of 1902, 1929 and 1959, which codified customs and conventions that stretch back thousands of years. The tremors erupted during a recent meeting to conclude a framework cooperation agreement between the Nile Basin countries. Evidently, the proceedings fell apart when upstream countries insisted on adding a paragraph stipulating their right to undertake construction projects on the Nile without obtaining the approval of downstream states, and without consideration of Egypt's historic rights. The upstream countries' insistence on this paragraph prevented the "cooperation" agreement from seeing the light of day. It further generated a climate of confusion and suspicion, compelling one to wonder who, or what, had brought us to the brink of an agreement only for it to dissolve into acrimony and tension. Egypt, in addition to pressing its historic rights, applied two other approaches to the question. The first was to handle it, from beginning to end, as a purely legal matter. We summoned the established treaties and agreements, and pored over the volumes of international treaties and conventions pertaining to international maritime and watercourse rights in order to gather supporting evidence. Efforts in this direction were enthusiastically supported by that school in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is infatuated with international law and believes that the world, like individual nations, should be subject to the rule of law. Disciples of this school have a passion for juristic sparring, and when the Nile waters issue erupted their extensive legal arguments called to mind the marathon debates that arose over the interpretation of the various articles of UN Resolution 242, which has governed Arab-Israeli negotiations since 1967. However, the problem with the legal approach was not in substantiating rights but in the fact that it cast them in such a solid casing of justice and lucidity that one could only be dumbfounded by the continued disparity of opinion among the Nile Basin nations. When it became apparent that clarity and justice were not sufficient to settle the question, we shifted to a second approach, almost antithetical to the first. The economic approach, which speaks in the practical language of economic interests, seemed like a quick way out of a dead end. But, looking back on the meat deal with Ethiopia and similar agreements with other nations, it became apparent that if we had only paid more attention to following-through and expanding on arrangements for closer cooperation with, and assistance to, our brothers and colleagues upriver, we would not be facing the current situation. It is a truism of international relations, after all, that the more closely countries are bound in relations of mutual dependence the less likelihood there is of any clash, and the greater the efforts and patience they will bring to bear in ironing out difficulties that do arise between them. While historic rights and legal testimony enabled us to point the finger at other Nile Basin countries, the economic approach placed the blame squarely on ourselves for not having been magnanimous enough with the countries upriver and for having come to this realisation too late. There was nothing wrong with these approaches, per se, apart from the fact that, as important as they were, they were not commensurate to the demands of a situation that had grown exceedingly complex over the course of successive meetings in Alexandria, Sharm El-Sheikh and various African capitals. Fearful, perhaps, that Egypt had not explored a fully rounded approach some espoused a fourth avenue, one that has always had the power to absolve Egypt of blame. They pointed the finger at Israel and the US, or at unnamed insidious outside powers. The argument ran along the following lines: Egypt's latent strength strikes such fear into the hearts of the great powers that they resolved to keep Egypt so preoccupied with a life-and-death matter that it will not have a moment to think about developing its dreaded power. It goes without saying that Israeli tentacles are everywhere, turning Nile Basin countries against Egypt in order to prevent it from pitting its full force behind the Palestinian people and their struggle to attain their legitimate rights. One might find it ironic that the majority of those who subscribe to this approach believe that Egypt has not been doing very much for the Palestinian cause to begin with. But when has thinking had to be consistent in Egypt? Historic rights, and the legalistic, economic and foreign strings arguments, have one element in common -- the complete absence of the other side. They do not allow for the possibility that the countries on the other side might have a history or legal arguments of their own, a view on mutual economic interests, or even a word to say on how closely they are connected to world powers to the West or East. There is no evidence, whatsoever, of any awareness that these countries have developed politically, economically and demographically or an acknowledgement of the fact that they may have economic initiatives worthy of noting and that they have their own assessments of regional and international affairs which shape their regional and international alliances. Egypt's approaches betray a contradictory view of the international community, which laid down the international laws we cherish and which also furnishes grants, aid and loans. On the one hand we accuse it of involvement in some kind of conspiracy. On the other, we see it as the key to the solution, because fulfilment of the condition of not supplying funds (whether in the form of loans or aid) for hydraulic projects on the Nile (or on any other river for that matter) is contingent upon the will and money of donor nations. More importantly, no one has had the courage to reassess our foreign policy with an eye to unearthing the causes of the surprise that landed so abruptly on our heads. I would suggest that the root of the problem stems from an imbalance in our foreign policy outlook in favour of the Arab Levant. We are feeling the repercussions of this lop-sided approach not only on our vital interests in the Nile Basin but across the whole of Africa. It is not as if there were no warning signs. We failed to heed them, ever confident in our ability to move with equal competence on multiple fronts without taking into account the relationship between our