We were a group of analysts from strategic research centres in the US and the Middle East holding a discussion circle on counterterrorism, or CT as it is abbreviated in the West, brought together to exchange views on the situation in the Middle East. While the discussion was conducted over an Internet linkup between several cities around the world, it felt as if we were gathered in a single assembly hall. There was a series of prepared questions as to what motivates terrorists and whether or not counterterrorist measures have been successful. There was a particular focus on the use of drones, and whether such measures have worked toward a victory against the Islamic State (IS) group and Al-Qaeda. Has the killing of civilians in such raids compounded popular frustration and anger and, therefore, worked to increase rather than decrease the ranks of terrorists? Other questions focused on Turkey which, despite its NATO membership is quite muddled on the war against terrorism. It has yet to make up its mind who the main enemy is IS or Syria's President Bashar Al-Assad. Other questions had to do with security reform. The Americans had ready answers for all these questions. Terrorists are driven to terrorism by local “root causes” that stem from dictatorial regimes, poor government performance and growing numbers of youth. Due to the likelihood of civilian casualties, the use of drones should be restricted if not abolished so as not to inflame anger and sow discord. As for Turkey, if it continues on its present course it will be difficult to sustain the war against terrorism, even more so if security reform leads to an increase in the number of terrorists. The whole affair seemed like an exercise in making excuses for terrorism and blaming its victims. There also seemed to be a tendency to hide behind what Turkey does or does not do, as though there were no other countries in the region engaged in a bitter war with a vicious enemy. As for security reform, it is essentially about clipping the wings of those who die while fighting terrorism. As often happens in academic circles, the debate grew heated, in this case between the participants who were from this region and those who were in Washington. In an attempt to cool tempers, I suggested the following idea: What if a meeting like this were held in Mosul, the capital of the Islamic State? What would they be saying there? Surely, there would be no wavering or softness. They would be intent on a single goal: victory. And victory to them means capturing more territory, taking control over more and more people, and reducing as many of them as possible to slavery, with the women used as maids and sex slaves. In order to achieve this end, it is just as important to manage relations with allies all the organisations that have declared allegiance to the self-proclaimed “Islamic caliphate” as it is to manage the confrontation against the enemy, or enemies. Therefore, if Kobane claims a victory, compensation will be found in Kalamoon and Deir Al-Zoor, and if there is a defeat in Tikrit, there is a victory in Ramadi. Perhaps this is the crux of the problem with the war against terrorism. Terrorist groups know exactly what they want, and they will massacre and destroy their way to their goal. Human rights do not even come into the equation. Rights simply do not count. What counts is reducing their enemies by slaughter. However, the most important topic of discussion at that roundtable in Mosul or Raqqa, or wherever the terrorist “caliphate” bases itself, would be how to use sectarian strife to achieve a resounding victory. As is well known to all, there are historic issues related to sectarian and ethnic minorities that live in a majority Arab Sunni sea. Therefore, one of the most powerful weapons that terrorist groups use is to define the current conflict as a clash between Sunna and Shia. Then the task is to augment and deepen sectarian sensitivities so that IS and its kin can cast themselves as warriors bound for victory in defence of the Sunni faith, which is the object of a universal conspiracy. This is how things played out in the past weeks. IS succeeded, despite US air strikes, took control of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province in Iraq. In Syria, it captured a government military base in Deir Al-Zour and even reached Palmyra. In addition, it solidified its hold in Homs and Hama it reached Quneitra, near the ceasefire line with Israel, thereby gaining another card to put up its sleeve, the one often used by politicians seeking to increase their popularity: champion of the Palestinian cause. The scenario is truly alarming and forebodes another explosion in the region that will overshadow the real conflict underway. This conflict is not about Sunna versus Shia but about the clash between the modern Arab state and the Kharijites in their 21st-century editions. One of the greatest disasters caused by the deterioration in Iraq is that events conspired to cast IS as a representative of the Sunnis there, when its real aim is to enslave the Iraqi people. The problem is that I am not sure that the parties on the other side, the US above all, know what they want, or what to do. Nor is there anything to indicate the existence of a stable mechanism for strategic consultation between international or regional parties. In previous articles I have underscored the need for a “higher strategy” for understanding and handling the war or, more precisely, wars that are in progress. Unfortunately, what has happened is that the great battle has disintegrated into diverse battles and the processes of mutual recrimination have begun to attribute blame for the fall of Ramadi and retreat in the face of IS in the civil war in Syria. The entry of Iran into the regional field (due more to geopolitical reasons than to sectarian ones) via Hezbollah, the Houthis and popular mobilisation has helped confuse the issues. Now the move toward a nuclear agreement between Iran and the West is having the effect of throwing oil on the fire, not because it will restrict Iranian nuclear capacities but rather because it has fired the Iranian imagination with regard to that country's role in the region. The whole matter requires profound thought and a comprehensive strategic vision with an effective operational dimension.
