Politicians and military leaders know exactly when a war may begin. They decide its start date. However, there is no guarantee that they will be able to decide its end. Operation Decisive Storm is not an exception. It was launched after a lot of consultations and deliberations. The aims of Decisive Storm included the liberation of Yemen from the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and their allies, ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh's forces, and to reinstate the legitimate president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and enable him and his government to go back to Aden. Remember, there was no mention of the Yemeni capital Sanaa where militias and military forces loyal to Abdel Malek Al-Houthi and Saleh are in control. Yemen is seen by the Saudi national security establishment as a “red line” that should not be crossed by a hostile power. Decisive Storm's ultimate target was to eliminate the threat posed by Iranian-backed forces south of the Saudi border. The decision to end Decisive Storm, on 22 April, came as a surprise, as the aims of Decisive Storm were still pending. Contrary to what was desired, there are negative indications on the ground. Saleh's political profile is on the rise, the Houthis are gaining legitimacy and the military and humanitarian situation is deteriorating. Saleh and the Houthis are at the least holding on to strategic positions and Saleh is practically assuming power instead of being eliminated. His call for all forces to hand in their weapons to his “security committees” is clear evidence that he is trying to make gains, building on the official declaration ending Decisive Storm. There is nothing to indicate a clear roadmap for a political process past the war. Decisive Storm started on 26 March and succeeded in stopping the Houthis from controlling Aden. It is true that the intensive air strike campaign had an impact, but thanks are due to young untrained resistance fighters, who stopped the Houthis and their allied forces from conquering Aden. Southern Yemeni resistance made the situation in Aden completely the opposite of that in Sanaa. Hundreds of young fighters in Aden lost their lives in an unequal confrontation with well-trained and well-equipped forces that came down from the north of Yemen to the shores of Aden. Their fighting positions in Khor Maksar, Kryter, Alam and all other districts in Aden are still open and active despite the decision to end Operation Decisive Storm. If Yemeni resistance fighters stop or retreat, the Houthis and Saleh will advance and take over all positions. There is no way southern Yemeni fighters will leave the battleground and let their enemies to take control. The war is far from over. Balance of power: After nearly a month of bombardment, the situation on the ground looks ugly. Aden in particular is suffering from severe shortages of fuel, electricity, food, water and medicine. Nor is there any money to spend on these needs. Despite that, the people of Aden enjoy a very high spirit and a very strong determination to resist. But we should not underestimate their daily suffering. Humanitarian assistance is urgently needed there. It seems that the official declaration to end Decisive Storm was strategically premature. It seems also that it came under pressure from within and from without Saudi Arabia. As parties to the conflict passed the deadline set by Security Council Resolution 2216 (ten days from 24 April), the balance of power on the ground looks unchanged dramatically. On one side, the Iranian-backed rebels, the Houthis and their allies, are almost in full control of Sanaa and most of the north. On the other side, resistance fighters backed by some army units and air strikes by Operation Decisive Storm are defending Aden and destroying the positions of their enemies. The positions of Houthi and Saleh forces elsewhere are still subject to daily air attacks despite the official end of Decisive Storm. As the war goes on, it is very important to try to understand the dynamics of it. In order to do so, we should identify the nature of the parties to the conflict, their capabilities, aims and ways to hit their targets. It would be very wrong to see Operation Decisive Storm as a mere military operation. The conflict in the region is much more complex and the war in Yemen is just one of many other fronts connected to the conflict. Regime change: Since the United States openly declared its strategy of “regime change” in the Middle East in the early 2000s, the political map of the region has changed and will continue to be under pressure for some years to come. The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq gave Iran a huge strategic advantage. Its geographic proximity to Iraq, alliances with political forces such as Al-Dawa Party and military groups such as the Badr Brigades, enabled Tehran's leaders to play a decisive role in shaping post-Saddam Iraq. Active Iranian diplomacy in Baghdad convinced