national capacities and the goals we are striving to achieve. Frequently, the language of Arab nationalism and the endless disasters of the Levant combined to propel our foreign policy decision- making agencies into pouring the bulk of their efforts and limited resources eastwards. Clearly, there needs to be a complete revision of our policies towards the Nile Basin countries and a reassessment of where they stand in our general foreign policy outlook. The dangers to us on that front begin right at our southern border with Sudan, extending southwards towards the sources of the Nile and the Great Lakes region, and horizontally, from Chad to the Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandab and the Indian Ocean. The review process needs to tap the best intellects in our foreign policy and national security agencies, and in those organisations connected with irrigation and other relevant institutions. Nor would it do any harm to continually consult with our friends and allies. Outside opinions may help us arrive at a more balanced and objective assessment. Domestic din, after all, is often misleading. Only recently, it has misled us twice, once into believing that the Nile Basin countries could not sign an agreement without Egypt's approval, and to suppose that the International Football Federation would rule in our favour in our dispute with Algeria. We were wrong on both counts. Upriver riparian countries signed an agreement of a different sort to the one we had in mind and FIFA ended up penalising us, not Algeria. Both instances compel us to examine ourselves before others as we attempt to sort out what happened. On the Nile question, the starting point is to solicit the views of others. Others may possess vital information that we lack on the nine upper Nilotic nations, each of which has a set of characteristics and situations that we need to consider when handling not only the question of water but a broader based partnership in development. As a whole, these countries are not only extremely poor but are contending with huge population growth rates. According to some estimates Ethiopia -- the most important of these countries and the source of 85 per cent of the water that reaches Egypt -- now has a population of over 85 million, making it the second most populous country in Africa after Nigeria. When we add to this the climate changes that are driving people from draught-stricken areas, where agriculture depends on rainfall, to irrigated agricultural areas, we can sense the urgency of revising our understanding of the issue in a way that takes into account others' needs as well as our own. In short, we need a new Egyptian vision for the Nile. It should seek to establish new foundations for relations between the lower riparian nations -- Egypt and Sudan -- and upper riparian nations, based not only on the division of Nile waters but also on joint development projects, increased trade and higher investment levels. Such a vision would work towards the depoliticisation of water by not reducing relations between the Nile Basin countries to the level of water quotas. It would further promote the notion of partnership in our interaction with these nations, thereby ensuring that these relations enjoy their appropriate level of importance and attention within the greater scheme of Egypt's foreign relations. I have no doubt Egyptian arguments will be more persuasive in this context than if they are formulated within a framework of political, legal or carrot-and- stick confrontations. Of the 1,650 billion cubic metres of water that originate annually from the upper riparian nations only 55.5 billion cubic metres reach Egypt. This is the quota that was set down in the 1959 Nile waters agreement and that Egypt is increasingly determined to retain in view of expectations of a possible water shortage. A 2009 report issued by the Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Centre predicted a deficit in Egyptian water resources by 2017, forecasting that Egypt's total available water resources will have shrunk to 71.4 billion cubic metres while its annual rate of water consumption will have reached 86.2 billion cubic metres. The report also predicts a decline in the annual per capita share of water to 582 cubic metres in 2025, as opposed to 860 cubic metres in 2003, and, 1,138 cubic metres in 1986. In addition, according to the report, whereas the 55.5 billion cubic metres of Nile water that reaches Egypt per year accounted for 86.7 per cent of our available water resources, this ratio is expected to drop to 80.5 per cent by 2017. Egypt's word will carry more weight among Nile Basin countries, and those elsewhere, if we backed the case for our water quota with an intensive drive to better regulate our water use and consumption, and searched for alternative sources of water, whether through recycling processes or desalinisation. Egypt needs to step up such efforts regardless of whether or not we manage to convince upriver countries of our continued right to the quota stipulated in previous agreements, and regardless of whether or not we succeed in launching cooperative hydraulic projects aimed at increasing the amounts of water available to all Nile Basin countries. Egypt's current rate of population growth and its developmental aspirations dictate that it will need more water than is available at present. If we are to meet our future water needs we must formulate a carefully considered scheme that combines the search for new water resources with measures for preserving our current resources and using them more wisely. Handling our water resources is a complex, multifaceted question. At one level it depends on our own efforts, at another it is contingent upon our relations with other Nile Basin countries, and at a third level is contingent upon those powers that have a say in all global issues. When faced with such intricate problems, the best approach is to think them through quietly and carefully, restraining as much as possible those fits of passion and knee-jerk reactions that more often than not prove counterproductive. Perhaps the next step forward is to set into motion a comprehensive drive, steered by a presidential water resources commission, charged with mobilising the necessary human and material resources. The time for political sloganeering and intellectual theorising has surely ended. Now the experts must get to work.
