News of American cruise missile strikes on coastal radar sites in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen last week raised the spectre of an escalation in the Yemen conflict. The American strikes follow two attempted attacks on the USS Mason that were likely retaliatory strikes by the Houthis and their allies in response to the Saudi-led Coalition air strike on a mourning hall in Sanaa on 8 October that claimed at least 140 lives. While the mourning hall air strike has been widely viewed as a possible war crime, this has not prompted a serious review of US and UK support for the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen. These apparent double standards at a time when both the UK and US are accusing Russia of committing war crimes by targeting rebel-held districts of eastern Aleppo in Syria present an opportunity for Iranian diplomacy to take the initiative in Yemen. However, Iranian activity on the diplomatic front has been noticeably lacking, a symptom of broader Iranian apathy with respect to Yemen. This laissez-faire attitude is not without risk, particularly if the conflict continues to escalate. Until now, Iranian policy on the Yemen conflict can be characterised as high on rhetoric but low on decisive action. This was underscored by the Iranian reaction to the assault on the funeral procession in Sanaa. Leading the rhetorical charge, Ami Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the aerospace division of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, claimed that information, specifically the presence of multiple American spy planes over the skies of Yemen, pointed to American and Israeli involvement in the Saudi attack on the mourning hall. This type of rhetorical flourish inevitably lends credence to Saudi charges of Iranian sponsorship of the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen and specifically of allegations of the supply of arms by Tehran to the rebels. Lack of hard evidence notwithstanding, the Western media has largely accepted the Saudi narrative and universally describes the Houthi movement as either pro-Iranian or at least aligned with Iranian positions. But this narrative is fundamentally flawed on political, military and religio-cultural levels. For a start, the Yemen conflict is a complex civil war that broadly speaking pits an uneasy alliance of the Houthis and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh – and by extension much of the Yemeni military – against the embattled government of current President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and a collection of tribal and Islamist militias led by the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. On a military level, the naval blockade of Yemen makes it extremely difficult for Iran to supply the Houthi-Saleh alliance, if a decision to that effect were to be made in Tehran. In any case, Yemen is awash with weapons, and the Houthi-Saleh alliance has no need of Iranian small arms. But the rebels would be interested in air-defence systems that could challenge Saudi air supremacy over the skies of Yemen, or missiles that could reliably hit targets deep inside Saudi Arabia itself. While Iran possesses such systems, it is highly unlikely to supply them to protagonists in Yemen for fear of rapidly escalating the conflict. On a religious and cultural level there is neither a natural affinity, nor a longstanding historical connection between the Houthis (who are Zaidi Shias) and the dominant Twelver Shias of Iran. However, there is a loose ideological connection, in so far as the Houthis (who style themselves as the Ansar Allah Movement) identify with the grand political and ideological narrative of the Islamic Republic and its regional allies, as embodied by the so-called “Resistance Axis” of Iran, Syria and Hizbullah. As some analysts have pointed out Saudi Arabia's stubborn tactics during the Yemen conflict and its attendant propaganda campaign may ironically be propelling the Houthis and their allies toward Iran. On a military level, the clearest feature of the Saudi-led Coalition's 18-month aerial campaign in Yemen has been its inability to translate air supremacy into tangible and durable gains on the ground. Even the port city of Aden, the seat of the Hadi government, is not fully secure, as evidenced by regular terrorist attacks by extremist organisations, notably the Islamic State (IS) group. Without direct military assistance from the UK and US, or a commitment to deploy thousands of troops on the ground, Saudi Arabia cannot advance on the capital Sanaa, let alone conquer the Houthi heartlands of north Yemen. The prospect of a Saudi quagmire in Yemen presents an opportunity for Iran to fully engage with the crisis, not as an indirect protagonist, but as a key diplomatic player with the potential to foster a lasting political settlement. By preventing Saudi hegemony in Yemen, which would surely come to pass should forces loyal to Hadi prevail in the conflict, Iran could score important diplomatic and political points at the expense of the Riyadh and strengthen its influence in the region. However, should Iran decide to stick to its current passive approach, then the Islamic Republic not only stands to squander a strategic opportunity, but also to risk reputational damage by staying silent in the face of ever bolder Saudi provocation. Furthermore, conflict escalation may force an Iranian entry into the war if, for example, the Saudi-led Coalition, either by accident or design, targets nearby Iranian civilian or military assets. A confrontation of this sort almost came to pass in April 2015 when the Saudis bombed Sanaa airport to prevent Iranian planes from landing. By dedicating significantly more diplomatic resources to the Yemen crisis, Tehran could minimise the risk of escalation and in the process raise its political and diplomatic profile at the expense of Saudi Arabia. The writer is an analyst of Iranian politics and director of the research group Dysart Consulting.
