When we look closely at the history of Arab thought over the last two centuries we run up against an invisible, unspoken, but ever-present fact: this thought fell prey to ideologies that held sway over the Arab intellect, leading us to read our reality and history through the lens of dogma. As a result, this thought grappled with ideological principles and concepts instead of the intricacies and complexities of lived reality, and it ignored empirical knowledge of the history of our societies gained through a profound reading that could extract the laws that governed Arab societies' political, economic, social and cultural trajectory. This gave rise to a gap between a proper understanding of history and a conscious awareness of the developments undergone by our societies and the causes of their advancement and losses. It also meant a disregard of the voices of the masses that created and built the components of daily life, unexamined by the elite, and thus a failure to understand their problems, concerns, aspirations and everyday rights. If Arab thought began with socialist, liberal and nationalist inflections in the 20th century, it is now apparent that most of these have failed in whole or in part, while some succeeded practically, at least relatively speaking. They all left a legacy of thought that did not reach the masses or influence grassroots positions and directions, remaining imprisoned within the walls and minds of the elite and the cultural vanguard, cut off from the masses. The Arab elite attempted to meet the challenge of Western civilisation believing, rightly so, that the root of accomplishments of Western civilisation in scientific, political, social and cultural fields go back to Arab-Islamic civilisation. If Westerners had not adopted sciences from the Arabs, Europe would not have experienced a renaissance in liberty, equality and tolerance, or the values of cooperation, social support, and participation that lay at the heart of Arab-Islamic civilisation. But the Arab elite did not realise that adopting Western values and ideas and planting them in Arab societies in a different social and temporal context would necessarily give rise to a truncated or curtailed modernity, especially in light of authoritarian systems of rule based on the family, clan, tribe and sect. Despite its enlightening intellectual and theoretical heritage, Marxist and socialist thought suffered setbacks and did not achieve its goal of laying the groundwork for genuine social change — most importantly, social and class justice. It, too, ran up against tribal, authoritarian regimes, most of them under the sway of Western colonial influence and backed by their special interest allies (merchants, businessmen, tribal leaders, feudalists and corrupt bureaucrats). The fate of those preaching socialism was first prison and detention, and then marginalisation, homelessness and security persecution. Arab wealth remained concentrated in the hands of a small elite that controlled the levers of political and cultural life, including laws, the courts and education. Armies and security services became simply arms of the authority, and the ranks of the poor, impoverished and marginalised swelled until they constituted more than 75 per cent of Arab citizens. Arab socialist thinkers did not rectify the grave error that deprived them of the ability to correct course, despite their noble goals and the enormous sacrifices they made for their principles. Their error lay in limiting themselves to the intellectual frameworks and general principles of Marxist and socialist thought, instead of attempting to draw inspiration from other models (China, for example) that had studied and understood their people's reality and history. Arab socialists did not strive to examine and understand Arab economic, social and cultural history, nor did they attempt to delve into Arab-Islamic heritage to understand the extent of its impact on Arab peoples. Dazzling Marxist ideas consumed the life of Arab leftists who were concentrated in cities and capitals. They did not attempt to explore the Arab street and countryside, connect with the masses, examine their natures, understand their material and spiritual needs, and learn from their expertise and popular, unrecorded history. Moreover, leftist organisations were fragmented and divided due to the same factionalism that afflicted nationalist and liberal organisations. A common Arab land, language and culture and a shared history of fighting foreign influence generated remarkable momentum for nationalist currents in the period of national liberation, raising the banner of Arab unity over all differences and contradictions, which nationalists saw as manufactured and contingent. Nevertheless, the concept of Arab nationalism remained confused and vague. There was no agreement on the idea or its content, and no uniform conception of its components or mechanisms to make it a reality, especially after the severe setback that shook the Arab nation following the June 1967 defeat. Liberalism, for its part, was limited to the Arab elite and never seeped into the social and intellectual fabric of the majority given its focus on political liberties and its studious disregard for social justice, which is an unspoken commandment for the overwhelming majority of people who continue to live in accordance with traditional culture. Their political leanings are determined more by sectarian, tribal and communal affiliations and values, and they suffer from ongoing policies of impoverishment and marginalisation by Arab governments and their class allies. As for the legacy of religion, it is well known that every generation imbibes scripture in its own historical context, reading and interpreting it in that social context. But in the Ottoman period the Arab world stagnated intellectually, as demonstrated in the continued closure of the “gate of ijtihad” or independent reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence. Religion and politics mingled, and political Islamist groups and movements employed Salafi interpretations of religious texts to justify their political enterprise. As a result, intellectual rigidity took hold in religious institutions, and generations of imams and jurists came up swearing fealty to rulers. Incapable of renewing religious thought, they also helped keep the overwhelming majority of illiterate ordinary people from a proper understanding of religion, made easier by the spread of ignorance, poverty and submission to rulers. Against this backdrop, in the 1980s democracy became the central issue in Arab political discourse, with a stream of research, seminars and conferences on Arab democracy, civil society and human rights. As Arab intellectuals and media figures increasingly focussed on political issues, other issues, such as economic, social and cultural rights — or citizenship rights — faded. This is the heart of the crisis of the Arab elite that has left Arab societies in a state of disequilibrium and deterioration. The manifestations were made starkly clear in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011. While raising unexpected promise and hopes, the turmoil, destruction and confusion that followed ushered in a new phase of soul-searching about the fate of the Arab masses, their legitimate right to justice and citizenship, their ability to confront regimes of repression and corruption, and how to stand up to the control of moneyed interests and the market. Meanwhile, traditional jurists beholden to Salafi interpretations of religion are ascendant, while most liberals are dazzled by and bound to Western thought and leftists are alienated and isolated from the lived reality of Arab publics.
