Last Thursday French President François Hollande announced that he would not seek a second presidential term and that he would not be standing in next year's French presidential elections. This was anything but a thunderclap in a serene sky. The president probably realised he would lose the Socialist Party primary and wanted to avoid this humiliation, which would also be a terrible blow for the prestige of the “elected monarchy” of the French presidency. Moreover, for different reasons he has become increasingly isolated, with very few supporters in the French Socialist Party. Hollande's relations with the party reached a staggering new low when two journalists published a book last October entitled “A President Should Not Say Such Things” based on 60 hours of in-depth interviews with the head of state. The book was supposed to be a defence of the Hollande's first term in office and an unveiling of the inner workings of his team. But the media rightly focused on what Hollande had to say about some of his colleagues, about the state of the judiciary, about sports stars in France and so on. The book was a public relations disaster, and it deprived the president of some of his key supporters, notably Claude Bartolone, the head of the French National Assembly, who had been a staunch supporter and who has started supporting the idea of a presidential bid by French Prime Minister Manuel Valls. Everybody, including myself, thought the nomination of François Fillon as the right's presidential candidate was an unexpected window of opportunity for the president, as many centrists have problems with Fillon's programme. But Hollande read the result differently, and I now think he was right in being struck by former president Nicolas Sarkozy's humiliating defeat in the primary elections. He knew that many French people were fed up with the last two presidents and wanted other figures to compete. The voters had ousted Sarkozy, and now it was probably his turn. According to the conventional wisdom, those who know Hollande say he is a likeable person, that he is funny, and that he has a deep knowledge of the French political map. He is subtle, intelligent and a hard-worker. Before his election as president, we were told his main problem was his tendency to seek compromises and his hesitation. He was unable to act decisively, it was said. He lacked “leadership” and had been a terrible general secretary of the French Socialist Party. His behaviour on security issues and foreign policy since has belied this diagnosis. He has often acted decisively and wisely, and his crisis management deserves high marks. On economic and social issues, however, the negative description was an understatement. One Socialist Party figure told me that Hollande was “the best political commentator in the world” but that he was not a leader. He has not been helped by his party, however, and Hollande's presidency has been poisoned by a small but vociferous minority of Socialist Party leaders and MPs who have kept on criticising his decisions and behaving in a terrible way. They tried to table a motion of censure against their own government, for example, in which they narrowly failed. They invoked the Socialist Party ideals and the left-wing programme presented to the French electorate in 2012 in order to keep harassing the president and his team who had to deal with economic realities and felt compelled to adopt a more business friendly attitude. The commentators were stunned by Hollande's tolerance of such behaviour. The French Socialist Party also imposed the organisation of a primary election in order to choose the Party's candidate in the presidential elections. In France, a primary that would include a president who was in office at the time was a novelty and a dangerous one, especially if the strong opposition to Hollande's policies is born in mind together with the childish behaviour of some French Socialists. Even if Hollande were to win the primary, he would have to endure a contest that would be prejudicial to his presidential status and his electoral chances. And then it turned out that he would probably lose it. The French Socialist Party, invented by the late French president François Mitterrand, is an association of very different lefts kept together by the iron hand of Mitterrand himself and by common challenges after 1995. These tensions explain Hollande's hesitations and his patience, as he fears an implosion of the party. However, his lack of authority has only deepened the rifts. He also promised he would not seek another term in office if he failed to reverse the unemployment curve while in his first one. This reversal has happened over recent months, but it has been too little, too late. During his first two years, the president lost precious time trying to accommodate his opposition in the Party and trying to abide by his own presidential programme. I see a parallel here with former US president Jimmy Carter. Both Carter and Hollande are highly intelligent men, and both have left behind them an above average legacy. But they were both unable to sell their policies to the electorate. The main reason was that they had to change track and to renege on their campaign promises while in office. Their respective electorates, not seeing immediate returns, were angry as a result. This anger further complicated their tasks, so they become yet more hesitant. The anger grew, forming a vicious circle that in Hollande's case underlined his personal weaknesses. He was unable to impose a closing of the ranks, he lacked authority, he often back-pedalled, and he tried out some things and then others, and so on. I think this lack of authority, this tolerance and these hesitations encouraged the ambitious people around him and his critics. Many French government ministers criticised their boss and their own government's policies. Instead of expelling them from the government, Hollande accepted this, and then they eventually resigned. His own protégé, the former finance minister Emmanuel Macron, resigned and decided to run for the presidency himself. Nobody would have dared to behave like this under Mitterrand. Worse, Macron has decided to snub the Socialist Party primary. He is running as an independent and is targeting segments of the population that like neither the left's nor the right's programmes. We should not put all the blame on Hollande's character, as there is also a cultural issue at stake. The left in France, thanks to its deep egalitarianism, has always had a problem with the quasi-monarchical powers of the French president: the only exception to this was Mitterrand, who grew up in a right-wing family. Some have even said that the French 1958 Constitution was originally designed to prevent a left-wing presidency, as the left's mentality is not tailored for such a job. The problem has become even more acute among the post-1968 generations in France: as one French political commentator has put it, the current leaders of the left in France “do not like vertical relations”. The writer is a professor of international relations at the Collège de France and a visiting professor at Cairo University.
