Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have announced there will be no military operations in Idlib in northwest Syria for the time being, agreeing during their meeting at the Russian resort of Sochi on 17 September to create a “demilitarised zone” in the area by 15 October under the supervision of the two countries. The Russian-Turkish agreement comes after two significant events that likely influenced Russia's decision to prevent the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad from launching an all-out war on Idlib. First, there was the failure of the three-way summit between the leaders of Russia, Iran and Turkey on 7 September, which revealed deep differences in outlook among the three countries. It also showed Turkey's defiance of Russia by refusing to countenance a war in Idlib, which it sees as an extension of Turkey's national security. Second, the demonstrations in Idlib and its suburbs by one million Syrians did not raise the banners of the armed groups, but only the flag of the Syrian opposition. The protestors demanded that the international community stop the regime from attacking the province where three million civilians are located. These were moderate civilian demonstrators without any trace of fundamentalist Islam, and they showed a cohesive community in the city that embraces the opposition. Military operations there would be long, difficult and costly for everyone, including the regime and Russia. The announcement by Putin and Erdogan that they will create a buffer zone in Idlib signaled that there will not be a brutal war, at least for the time being. It could even be a turning point for the military and political scene in Syria and for the regional and international players involved. Developments did not go according to the will of Russia or the regime. Northern Syria is different from the south, where Jordan quickly abandoned opposition fighters because its interests would not be impacted if the area returned to the control of the Syrian regime. In the north, however, Turkey is adamant about supporting the armed opposition in northwest Syria because if the opposition is defeated there, this will expose Turkey to a separatist scheme by the Syrian Kurds and the regime's goal of regaining its control of all Syrian territory at any cost. Idlib, considered the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition, is now a thorn in Russia's side that cannot be transformed into an area friendly to the regime for at least three reasons. First, the Russians felt they would become entangled in an imbroglio if they attacked three million people, including 40,000 combatants with their families displaced from across Syria. These combatants have refused to sign a truce with Russia because they believe Moscow is an untrustworthy guarantor, as witnessed in Ghouta and Deraa where Russia reneged on agreements with armed factions after disarming them. The areas were handed over to the Syrian regime and its security agencies, which then broke promises made by Russia. Second, Russia failed to convince Turkey to abandon this strategically sensitive area that was part of the de-escalation agreement signed by Russia and guaranteed by Turkey and Iran at the end of 2017. Having Turkey as its neighbour protected Idlib, and it is still preventing pressure by Russia and Iran, which have done their best to create pretexts to invade the province. Third, Russia failed to convince the West to join its “war on terrorism” against radical groups in the area, since the West wants more specific information first. Erdogan promised to tame these factions either by convincing them to disarm voluntarily, or by transforming them into political forces, or by fighting them using Turkish-backed opposition groups and the Turkish army. Although there is now no all-out war on Idlib, this does not mean local military operations will halt. Turkish forces will likely carry out attacks, perhaps with Russian cooperation, targeting the Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group (Liberation of Levant Organisation), formerly known as the Al-Nusra Front, to eliminate it from the province. The Russians would agree because this would rid them of a threat against the Hmeimem airbase, which is intermittently attacked by HTS drones. HTS is also classified as a terrorist group by the US. After experiencing the ravages of war and to protect their city, Idlib residents and local groups have organised themselves without involving the armed factions. This has negated Russian claims about the terrorist presence in Idlib, as seen in the one million-strong march praised by the political Syrian opposition. Idlib is now the only cradle of the Syrian Revolution and the focus of the regional and international parties. Russia and the regime are determined to regain control of it because they believe this would extinguish the revolution. However, military force will not resolve the situation, and there will be no victor even if the territory is taken by force. Resolving the crisis in Syria can only be through a political process that satisfies all the parties and guarantees the political transition. Turkey's hardline position in protecting Idlib is similar to Europe's in that it sees the conflict in Idlib as a civilian one, requiring it to protect civilians from the ravages of war. This position was made clear during the Security Council session on 11 September. The Syrian opposition believes Idlib will be a turning point for the Syrian Revolution and the start of political changes based on international resolutions. The issue of the armed factions is complicated, and there is a clear antagonism between civilians and combatants in Idlib since the Islamist ideology of the armed groups restricts civilian activism that does not serve their strategy and goals. The opposition is worried that the civilian nature of the protests in Idlib will not resound with the global players, or generate meaningful support, unless the protesters acquiesce in international interests holding important positions in Syria and representing political, economic and strategic subordination to the major players. The “hot and cold” pendulum of war / no war in Idlib is due to international dynamics and has nothing to do with the balance of power inside Syria. The opposition wants to focus the attention of the world on Russia's threat to millions of civilians in Idlib. It calls on the armed opposition to speak with a softer voice while hiding a larger stick behind its back.
