Following a historic accord struck between Hizbullah and Lebanon's Christians, Michel Aoun speaks to Omayma Abdel-Latif about the new moment in Lebanese politics Following a historic accord struck between Hizbullah and Lebanon's Christians, Michel Aoun speaks to Omayma Abdel-Latif about the new moment in Lebanese politics The scene was unprecedented in the history of post-war Lebanon. Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hizbullah, traditionally Syria's long-time ally, shaking hands with Michel Aoun, Syria's arch enemy for almost 15 years and who championed a war from his position in exile in France against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Mar Mekhayel Church in Haret Hureek, originally the birthplace of Aoun and the Shia heartland in Beirut played host to the signing of what came to be known as "a declaration of understanding", a document comprised of 10 points which tackled the most ticklish issues in today's Lebanese politics, from Hizbullah's arms to the relationship with Syria, passing through the efforts to bring back the Lebanese state and put an end to political corruption. Many analysts described the event as "a political coup", from a historical point of view. An "earthquake", suggested others, which shattered the political traditions in Lebanese politics of organising along sectarian lines. It also came at a time when sectarian tension is at an all time high. It was the latest in a string of events unleashed by Aoun's homecoming from exile last May. The general's return has been received with mixed reactions from varied political forces. Despite attempts by opposition forces then to isolate Aoun and marginalise his contribution in the political process, Aoun remained a key player in the reshaping of the political landscape following the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. His landslide victory in the parliamentary elections -- he leads a bloc of 21 seats -- anointed him and his movement the Free Patriotic Movement ( Tayyar ) as representing the Christian street par excellence. Although Aoun boasts that 20 per cent of his constituency are Muslims, yet many believe that the significance of his return lies in the fact that he has been crowned as the leader of Lebanon's Christians. A year after Rafik Al-Hariri's assassination, and as Lebanon stands at a historic juncture, Aoun is one of the few Lebanese politicians who read events well, as proven by his deal with Nasrallah; that both have a constituency that cannot be ignored by the 14 March team which rule Lebanon today. At his office in Al-Rabiya, Aoun spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly about the current political situation and implications of the deal with Hizbullah on the future of the political process in Lebanon. How do you assess the situation a year after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri? No doubt Al-Hariri's assassination has been a catalyst accelerating efforts towards the implementation of Resolution 1559 in respect to the Syrian withdrawal. It also led to my homecoming after years in exile and the release of Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese militia. Holding the parliamentary elections was yet another important development but it exposed the acute political crisis the country was facing when the political elite failed to establish a new elections law. This meant that the election results did not reflect correctly the present political scene. This distortion was also present in the composition of the new government and parliament. In the meantime, we have witnessed a surge in the role played by the media in inciting hatred and sectarian tension in a way that goes against a basic code of ethics. Do you think the high levels of sectarian tension can lead to civil war in Lebanon? There are wise men in Lebanon today who remain in control of the situation. I don't think there is a will to initiate sectarian strife. I believe that those who control the situation on the ground don't want to have war, and those who have the will to start a war don't have the power to do so. They keep the levels of tension high through fiery discourses but they cannot change the situation on the ground because those able to start a war don't want it. Do you mean Hizbullah and your Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)? I cannot comment on this. You said that the current composition of parliament does not reflect the true weight of political forces on the ground; so you agree with Nasrallah's description of the majority which is in power as a "false majority"? We can explain this through the number of votes each of the three political forces that comprise the bulk of the assembly gained during elections. There are now three axes within the assembly: Al-Mustaqbal and its allies which has 72 seats -- it has gained the third of the votes; the second is the Hizbullah-Amal axis, and it also gained a third of the votes with 34 seats; and the third is the FPM and its allies, and it also got the last third of the votes with 21 seats. In terms of numbers, Hizbullah and FPM both represent one third of the assembly, but in reality they became the majority thanks to the number of seats. Seven months after the opposition came to power how do you read their performance, particularly regarding the security situation? Their political discourse shows that they run the affairs of the country in an amateurish way. They were made politicians under the gaze of the Syrians. Today they have proved a disastrous failure in handling security in Lebanon, particularly in such a volatile situation as that following the Syrian withdrawal. They lack the technical abilities and the leadership to run a proper security