As Iranians celebrate last week's nuclear agreement, which promises to end the punishing economic and financial sanctions against the country, behind the scenes many in Tehran have been left reeling by the deal's shortcomings. While the full details of the agreement are not yet known, it is clear that some of Iran's declared red lines have been breached. This is especially the case in the military sector where the Iranian negotiators, guided by the country's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, had ruled out any inspection of military sites. At this early stage, it appears that Iranian military sites are not exempt from inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the deal, but Iran apparently has the right to challenge inspection requests on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the IAEA appears intent on pursuing investigations into past activities with a view to developing exhaustive knowledge of the full extent of Iran's nuclear-related activities over the past three decades. This is yet another breach of Iran's red lines, as it will likely necessitate long and intrusive interviews with key scientists and officials at the heart of the Iranian nuclear programme. However, the biggest failure of the deal, as far as Iran is concerned, is the continuation of the arms embargo that has for decades deprived the Iranian military of access to modern supplies and technology. The failure to remove military-related sanctions under the new deal means that Iran's position in the region will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. The Islamic Republic will continue to rely on resourceful diplomacy and ideological outreach to achieve its foreign policy aims. According to all credible accounts, Iran's armed forces are in poor shape in terms of equipment and arms. Even though the country spends three per cent of its GDP on defence (around $12 billion), much of this money is spent on personnel and the maintenance of bloated military organisations. Iran's defence budget is dwarfed by those of its two regional adversaries, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The latter will spend nearly $50 billion on defence this year alone and is set to become the world's fifth-largest military spender by 2020. Even the tiny United Arab Emirates has a bigger defence budget than Iran and, according to London-based IHS Jane's, is set to become the world's third-biggest defence importer by the end of 2015. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s depleted Iran's conventional forces. More than two decades later, they still have not sufficiently recovered in terms of replenishing equipment and modernising structures and doctrines. Problems of supply and maintenance are compounded by the fact that all three military services in Iran were originally equipped and trained by the West, in particular the US. This is especially the case with the Iranian air force, which continues to operate a decrepit fleet of F-4, F-5 and F-14s planes that were supplied by the US 40 years ago. Even though some Russian supplies in the form of the MIG-29 and SU-24s were acquired in 1989-1990, the bulk of Iran's military air fleet is still comprised of acquisitions from the US. This has raised profound maintenance-related difficulties as sanctions have prevented Iran from accessing the legitimate arms market to acquire spare parts and supplies to keep the fleet operational, forcing it to develop a global clandestine network to acquire spare parts with the help of shady middlemen at often vastly inflated prices. At a strategic level, Iran's inability to access the international arms markets has forced the country's armed forces to undertake two credible, if costly, ventures. First, in order to acquire a credible level of deterrence the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has developed an extensive ballistic missiles programme. Even though Iran operates a formidably diverse network of such missiles, the fact remains that even the most sophisticated missiles programme is not a substitute for an effective air force. Second, the Iranians have tried hard to develop an indigenous conventional arms industry and showcase their products and achievements to others. While some breakthroughs may have been achieved in this field, the fact is that the quality of Iranian-made weapons systems has not been independently verified. Furthermore, apart from the rudimentary technology and weapons supplied to pro-Iranian paramilitary groups across the region, Iranian-made weapons systems and arms have not been tested in battle. The key question is to what extent last week's nuclear deal can now potentially alter Iran's military posture and doctrine and broader foreign policy. Much depends on not only the substance of the agreement but also the extent to which it is faithfully implemented. If, for example, a strict arms embargo is duly maintained for another five years, then the dynamics driving Iranian military posturing and planning will remain largely unaltered. However, if there is a gradual easing of restrictions, then this might trigger a corresponding change in Iranian behaviour. The Iranian military establishment, notably the IRGC, had lobbied hard for Iranian nuclear negotiators to include the removal of arms-related sanctions as an essential condition before the signature of any deal. The negotiators' apparent failure to achieve this outcome means that, appearances notwithstanding, the IRGC is deeply unhappy with the agreement. While it appears that the Vienna agreement does not change Iran's status as a nuclear-threshold state, the fact remains that the IRGC cannot opt for a breakout for at least ten to 15 years. Despite the absence of evidence of a military dimension to Iran's nuclear programme, the threat of a breakout was a key psychological warfare tactic deployed to achieve strategic equilibrium with the Islamic Republic's deadliest foes, notably Israel. This threat has now been removed, and the country's inability to compensate in the conventional arms sphere due to the persistence of the sanctions means that the Islamic Republic's regional clout will diminish, at least in the short term. This will have internal and external repercussions. Internally, the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani faces an uphill battle to convince the country's military establishment of the merits of the agreement. Externally, tensions may rise across the region as the IRGC steps up its expeditionary activities to compensate for its strategic loss.
The writer is an analyst of Iranian politics and the director of the research group Dysart Consulting.
