According to observers, most of the demonstrators who protested Egypt's declaration of the Saudi right to resume possession of Tiran and Sanafir islands on Earth Day, and on the Monday before that, belonged to such groups as 6 April, the Revolutionary Socialists and the remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood. All these opposition groups have a thirst for vengeance against the government. This does not, however, refute the fact that others who may not have a particular political affiliation also took part in the protests. They too were angered by the surprise announcement during King Salman's visit. Despite the many agreements that were concluded and Saudi commitments to projects it will undertake in Egypt, the announcement cast a pall over the visit and sparked unwarranted suspicions that Egypt had sold its land to Saudi Arabia. It is evident that the processes of incitement to demonstrate are still at work and that these are fired by the hope that the number of protestors will increase. There were only 3,000 demonstrators in front of the Journalists Syndicate, but some picture a new demonstration of “millions”, or a mass sit-in at a major square in Cairo, as though they were set on turning the clock back to this date or that. Although there are vast ideological distances between the three groups that led the demonstrations last week (6 April, the Revolutionary Socialists and the Muslim Brotherhood), they have formed a coalition. They all see the crisis over the islands as an opportunity to rock the stability of the country, undermine the government and bring an end to President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi's rule, or at least hamper its prospects for success. Moreover, these three groups have shown no hesitation to deliberately trigger clashes with police and security forces, so as to create “martyrs” they can use to stoke anger and fuel the demonstrations. In all events, as things stand, none of the three groups will succeed in producing a new millioniya (million-man march) any time soon. For one, they will not secure the support of the Salafists, who want to avoid souring their relations with Saudi Arabia. But more importantly, the groups' movement is based on fabrications that are quickly exposed and will ruin their plans for a build-up. It is also clear that the most active members of the alliance — Muslim Brotherhood remnants — are merely intent on marring the image of President Al-Sisi, this time by circulating lies about the “sale” of two islands as a means to exact revenge for the charge of treason brought against former president Mohamed Morsi in the espionage case now before the Egyptian courts. In fact, the story of the sale of the two islands finds few takers because no one can really believe that the Egyptian Armed Forces, which has made such huge sacrifices for the sake of defending every inch of Egyptian land, would do such a thing. Also, the majority of the members of the Armed Forces know that the islands belong to Saudi Arabia and that King Abdul-Aziz bin Saud asked Egyptian King Farouq to guard them because Riyadh at the time wanted to avert all possibility of a direct confrontation with Israel. Unfortunately, the Egyptian government created a problem for itself through its mismanagement of the issue and its failure to respect the Egyptian people's right to know and right to participate. Moreover, it is difficult to predict how this crisis will impact the stability of the country at time of ongoing incitement and in a climate of sharp polarisation. This polarisation is represented by those who maintain that the islands belong to Saudi Arabia, on the basis of historical evidence and the geographical survey that was carried out to draw the maritime boundaries between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and that determined that the islands fall in Saudi territorial waters, and those who maintain that the islands are Egyptian on the grounds that the seven decades that the Egyptian forces were stationed there is sufficient to establish Egyptian title. True, the islands are still under Egyptian control. No one has the right to transfer ownership apart from the Egyptian parliament, in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution. However, this does not diminish the gravity of the government's dilemma due to the secrecy that enveloped the months-long process of drawing the maritime boundaries, and the fact that the Egyptian public was kept in the dark on this matter. Nor will it help the government much to plead that the Saudis were in a rush for the committee charged with delineating the maritime boundary to complete its task before King Salman's visit to Egypt. Hopefully, this bitter experience will have convinced those in power in Egypt of the need to bring a new approach to bear in the management of our national affairs, one that “renders unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's” and that safeguards the peoples right to be informed on matters that concern them and to participate in basic ways in decisions regarding such matters. Egyptians have radically changed since the January 2011 and June 2013 revolutions. They can no longer accept some of the things that they accepted in the past. In addition, the new generations are not as acquiescent as older generations; they need to be convinced by means of rational argument, evidence and proper examples. Meanwhile, to make the question of the islands thornier yet, the available options are limited. In fact, there are only three: - An Egyptian parliamentary vote in favour of Saudi title to the islands on the basis of historical documents and geographical evidence (based on a review of the process of delineating the maritime boundary between Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The agreement, once ratified, will help safeguard good relations between the two countries as they will be able to utilise and invest in the resources available in their respective territorial waters without any confusion over their respective rights. The agreement would also ensure Saudi commitment to guarantees for freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba and to the provisions of the Camp David Accords regarding the size of nature of Saudi forces stationed on the two islands. At the same time, the agreement would ensure Egyptian and Saudi cooperation in the preservation of the security of the Red Sea and in promoting cooperative and peaceful relations between all Red Sea nations. - An Egyptian parliamentary vote in favour of retaining Egypt's control over the islands on the basis of its continued military presence on the islands for 67 years. As this would prevent the handover of the islands to Saudi Arabia, it would precipitate tensions between Cairo and Riyadh and, perhaps, compel the two sides to seek international arbitration to settle their dispute, drawing on available documentary and geographical evidence and a review of the processes of demarcating the maritime boundary between the two countries. - The more difficult and complicated option is for Cairo and Riyadh to agree to separate the question of title over the two islands (which belongs to Saudi Arabia) from the question of the administration of the two islands, in which Egypt could take part. This option takes into account the fact that navigation through the Straits of Tiran is restricted to the area between Tiran and the Sinai coast due to the depth of the water (270 metres) and that this area is located within Egyptian territorial waters. This factor makes it difficult to separate Egyptian national security from the security of Tiran Island. Naturally, if the two sides go for this option, they would need to conclude a formal agreement, complete with the provisions necessary to ensure that the two islands are managed appropriately. More generally, regardless of the differences between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, negotiation and consensus is the best way to reach a proper settlement that safeguards both countries' interests in Tiran and Sanafir.
