In Focus: Dressing up old plans The Israeli leadership is no more bent on peace than it has ever been, writes Galal Nassar Acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has said setting the final boundaries of Israel is the "most important" mission of his government. Like his mentor, Ariel Sharon, who remains in a coma from which he may never recover, Olmert believes that Israel's final boundaries must include Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and both East and West Jerusalem, occupied in 1967 and 1948 respectively. He rejects out of hand Palestinian refugees' right to return. Bringing this mission into effect thus entails imposing unilateral solutions to what the architects of Oslo had identified as final status issues -- permanent political boundaries, the dismantling of Jewish settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the rights of Palestinian refugees. One would be hard pushed to find any differences between Olmert's plan, unveiled a few days ago, and the proposal he made in November 2003 in which he called for Israel to withdraw from some occupied territories so as to create a de facto partition of the land that would leave Palestinians with 20 per cent of historic Palestine. Three months before that, in August 2003, Olmert had hinted that Israel might attempt to assassinate president Yasser Arafat. It appears that the acting prime minister shared the currently comatose prime minister's obsession with the late Palestinian leader as the primary obstacle to the fulfilment of his designs. That Olmert should speak so magnanimously of great "concessions" on the part of Eretz Israel should come as little surprise. It is the borders of biblical Israel, which long served as a clarion call for Zionism's aggressive expansionism, that today constitute the reference for Israeli "concessions" rather than any contemporary instruments of international legitimacy such as the roadmap, drained of any content by Tel Aviv's 13 reservations, let alone the UN resolution of 1948 calling for the creation of two states. If Olmert's talk of "concessions" has succeeded in pulling the wool over Western eyes, one can only hope that Arabs do not allow themselves to believe that he is any more flexible than Sharon. Olmert is implementing Sharon's plans to the letter. These plans are a masterful sleight of hand which Israel, along with Washington and the Western media, will bill as Olmert's gift to Arabs and world peace. Olmert appears to be working to offset the results of the Palestinian legislative elections. He knows that the Palestinians with whom he will be negotiating will be very different from their predecessors, who were weak and unable to stand up to Israeli negotiators convinced that might meant right. The next Palestinian negotiators are going to reflect the new Palestinian legislature and government, both of which will embody the Palestinian people's anger and frustration at Israeli policies and an inequitable peace process. Olmert knows this and is attempting to rally international opinion to his side so as to be in a position to pounce before the Palestinians even have a chance to put their cards in order. And if this stratagem tells us anything it is that the Israeli leadership is no more bent on peace than it has ever been. From the broad outlines of the Olmert plan, and other available information, it is obvious that even if he appears prepared to offer more territorial "concessions" than Sharon, Olmert has no intention of withdrawing to pre-June 1967 borders within the framework of a comprehensive peace with the Arabs. Similarly, he has no intention of dismantling the racist separating wall, even if he has suggested he will make a few adjustments to its course. Much, too, has been made of his appeal for economic cooperation with the Palestinians and international support for the creation of industrial and transit zones linking Gaza and the West Bank, though there is little new in these ideas. There is, too, the question of whether Olmert will continue to subscribe to these positions in the event that he is sworn in as the next Israeli prime minister. Certainly, he will be under considerable pressure, both from adversaries within his own party and from the opposition parties, Likud in particular. They will be seeking to capitalise on any slight miscalculation he might make in dealing with Israel's new political landscape, and specifically the growing influence of Palestinians in the Israeli electorate. According to the latest census there are now 1.3 million Arab Israelis, representing 19 per cent of the Israeli population. Already there is considerable anxiety inside Israel over what is commonly referred to as the demographic "bomb". That there is currently a move to create a united Arab list in order to lure Arab votes away from the Zionist parties, as well as talk of an Arab "lobby" in the Knesset, as suggested by the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality MK Mohamed Baraka, has increased these anxieties. It is not difficult to imagine Olmert manoeuvring in such a way as to minimise the influence of Arab Israelis in the Knesset, if not actively campaigning for a maximum quota of Arab representatives. In so doing, he would be acting in a way consistent with the essentially racist attitude Israel has adopted towards the Arabs of '48 since the inception of the state. Given Olmert's conservative credentials he can hardly be expected to depart from the herd. He will do his utmost to promote the Zionist enterprise in the region to the detriment of Arab rights and everything that bears an Arab stamp, including those Arabs in Israel who have Israeli nationality.
