The Camp David meeting between Gulf Cooperation Council (GGC) countries and the US has not changed much, whether in the relations between these two sides or in those between Washington and Tehran. What it did was confirm that the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 will go ahead regardless of the reservations aired, and that not even Congress or Israel can stop it. It simultaneously confirmed that the agreement does not necessarily imply that full rein will be given to Iranian ambitions. It also confirmed that Washington want to maintain its close relations with Arab countries in the Gulf. All this is in keeping with the US Middle East policy set by President Barack Obama, a policy that espouses intensive use of diplomacy and minimal use of military might with, above all, no boots on the ground. US positions on Yemen can perhaps serve to illustrate. Washington opposes the actions of the Houthis and hence those of their Iranian allies in Yemen. This position was demonstrated by means of naval presence, military, aerial and perhaps satellite intelligence in support of Operation Decisive Storm, and then Operation Revival of Hope, and by US efforts to enhance the military capacities of these operations with armaments and technical support. All this is unlikely to change at least until US presidential elections are held next year. In other words, this is how things will stand for the near future, at least another year and a half. As for what will happen after the new president is elected, all possibilities are open. Now that Arab countries, and the Gulf countries in particular, are aware of the strength of the US relationship with them and the level of US support for them, which is considerable, they should undertake three major tasks. The first is to promote the recovery of the Arab states that have collapsed or are teetering on the brink of collapse. The second is to recover the Islamic faith from the extremist, fanatical and radical forces that have tried to hijack it. The third is to revive regional security, which is threatened by regional powers such as Iran or by transnational non-state groups such as the Islamic State (IS) group. Addressing these challenges must proceed from two premises. First, the decline in the extent of US efficacy in the region, in spite of the imbalances it causes, offers the Arab states a greater degree of manoeuvrability in how they handle the deteriorating conditions in the region. This was already evident in Operation Decisive Storm, which aims to rescue Yemen from its dark fate, the repercussions of which threaten the entire Arabian Peninsula as a strategic zone. Here the centre of initiative and action was Saudi Arabia, together with its Arab allies. Second, the balance of powers in the region militarily, economically and, above all, politically is in favour of the Arab coalition. What this coalition needs is more extensive coordination at the theoretical and operational levels. This will enable it to optimise the available resources among its respective parties. The recovery of Arab states begins with their preservation, safeguarding them from the slide into failed states. Perhaps the story of how Arab states stood by Egypt serves to demonstrate how resolve and the determination to carry out decisions not only rescued an important Arab state but also brought greater efficacy and added strengths to the Arab coalition, one of which is the drive to create a joint Arab military force. The task will be far more challenging when it comes to other Arab states, most notably Yemen, Syria and Libya and, to a large degree, Iraq. It is essential to assess current conditions in these countries and to intensify intelligence cooperation with respect to the various parties operating in them. In all cases, the recovery process entails a political process backed by the power to use military instruments, especially where there are forces such as IS or proxy forces such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. In all cases, too, doors should remain open to all parties. Recovering Islam and restoring it to Muslims who believe in its inherent tolerance and leniency is no less difficult a task. This religion has been the victim of a hijacking process that has taken place in full view of everyone for many years. At one point, the Muslim Brotherhood found fertile pastures not only in almost every Arab state but also in almost every Islamic state, and even in some Western countries. It was also the mother organisation that bred and nurtured other groups, which then sought to surpass it in violence and extremism. Rolling back that vast expansion will not be easy. It will require carefully calculated but simultaneously firm steps. Little benefit will come from the forms of “secularist fundamentalism” that have become so common, and that in Turkey have produced Muslim Brotherhood-like responses. What will work is to draw a precise line between “Islamic ideas and thought”, in regard to which the right to conjecture is necessary, and the Islamic faith and the duty to comply with its tenets. We should perhaps acknowledge that we have excessively blurred or allowed an excessive blurring of the boundaries between jihad and the taking of lives for other ends and purposes. Ultimately, all matters are connected by fine threads and it will require some authentic, creative thought and an open drive to restore Islam to its proper status as a faith that seeks to protect humanity and place it on the correct path without subjugating, or inflicting undo hardship on, human beings. Freedom of belief and the right to choose are authentic, inalienable and non-negotiable rights in Islam. This is not just about meetings, seminars or even television interviews: it is about responding to the needs and spirit of the times and its technological instruments which, we should also confess, are expertly exploited by the hijackers of the faith. Quite simply, the task at hand is to reach the new Arab generations with ideas that enable them to live in their present age and to serve their countries and the Muslim peoples rather than serving as a lethal instrument against them. Restoring regional security will not be an easy task either. Anyone who imagines that it is possible to restore the situation to how it stood before the Arab Spring uprisings is fooling himself. The region has changed. Now it is time to deal with those changes. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen cannot recover without changing the nature of authority and the instruments of rule. The Arab coalition must have a firm heart endowed with sufficient respect and prestige so as to ensure that the processes of dealing with change and safeguarding the balances of powers in the region is both possible and achievable without bloodshed. There remain many details to discuss with regard to each of these three tasks. What counts is that we are firm in our conviction that this strategy is sound and its purpose is of crucial importance.
