“The negotiations did not fail. There was an agreement to suspend them temporarily and resume again on 25 February.” This sentence basically sums up the statement issued by UN Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura following intensive consultations he held with the participant delegations in the Geneva III Conference. As all these delegations, some of which been very reluctant to come to Geneva in the first place, were keen to avoid talk about “failure”, the nature of the recent events in Geneva can also be summed up briefly: it has become very clear that a peaceful settlement is the only option for all parties, even if the concrete conditions needed to bring such a settlement to fruition do not fully exist yet. But when will they fully exist? The international community is growing increasingly and aware that the humanitarian costs of the Syrian crisis have become too great for the world's conscience to bear. The warfare that has been raging in Syria for five years now has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, turned half the population of Syrians into displaced persons and refugees, and destroyed most of Syria's cities and civilisational landmarks. There is also a growing awareness that this crisis, which spiralled from a local conflict between a people and a dictatorship into a regional conflict between neighbouring states fighting over power and influence in the region, has flared into a global crisis in the fullest sense of the term. This crisis gravely threatens international peace and stability, and all the more so now that Russia has pitted its military weight alongside the Syrian regime. The innumerable commentaries and analyses on the Syrian question that fill various media every day fail to reflect what is actually happening on the ground in Syria and they help little to enhance our understanding of the real objectives of the various local, regional and international stakeholders in that crisis. This is because most authors are biased in favour of one side or the other, and therefore channel their intellectual and professional energies and skills into justifying and exonerating the side they support and denouncing and blaming the other. The Syrian crisis has been allowed to ferment and escalate for more than five years because some of the parties involved imagined that they could settle it in their favour militarily. As a result, it has grown increasingly complex, steadily reducing the opportunities for a political settlement. Although the conflict began as a popular revolution against a corrupt and tyrannical regime, it quickly evolved into a civil war fuelled by regional and international powers bent on settling old scores with the Syrian regime and indifferent to the cause of democracy or the welfare of the Syrian people. As “terrorist groups” were already present and accounted for in the interplay in all the region's frictions and antagonisms, the various parties involved in the Syrian crisis readily succumbed to the temptation to utilise them for their own purposes. The opponents of the Bashar Al-Assad regime did not hesitate to cooperate with terrorist groups on the grounds that this regime was the main enemy and fighting it had to take priority. The Bashar regime, too, utilised terrorism in its own fashion. It held that everyone who takes up arms against the state is a terrorist, outlaw and traitor to his country, regardless of whether some were and remained fighters for the cause of justice and democracy. This became the regime's blanket excuse for recourse to excessive force against all who took up arms against the state and sought outside help to topple the regime. Without a doubt, the rapid internationalisation of the Syrian crisis had the effect of sidelining the local disputants in the conflict, including the regime itself. As outside forces came to prevail in steering the course of the conflict, core issues were confused and obfuscated. Although regional and international powers involved in the Syrian crisis claim that they are fighting terrorism, as epitomised by Daesh (Islamic State group) and Al-Nusra Front, the hostilities and patterns of interaction point to two opposing alliances each with their particular take on terrorism. These perspectives, moreover, are virtually antithetical. On one side are supporters of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, consisting of Russia, Iran and Hizbullah. This camp maintains that the fall of the Bashar regime will enable terrorist groups to seize control of the Syrian state because balances of power on the ground are heavily in favour of these groups and against the “moderate” opposition. Accordingly, the war against terrorism and support for the Bashar regime are two sides of the same coin and two means to attain the same objective. The opposing alliance, which consists of the US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other countries, maintains that the Bashar regime is a consummately terrorist organisation as it has caused the killing and displacement of the Syrian people. Therefore, toppling this regime is an essential precondition to eradicating other terrorist groups. Nevertheless, developments suggest, especially after Daesh and Al-Nusra expanded their control, that the ranks of the pro-Assad camp have become more cohesive and that their vision for a settlement has become increasingly distinct. Russia, Iran and Hizbullah's intervention in Syria on the side of their ally, the Bashar regime, is driven by clear conceptions of their strategic aims and interests, regardless of the extent to which their respective views overlap. Therefore, they will not permit the regime to fall, even if that means fighting in the war on its side until the end, since most of the forces that are fighting that regime pose strategic if not existential threats to them. The opposing camp is less cohesive and its vision for a settlement less distinct. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar appear united in their animosity towards the Bashar regime and they also have a clear interest in toppling it. However, their reasons and motives are quite different and their attitudes towards some of the forces that are fighting the regime are so divergent as to sometimes appear almost diametrically opposed. In addition, they had long counted on US military intervention to overthrow Al-Assad's regime, but failed to appreciate the degree to which US foreign policy changed under President Obama. More recently, it is clear that they are unable to grasp the fact that Washington is no longer that interested in ousting Al-Assad because it sees Daesh and Al-Nusra Front as the greater threat. Given such sharp discrepancies between the opinions and policies of the two major camps and divergences within the camps themselves, it is difficult to realise the essential preconditions needed to reach a balanced settlement. Any effective settlement to the Syrian crisis is contingent upon a regional and international consensus on a number of general rules and principles. The most important are: - It is essential to prioritise efforts to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. This cannot be achieved without an immediate ceasefire. - It is impossible to include terrorist groups in the settlement process. Eradicating those groups has become a prerequisite for regional and international stability and security. This task, therefore, requires unifying the military efforts needed to defeat them. - No outside party has the right or ability to determine the future of Syria. Accordingly, the duty of the international community should be restricted to empowering the Syrian people to determine their own fate and to ensure a climate conducive to free, fair and transparent presidential, parliamentary and local elections without pre-set dictates. On the basis of the foregoing rules and principles, the parties need to agree on a roadmap for building a new Syria. I propose the following steps: - Draw up a list of terrorist organisations detailing precisely their locations on the ground in Syria. - Immediately put into effect a ceasefire between the “patriotic” opposition factions and the regime. Under this ceasefire, each faction will retain the territory they control but simultaneously will be obliged to lift the siege on any areas under their control. International observers should be allowed in to help secure the ceasefire if necessary. - Mount a unified campaign, engaging all international forces and efforts, including forces belonging to the opposition, the regime and the international community, to eliminate the listed terrorist groups. The areas liberated from these groups should be placed under the temporary supervision of the UN. - Create a supreme council to administer the interim phase by means of a consensus reached between the regime and opposition factions in close coordination with the UN. The role of this council should be restricted to taking the steps necessary for a new constitution to be drawn up and implementing agreed upon arrangements for electoral processes at various levels. It should also oversee the reconstruction of Syria and the restoration of displaced persons and refugees to their original towns and villages. These processes should be set into motion as soon as possible so as to ensure that all Syrian citizens can take part in the plebiscite on the constitution and in other stipulated electoral processes. The Syrian crisis became complex and intractable because many parties believed and still believe that they have the power to impose a solution militarily, whether by dint of their own strength or with the assistance of allies from abroad. In my opinion, that belief is an illusion. I also suspect that those parties are not motivated by the plight of the Syrian people and are not interested at least sincerely in promoting their welfare. Therefore, all who are truly dedicated to the welfare of the Syrian people should do all in their power to realise an immediate ceasefire. The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
