With every new crisis that the Egyptian government encounters voices clamour that our country is the target of an international conspiracy. Recently, the “conspiracy” din has been growing remarkably loud. It reached a new pitch in the wake of the heart-rending tragedy in which 66 people aboard an EgyptAir flight from Charles de Gaulle to Cairo crashed into the Mediterranean. The causes of this horrible incident are still unknown. Some attempts to explain it seem designed to drive a wedge between Egypt and France. Conspiracy theory devotees have rushed to draw a link with two other incidents that have caused tensions between Egypt and Russia and Italy. These are the downing of the Russian passenger plane over Sinai after its departure from Sharm El-Sheikh airport, and the torture and murder of the Italian researcher Giulio Regeni. As though determined to outwit the sceptics, the conspiracy theorisers asked: “Is it mere coincidence that Egypt's relations with Russia, Italy and France are undermined precisely at a time that these relations had begun to flourish?” Such conspiracy theories are often espoused in media circles that speak in the name of the regime or that advocate its policies, whether out of conviction or self-interest. Such theories are clearly geared for domestic consumption, since it is inconceivable that they could target international public opinion, where they would only become the source of jokes. Therefore, the propagators of the theories must believe that if they can convince large segments of the public to believe them, they are helping the regime by alleviating the pressure on it by those forces that are determined to portray the government as incapable of averting crises, or unable to manage them effectively when they occur. Unfortunately, these circles have forgotten, or prefer to overlook, the fact that conspiracy theorising is a two-edged sword. The more such theories are repeated, the greater the danger is that they give rise to contradictions and, consequently, backfire. More generally, I believe that the obsession with conspiracy theorising, regardless of the motives behind it, is indicative of an inability to grasp the intricate nature of international relations and reflects a kind of intellectual laziness that finds it easier to leap to readymade explanations and hand-me-down formulas. International relations are not based on lasting friendships or animosities but on lasting interests. They are the product of a vast network of cooperative and antagonistic interplay that continues non-stop between a huge number of international players: nations and their governments, international and regional governmental organisations, whether general or specialised, non-governmental organisations that are now referred to collectively as “global civil society”, and transnational corporations whose influence has become greater and more dangerous than that of most other actors. As each international player perpetually seeks to advance its own interests, in the manner it deems best and using whatever means available to it, regardless of considerations of legitimacy or transparency, it is natural that its interests will overlap with those of other players, and conflict or even clash with those of other players. In view of the innumerable variables involved, each government or organisation has to try to interact with this vast and complex web as effectively as possible, and in a manner that best opens opportunities and enhances its manoeuvrability and averts risks or restrictions. Despite the progress that has been made over the past two centuries toward rationalising this interplay through institution-building and establishing legal frameworks, the criteria for managing it remain too loose and uncontrolled. As a result, international relations remain very much the same as the British philosopher Thomas Hobbes described them about four centuries ago. He likened the international arena to a jungle still in the “state of nature” and characterised by “the war of all against all”, in which the strong relentlessly and mercilessly destroy the weak. In such a context, no conspiracy theory can sufficiently explain events. Every system of government, regardless of its particular nature, has a political, social and economic base on which it relies in order to run the affairs of the state and society it represents. Its policies in various fields presumably reflect the interests, desires and aspirations of that base. As it is difficult to imagine a government that is supported by all, or that pursues policies that reflect the interests and aspirations of every segment of society, it is equally natural for “opposition” forces to emerge at home and abroad. The crucial issue, therefore, is not necessarily the form of the regime but rather the manner in which it manages its relationship with the “opposition” and, specifically, the extent to which it can systematise and regulate this relationship so that differences in opinion or conflicting interests do not evolve into clashes or strife, and so that the “opposition” is not automatically branded as the “enemy”. This applies to Egypt as much as it applies to other countries. It is well known that Gamal Abdel-Nasser was an ally of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of the 1952 Revolution. Differences soon arose over the nature of the policies that should be implemented after the revolution and these differences escalated to an all-out clash. Nasser won that round and succeeded in eliminating the organisation and putting its leaders in jail. Nasser had also been an ally of the West until the two fell out over the funding of the Aswan High Dam. Then, when he moved to nationalise the Suez Canal, France, Britain and Israel joined forces, secretly conspired against him and launched a concerted attack on Egypt in 1956. Subsequently, Egypt and Syria united into a single state, and this rattled other Arab countries which, feeling threatened, conspired to dismantle the “United Arab Republic” and assassinate its leader. President Anwar Al-Sadat fought the 1973 War against Israel using Soviet arms. He then allied with the Americans when he began to pursue the route of a political settlement after the war. Suddenly, the Americans switched from the ranks of enemies to the ranks of allies and the Russians from allies to enemies. When Sadat first came to power he struck up such a close alliance with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi that the two leaders were on the verge of forging another unified state. But he did not balk at waging a war against Libya at a subsequent date. At the time of the confrontation with Israel, Sadat was allied with most Arab states. These countries did not hesitate to punish him after he concluded a separate peace accord with Israel. At home, Sadat was allied with the Islamists and released their leaders from prison at the outset of his rule, only to end up being assassinated by them a decade later. In the course of his 30 years in power, Hosni Mubarak appeared to have succeeded in striking the balances capable of averting dangerous hostilities at home and abroad. Nevertheless, this did not spare him from assassination attempts, once abroad while he was in Addis Ababa and once at home in Port Said. Moreover, eventually the whole of the Egyptian people became “the enemy”, decided to rebel against his rule and succeeded in overthrowing him. Despite the many contradictions inherent in all the abovementioned shifting alliances and positions, no one ventured to claim that Egypt was being targeted. The regime that governs Egypt today came in the wake of a mass movement and intervention on the part of the military. The movement is seen by some as a popular revolution against Muslim Brotherhood rule and by others as a conspiracy, or a counterrevolution, while the military intervention is regarded by some as a response to the will of the people and by others as a military coup. Any system of government to emerge out of such conditions is bound to have strong enemies at home and abroad. However, this particular regime also suffers from some structural problems, the most salient features of which are: - Ambiguity in its policies. Perhaps the source of this problem is the inability to clearly discern or define the grassroots bases on which it relies politically, socially and economically, and which, in turn, renders it incapable of differentiating between its actual or potential friends and allies and its actual or potential adversaries. - The preference for security methods over political methods in handling various issues and problems that this has caused as the scope of adversaries continually broadens. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that most of the leaders of the mass movement of 30 June 2013, especially from the youth generation, and others who could have presumably formed a strong source of support for the regime, are currently languishing in prison. - Confusion among international and regional powers that are unable to hit upon a correct formula for a balanced relationship. On the one hand, these powers want to — or have to — deal with this regime because they need it for any number of purposes. These purposes includes the need to take part in the fight against terrorism, to confront new security threats that have emerged due to changes in international and regional balances of powers, to help resolve conflicts in the Middle East or simply to safeguard their conventional markets for their products. On the other hand, these international and regional powers fear that the repressive policies of the regime could generate a new state of instability that could put their interests in jeopardy. I suspect that talk of a “global conspiracy against Egypt” conceals the inability of the government to work out a way to manage relations with those that differ with it politically at home and abroad. The regime still regards all who oppose its policies not just as adversaries to the government but also as enemies set on destroying the Egyptian state. This is a dangerous outlook that could lead to grave consequences.
The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