US representatives, diplomats and military men that they would not escape necessary cooperation with Tehran in regard to Iraqi affairs. On those grounds, the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad was a member of a supreme security committee overseeing the situation in Iraq until the official departure of US troops from Iraq. After that, it is now Tehran alone that decides with its allies in Baghdad the fate of Iraq. Iranians take Bashar Al-Assad's side, citing a situation when Bashar may be threatened. Prior to the war in Iraq, Iranian leaders stood by him against all pressure and temptations coming from some Arab capitals. In Riyadh, the late King Abdullah tried hard to drag Bashar away from Iran's influence, but he failed. For Tehran leaders it is not Bashar, but it is Syria that matters. Iranian foreign policy has always shown a strong interest in securing a route to the Mediterranean Sea. With the Assad regime in Syria remaining in power they feel comfortable and satisfied. They also have a “veto” in Lebanon where Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, hold the balance of power in Lebanese politics. In Palestine they founded the Islamic Jihad movement and presented themselves as the true defenders of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the liberation of Palestine. Measuring their influence in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and, recently, in Sanaa, the Iranians consider themselves the dominant power in the East Mediterranean area. They enjoy geographic proximity and military presence on the ground. They also enjoy the benefit of strong political and military allies. On top of that, Iran's active diplomacy is providing their regional activity with extended political and diplomatic cover. Iran's smart diplomacy: Moreover, just two days before the official Saudi declaration of the cessation of Operation Decisive Storm, Iran asked the US, not its Arab neighbours, to start talks about regional cooperation in what the Iranian foreign minister called the “wider Persian Gulf region.” What a humiliation to the countries of the region! In his open message, published by the New York Times on 20 April, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Jawad Zarif said: “Iran has been clear: the purview of our constructive engagement extends far beyond nuclear negotiations. Good relations with Iran's neighbours are our top priority. “Our rationale is that the nuclear issue has been a symptom, not a cause, of mistrust and conflict. Considering recent advances in symptom prevention, it is time for Iran and other stakeholders to begin to address the causes of tension in the wider Persian Gulf region.” I wonder if kings, heads of states, prime ministers and political and military leaders in the “Arab world” have anything to say to Mr Zarif? Anyway, they were not addressed and were completely ignored. The message about cooperation in the “wider Persian Gulf region” was sent to the White House, which makes you wonder: Is it really there, in Washington DC, that the agenda for the Middle East should be set first? The Iranians believe so. I suspect that Iran will also exploit the fragile political situation in Arab countries in its favour. Some politicians and community leaders in the Arab world believe that Iran is the real “political equaliser” to Israel. Others in the region see it as a threat. A few, including the “wise” Omani leadership, see Iran as a “fact of life”, regardless of the nature of its political regime at any given time. Arab regimes don't have an intact and coherent strategy to deal with their powerful neighbour. Nevertheless, the success of Iranian foreign policy in the “East Mediterranean” –– or the “Arab world” or the “wider Persian Gulf region” (pick the name you prefer according to our ideological belief) –– depends mainly on the weakness of their opponents. This weakness is Iran's biggest and most influential ally in the region. The Yemeni divide: In Yemen, the story is part of Iranian strategy to seek maximum influence in the region. Tehran has been for a long time forging close relations with Badr Eddin Al- Houthi and then with his son, Abdel Malek Al-Houthi. With the help of Iran, the Houthis fought one war after another against Ali Abdullah Saleh. They got toughened up through those wars, trained, equipped and fully practiced in the arts of fighting in mountains and valleys against traditional army troops. When they took control of Sanaa on 21 September 2014 they immediately brought with them a new administration, or appointed new faces loyal to them in sensitive posts. They wanted to impress and convince the people of Sanaa that they were better and that they were taking the side of the “deprived people.” They demanded the support of the people against the newly born regime headed by Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. They swiftly controlled Sanaa with no resistance. As the political process was paralysed and as the Saudis