Three years on, Iraq, argues Abbas Kadhim*, has become the model of what not to do Three years ago, a coalition of mainly American and British forces made its way into Iraq along the same path of previous invasions, the south. Once again, the Shia were subjected to the hard test of a three-fold dilemma. While they did not want to die defending Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime, they were not very excited about the prospects of the imminent Anglo-American invasion of their land. The third dimension of their quandary was inspired by their 1991 experience with broken American promises, for which they paid the heaviest price among other Iraqis. Unlike the Kurds who were given a safe enclave in the north, the Shia were thrown to the wolves with complete indifference. This time around, American affirmations, pronounced by yet another George Bush, were shrugged off. The march through Iraq was not a "cake-walk" as self-appointed Iraqi opposition leaders with nominal affiliation with the country and a cursory knowledge of the real Shia sentiments prophesied. Shocked and awed by the malfunction of their own "shock and awe" strategy, many supporters of invading Iraq jumped out of the sinking ship leaving the Bush administration scrambling for any ideas to contain a situation that was clearly spinning out of control. Adding insult to injury, months of rigorous and quite expensive search throughout the country turned no weapons of mass destruction and aside from some retired trouble- makers, there was evidence pertaining to real links between regime and any anti-American terrorism. Indeed, the open-border policy in the first months following the invasion turned Iraq into a nest of what may as well be a chronic problem for many decades to come. The collapse of the two selling excuses for the invasion of Iraq that would fit the adventure in the larger context of the "global war on terror" forced the administration to find a reason outside the original framework of the ante-bellum period. In preparation for declaring Iraq a WMD-free country, the administration reduced any mention of them in favour of the ever- increasing oratory concerning the democratisation of Iraq in order for it to serve as a model for the entire region, which was going to catch the virus of democracy from Bahrain to Morocco. Indeed, this might be a viable theory if not for the clumsy planning and catastrophically incompetent management of Iraq ever since the country was invaded in 2003. Instead of serving as a shining model for democratic transition, Iraq has become a model of what not to do. On the political front, and after a very rough start with 14 months of occupation ending in a partial transfer of certain responsibilities to an appointed and by all measures a very corrupt government, Iraq had three elections, including a referendum on the constitution. But the actual effects of these elections fell short of achieving anything even remotely close to the level of the expectations of Iraqi voters. After more than two months of negotiations following the January 2005 elections, the new government came as a concoction politicians recycled from the old governing bodies according to a formula unrelated to the results of the elections. A paralysed assembly was also seated for the sole purpose of drafting a constitution, which they presented in an incomplete form to meet the strict deadline imposed on them by the transitional administrative law, among other external considerations. A semi-final draft was published and distributed to the Iraqi people, with the food ration -- which was also missing some essential items of its own. Just before the referendum was scheduled to take place, a number of changes were added to avoid a veto by three governorates. It is unclear whether the Iraqi people actually voted for the current constitution, because the adopted version is different than the one distributed to them. As to the third elections, it remains to be seen, what sort of a mockery is going to come out of the negotiations currently underway. More than three and a half months have passed by and no government has yet been formed. On the security level, Iraq has moved from one of the safest countries to a completely lawless place. It is impossible to believe that such lawlessness is attributable to the lack of capacity on the part of the forces on the ground. Indeed, one must take it as an insult to the American troops and their allies, including the Iraqi forces to say that they are unable to provide a bare minimum of security level in the country. The problem must indeed be attributed to the lack of will. Iraqi ministers of defence and interior have both said publicly and honestly that they are not allowed to do their job in order not to "disturb" the political process. In other words, security is being placed as a lower priority than the already dysfunctional political process with the Iraqi on the street paying the ultimate price. Services, too, continue to be a nightmare for every Iraqi. Sitting on a sea of oil, Iraqis are unable to heat their homes, find cooking gas or fill their cars with fuel. Many Iraqis go through the trash for food or stand in humiliating long lines to receive $100 per family every three months while Iraqi oil is stolen by militias and politicians to be sold in the black market. With no metres installed -- and this is a story in its own right -- one may only guess how much oil is being exploited on a daily basis and what kind of corruption is involved. What hope remains for Iraq in any success if the Iraqis and the Americans claim that it is hard to stop ships loaded with stolen oil sailing off from Basra? The electricity is another chronic problem for Iraqis. The service now runs approximately three hours a day for most Iraqis. It is estimated that Iraqis will not have full-day electricity any time in the foreseeable future. It would take more than $25 billion to provide adequate service through this essential field of service. The rest of reconstruction efforts are in no better shape than electricity, all wrapped in corruption, incompetence and negligence. For Iraq to recover, three changes must take place. First, problems relevant to security and services must be considered as important as the political process. The lessons from Hurricane Katrina clearly indicate that democracy is meaningless without security and basic services. Iraqis have lived in Katrina conditions for too long and no political process is going to impress them so long as their daily life remains unchanged. Second, financial corruption and lack of accountability have to be treated immediately before any further steps in this ailing process. The current policy of rewarding dishonesty and incompetence will lead to an imminent catastrophic end. And finally, there must be an immediate effort to address the economic deterioration of the country. This may not be done by granting victory to fundamentalist ideologies, like the implementation of sweeping privatisation, but multi-phased plan taking into consideration both the current conditions and needs in the country as well as the realistic potential of the Iraqi economy at each following stage. * The writer is an Iraqi academic based in the US.