establishment. Do you believe that the situation will escalate under this government? Yes, things are only getting worse. In your view, why is there fear among some Lebanese politicians of Arab mediation between Syria and Lebanon? Those who fear mediation efforts think that there is something that they will lose if Arab mediation takes place. But the irony is that the majority that is in power is the one that is rejecting any efforts for mediation sponsored by Arab parties. This is why, when the situation in Lebanon came to a standstill, I took the initiative and called for national dialogue among different political groups and put all the issues on the table. When no one responded to our call, we opted for a bilateral dialogue with Hizbullah, and we reached an understanding on nearly all the controversial issues. What needs to be done for this declaration to see light on the ground? Both Hizbullah and the FPM cannot achieve all the points mentioned on their own. There is an important role for the state. We only put forward a draft paper in which we offered our views regarding key controversial issues, and the ways in which they can be approached and resolved. Government partnership is vital. We only established the framework. What is important is the significance of the deal where two major powers in the country have opted for dialogue and reached an agreement over the most sensitive of issues. Do you expect other political forces, like the Future bloc ( Tayyar Al-Mustaqbal), will join forces with FPM and Hizbullah? The problem with the Future bloc is that there are two types of discourses; the political discourse that is flexible and the media discourse that incites hatred and is the more powerful on the ground. You say that the government is essential. Do you think that the issue of Hizbullah's decommissioning is one such issue where you will need the partnership of the ruling powers? We have offered our understanding of how the issue of Hizbullah arms should be tackled. We have put conditions on the context in which Hizbullah arms should be used in defence of the Lebanese land and until the Shebaa Farms are liberated. But signals coming lately from the government are perplexing. Some, like Jumblatt, call for disarmament and accuse Hizbullah of being a Syrian or an Iranian agent, while others have a different line. Let them dare ask Hizbullah to decommission. I don't think this is a proper way to deal with Hizbullah. We are one people; they are citizens of this land as much as we are. They have made sacrifices to liberate the south and their resistance was legitimate and holistic. These are the same people we are dealing with today and who said they want to keep their arms forever. Our mission is not to destroy Hizbullah but to allow it to enter the political process to achieve the goals for which it took up arms. I believe that Hizbullah's leadership has flexibility and there is a will to transform. Walid Jumblatt insists that Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese territory and that they are being used as a pretext by Hizbullah to keep its arms. What will be the fate of the joint FPM-Hizbullah declaration in light of such comments? Jumblatt's map is of no use. There are maps that show the farms in Lebanon and there are others that show them belonging to Syria. There are ownership documents which were issued from the Lebanese authorities and land ownership is the only arbiter to decide where sovereignty lies. A recent statement by the 14 March team -- an allusion to the Hariri-Jumblatt-Geagea axis -- clearly stated that the national consensus over Hizbullah's arms has eroded. What is your comment? Yes, the national consensus might be like before, but resistance arms are tied with the liberation of Shebaa Farms, the release of all Lebanese prisoners and the issue of Palestinian arms outside the camps. These issues are all related. We cannot ask a Lebanese group to put down its arms while Palestinian groups remain armed. In other words, it is only natural that you set some priorities before getting down to Hizbullah's arms. Who deals with the larger issue of defending Lebanon's national security against ongoing Israeli violations? This should be the strategy of the state; and when there is first a clear strategy as to how the state will protect national interests against such violations we would reach the final stage where Hizbullah decommissions or integrates within the national defence mechanism of the state. To what extent was there a consensus inside the FPM over the deal with Hizbullah? Some say that prospects of such a deal angered a number of your constituency? It took us six months of intense discussions to reach that level of understanding with Hizbullah. Every word is carefully chosen. In the end, when the FPM and Hizbullah reach an agreement it is not about who made concessions more than whom. It is Lebanon that truly wins. We might indeed have lost some of our undecided or neutral sympathisers, but we have definitely gained more -- particularly amongst Lebanese Muslims. We know that FPM popularity skyrocketed in Akar, for example, where there is a dominant Sunni constituency. We wanted to be forces of stability in the country. US officials expressed concern over your deal with Hizbullah. The US ambassador visited you. Did you discuss the issue with him? We explained a few points. We also explained that this deal is not against any party but rather an effort to start a dialogue amongst ourselves. Do you consider it to be a new Taif agreement? I cannot say it is a new Taif because there is no contradiction between our agreement and Taif. On the contrary, it sought to resolve some of the issues that were left unresolved in Taif.
