On Friday, 26 February, Iranians headed to the polls to elect the next Assembly of Experts, which sits for an eight-year term, and their next Consultative Assembly (parliament), which sits for a four-year term. The world followed these elections closely for two chief reasons. First, this was the first time that elections for these two important institutions in Iran's complicated system of government were held simultaneously. Second, these were the first elections to be held after the signing of the nuclear accord between Tehran and the P5+1. That accord was promoted, negotiated and signed by the reformist trend in Iran, while support from the conservative and hardliner camp, which has controlled the abovementioned assemblies during previous terms, was less than enthusiastic. Therefore, the elections constituted a gauge of the popularity of the policies espoused by the reformist trend. The final results of these elections will not be known until after the second round in April. Nevertheless, we can already say that the conservatives and hardliners sustained a stunning setback when compared to previous electoral rounds, even if reformists or moderates do not win a clear or comfortable majority. In the current Consultative Assembly, moderates held only 30 out of 290 seats (while hardliners held 200). According to the preliminary results for this year's Consultative Assembly elections, the reformists succeeded in tripling this number of seats, in the first round alone. This signals an end to the sole and absolute hegemony of the conservatives and hardliners over the Iranian legislative authority. In fact, we cannot rule out the possibility that the reformists and moderates could gain a parliamentary majority through an alliance with independents, the representatives of minorities, and other non-conservative trends. It also looks like the Assembly of Experts elections will yield similar results. Just as reformists won all the seats designated for Tehran in the Consultative Assembly elections (30 out of 290 seats), they won 15 out of the 16 seats allocated to that district in the 88-member Assembly of Experts. According to the figures released by the Iranian Ministry of Interior, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, current President Hassan Rouhani and a large number of their supporters won their electoral bids for the Assembly of Experts. Some observers see this is as a major breakthrough in that crucial institution, which is dominated by the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guard. One is struck by the contradictory conclusions that have been drawn from analyses of the last Iranian election results and their ramifications. The general impression among Arab observers is that the results will not lead to an essential change in the Iranian regime's political outlooks, especially in terms of foreign policy. The regime, they argue, will remain a fundamentalist sectarian regime based on the principle of the “rule of the Islamic jurisprudents” and directed by a single man who controls the religious and military institutions, and who allows only those who support him, and are totally loyal to him, to run for office. As the Supreme Leader controls all the strings in the political game, he has no problem in distributing roles between hardliners and moderates, depending on the conditions and exigencies of a particular phase. Therefore, according to this view, there are no essential differences between hardliners and reformists or moderates. Or, whatever differences do exist are purely ones of degree and, thus, not of a nature that could lead to any significant change in the Iranian regime and its key political outlooks. Exponents of this camp of opinion also point out that the Arab world had previously interacted with Iranian moderates, as the reformist Sayyed Mohamed Khatami served as president. Khatami visited many Arab capitals, but this was not accompanied by any essential change in Iranian foreign policy. They add that if efforts to promote a genuine rapprochement between Arab countries and Iran failed at the time when Iran was not so involved in the domestic affairs of many of them, rapprochement today has become impossible in view of the current crises in many Arab countries which, it is widely believed, were caused by Iran or, at the very least, which Iran could have done more to contain. Western observers and governments read the election results differently. They maintain that the nuclear agreement, which conservatives viewed with distaste and hardliners fiercely attacked, could not have succeeded had it not been for the determination of the reformist trend, currently led by Hassan Rouhani in his capacity as Iranian president. Therefore, the fact that the reformists won such a large proportion of the votes is a major indicator that the majority of Iranians are keener to see economic sanctions lifted and their country's relations normalised with the West than they are to export the Iranian revolution to the Islamic world and their Arab neighbours in particular. In addition, this camp of opinion holds that the return of Western investment and companies to Iran will open opportunities for Western countries to have a more effective input in the process of restructuring Iranian society from within and propel it toward more moderate outlooks. It is widely believed that Western nations attach greater importance to the results of the Assembly of Experts elections, as that body is the highest religious institution in Iran and has the power to choose or dismiss the man who controls the main keys to the entire Iranian political system, namely the supreme leader. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is 76 years old and is rumoured to have serious health difficulties, which means that the forthcoming Assembly of Experts, which sits for an eight-year term, is the one that will most likely choose Khamenei's successor. In fact, some have already begun to place their money on Rafsanjani, well known for his more moderate positions, as the next supreme leader. This, in turn, could open doors to more profound changes in the Iranian regime, which thus compounds the significance and potential impact of the current elections. In all events, it is clear that most Western observers believe that the Iranian economy, which is in a shambles, needs major reforms if Iran is to emerge from its current straits. Therefore, to the West, the current elections appear to be opening up an opportunity to penetrate Iranian society in support of transformative developments that will change the system from within, after years in which the West failed in its efforts to change it by applying external pressure. The difference of views between Arab and Western analyses of the Iranian elections results stems from differing attitudes toward the Iranian system itself. Where Western observers see a considerable degree of vitality and flexibility that make it possible for that system to evolve and reform itself from within, Arab observers see rigidity and immutability. While it is difficult to contend that the Iranian system of government, on the basis of Western criteria, is democratic, Western observers believe that system is more pluralistic than other systems of government in the region. Accordingly, it is capable of evolution and change. Some 12,000 candidates registered to run for parliament's 290 seats, which means an average of more than 40 contestants per seat. True, the powerful Guardian Council, which is close to the supreme leader, eliminated more than half this number, and most of those deemed “unqualified” were moderates. But still, this left approximately 6,000 qualified candidates in the race, which is quite a high number by international standards. In other words, despite its totalitarian and autocratic nature, that regime allows for a certain degree of rotation of authority. Moreover, we should also recall that the 2009 elections almost erupted into a full-fledged popular intifada. It is ironic that the Arab world adopted a conciliatory policy toward Iran at a time when that regime was in its full revolutionary prime, while today the Arab world is more hardline and adamant in its opposition towards Iran's expansionary designs, at a time when Iran, at least from the Western perspective, is more moderate than ever, after having signed the nuclear agreement. Clearly, the six countries that worked together to reach that agreement and that are determined to make it succeed will compete with each other to win trade deals in order to reabsorb the millions in unfrozen Iranian assets now that the sanctions have been partially lifted. But these same six countries, or at least the ones in the West, will simultaneously work together to push Iran toward more moderate positions in its foreign policies. In particular, they will coax it toward some form of rapprochement with Israel and toward playing a greater role in the war against terrorism. In my opinion, the Arab world needs to make deeper and more comprehensive analyses of what is happening in Iran in light of the results of the recent elections. It should also try to build bridges with moderate currents in Iran, which could be instrumental in changing Iranian foreign policies in a way that would promote efforts to reach solutions to crises and conflicts in the Arab world. The problem with the Arab world is that it does not possess a clear vision, whether on how to lift itself up or how to deal with others, Iran in particular. The writer is a professor of political science, Cairo University.
