Finally, Egypt has a parliament. The country's newly-elected legislature is seen by many as the last step in rebuilding Egypt's political system and replacing the regime that was brought down by the January 2011 Revolution. The new parliament, which will soon be sworn in, will thus end a long procession of interim periods, none of which offered us a fully-formed political regime. Over the past five years, Egypt has gone through what seems like an endless parade of transitions. The first interim period was managed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which succeeded in holding legislative elections and presidential elections, but gave us no constitution. Also, the parliament produced by that first interim phase didn't last for more than six months. Then came Mohamed Morsi who, following his election as president, went through the motions of what seemed like another interim period, one during which he failed to restore the disbanded parliament or hold new parliamentary elections. The constitution Morsi finally gave the country came into being only after the Muslim Brotherhood leader had passed a constitutional declaration that caused widespread discontent and sent the country back to square one. As head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adli Mansour took over as interim president after Morsi's overthrow. He presided over a third interim phase during which he managed to get a new constitution written and held presidential elections. But Mansour couldn't hold parliamentary elections. When Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi became president, Egypt found itself going through another interim phase. Parliamentary elections were repeatedly postponed, and the country functioned without a parliament for a year and a half. Now, after almost five years of political limbo, Egypt has a fully-fledged political system for a change, with a president, a parliament, and a constitution all in place. But how stable and sustainable is the current system? Before offering an answer, let me first state that the strength of any political system is not solely reliant on the presence of institutions, but on the vitality of such institutions. Mubarak's regime didn't fall because it lacked institutions, but because these institutions were too outdated to function, too inept to meet the basic needs of the population. Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood regime didn't fall because it lacked institutions, but because the institutions it created appeared to be custom-made for the Muslim Brotherhood, not the whole nation. Our new political regime was born out of a consensual roadmap, one that was designed to justify Morsi's ouster. It is therefore timely to ask whether the new regime is acting within the spirit of consensus that underpinned the roadmap. The main argument of the roadmap was that Morsi acted in office as a representative not of all Egyptians, but of the Muslim Brotherhood alone. Hence, Morsi's ouster was a necessary step to create a democratic system that allows everyone to participate. Such was the central theme of the roadmap that the head of the Armed Forces presented to the nation on 3 July 2013. The roadmap involved specific measures and included a timetable for such measures to come into practice. The constitutional declaration issued by the interim president on 8 July 2013 called for: - A new constitution to be submitted to a public referendum within four months; - Parliamentary elections to be held within two months of the approval of the constitution; - Presidential elections to follow within one week of the convocation of parliament. In addition, the roadmap called for “a higher committee for national reconciliation to be formed of individuals with credibility who are acceptable to all national strands and who represent various points of view in the country.” The roadmap didn't set a time for the said committee to start its activities. The roadmap, thus, came with a clear sequence of priorities: a new constitution is to be written, followed by parliamentary elections, then by presidential elections. All of those steps were supposed to materialise within one year. This sequence of priorities was not followed. Instead, presidential elections were conducted ahead of parliamentary elections. And the interim period lasted for two and half years, instead of one year. Furthermore, the matter of national reconciliation was totally discarded, although the first cabinet formed after the announcement of the roadmap had a minister of state for national reconciliation and interim justice. In attempting to assess the new Egyptian system in the light of the roadmap of June 2013, three points come to mind: - The current constitution truly reflects the spirit of the roadmap, although some of its articles may be somewhat controversial. The constitution, for example, limits the powers of the president in order to avoid a replay of the abuses committed under Mubarak and Morsi. The constitution gives parliament the power it needs to establish a much-needed balance between the executive and judiciary branches, thus guaranteeing that neither would overstep its assigned mandate. Under the current constitution, the parliament is entitled to choose the prime minister in consultation with the president and also to withdraw confidence from the government if needed. The parliament is also entitled to question the president and even impeach him in cases of unconstitutional actions or high treason. Also, the parliament can pass a vote of no confidence in the president and call for early elections. Crucial as these provisions are, they remain theoretical and hypothetical to a degree. One must keep in mind that they were written before Al-Sisi decided to run for president. And it is widely believed that no one now supports them. This is what one senses from some of Al-Sisi's statements as well as the utterances of his close supporters, including those who are members of the new parliament. The latter have made it clear that they wish to amend the said provisions in order to strengthen the president's hand at the expense of parliament. - The new regime is led by a man who has the firm backing of a powerful and cohesive army, an army that stayed united even when most Arab countries were disintegrating and turning into failed states. The current president, thus, achieved power through a process that was closer to a referendum than to elections. Only one candidate ran against Al-Sisi, which is unusual in a country of this size. And Al-Sisi won the elections with 97 per cent of the vote, which also is extraordinary in a world that frowns upon totalitarian regimes. Any regime run by an exceptional president who comes to power under exceptional circumstances is by its very nature a temporary regime; namely, a regime that is subject to change once the circumstances that produced it disappear. - The country now has a parliament that looks outwardly as one of the most diverse in Egypt's modern history. It has representatives from 20 parties or so, more women and Copts than before, and representatives of marginalised groups and people with disabilities. Despite this outward diversity, the parliament is homogenous in its political and ideological composition and seems devoid of active opposition. The parliament is unlikely, therefore, to play any role in forming the government, exercising oversight, or fighting corruption. The current parliament is also a divided one, in the sense that it is unlikely to produce large alliances that may influence policymaking. It is unlikely to produce a “maestro” who may set high standards of performance and steer parliament away from petty squabbles and special interests. What this brief review of the traits of the current regime suggests is it is not a direct descendant from the January 2011 Revolution, nor does it faithfully represents the spirit of the June 2013 roadmap. On the contrary, what we have today is a regime that is custom-made to fit a president-saviour, a figure who rose to power out of sheer necessity. This may explain why most Egyptians stayed at home during the recent polls. Many of them may have doubted the usefulness of elections, since Al-Sisi appears to be either not interested in participatory politics, or not good at it. He would rather follow his own instincts. A situation such at that places the ball firmly in Al-Sisi's court. The people are now waiting to see how the maestro will hit the ball. Then they will decide what to do next. The writer is a professor of political science, Cairo University.