started to influence the situation by inviting all political opponents to go to Riyadh for negotiations, the Houthis felt they were going to be politically squeezed in any talks hosted by the Saudis. I strongly think that Iran and its allies tried everything to stop such a move. During the week before the Houthis started their advance towards Aden, the UN secretary general visited Riyadh and had a meeting with King Salman and the two strongmen in Riyadh, Prince Mohamed Bin Nayef and Prince Mohamed Bin Salman. During these meetings, the secretary general's special envoy to Yemen was severely criticised and the secretary general himself backed the Saudi call to host the Yemeni talks in Riyadh. It was at that time that Iran told the Houthi militia and Saleh's forces to advance towards Aden. The strategy was to create a new situation on the ground and to cut the Saudis short of their target of hosting talks in Riyadh. The Houthi's power and deficit: The sources of power feeding into Houthi influence include the Iranian lifeline of weapons, expertise, money, food and medical supplies; their loyal militias and army units; some tribal leaders, especially in the north; some army units loyal to Saleh; stocks of weapons taken from the Yemeni armed forces; considerable amounts of money taken from banks and government treasuries; Saleh's ability to mobilise troops and tribal leaders by buying their loyalty with money; and a well-organised chain of command throughout the country, north and south alike. Of course, they also have the full diplomatic support of Iran and Russia. The support of the Russians will prove to be the most valuable international factor for the Iranian-backed rebels in the coming months. And we will see that clearly again and again in Security Council meetings. Delaying tactics, political manoeuvring and pushing the situation to the brink of full regional war will become methods that will be employed inside the Security Council by the Russians, in order to give rebels some advantages and to qualify them as equal political partners alongside the legitimate government of Yemen. The aim is to give the Houthis a legitimate path to political power, recognised and protected by the international community. However, the Iranian-backed rebels suffer from some serious deficits. The main shortage is the air, sea and land blockade that is imposed by Operation Decisive Storm. Removing the blockade will free them of this deficit. Iran can't supply its allies with weapons, troops or trainers but through smuggling routes and other such methods. This situation is the opposite of the advantage Iran enjoys in its supply routes to allies in Iraq and the East Mediterranean. Iranian allies may find themselves isolated and suffering a lack of all kind of supplies if the full blockade continues. The resistance movement in Aden consists mainly of young and militarily inexperienced persons. They lack proper training, organisation, equipment and leadership. Recently, some retired officers joined in and became a strong addition to the resistance. But there is an overall deficit in leadership, organisation and weaponry. Members of the resistance have very often found themselves obliged to fight with guns against armoured vehicles, tanks and artillery. This is an uneven fight that has cost the resistance dearly. Visibility is credibility: One of the positive developments was the appointment of Khaled Bahah to the post of vice-president. Bahah is an excellent technocrat who has the respect of the majority of the people in his country. He will have to do a lot to reset the chain of command in Yemen, both in the armed forces and in the government civil service, in the north as well as in the south. As the president is now in Saudi Arabia and Minister of Defence General Sobaihy has just been released by the Houthis, Yemen's legitimate authorities should work hard to establish “credibility” on the ground. In politics, we always say, “visibility is credibility.” If there is no leading figure “visible” on the ground, the resistance will lack one very important element for making the needed victory. The alternative is to promote a ground resistance leader to become a shining figure inside Yemen and to protect him. I should here warn of the re-creation of “Tajamoa Al-Islah”, the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. I should also warn against making the reinstallation of President Hadi the end of Operation Decisive Storm. The political end should be to set up a modern democratic system of government in Yemen. Operation Decisive Storm should have declared that aim loud and clear to win the support of the Yemeni people, especially the young, across the whole country. One last word about Security Council Resolution 2216: it is not seen by Iran or by the Houthis as the end of the game. Moreover, the resolution will be used as a tool to pressure Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who thought that they brought the international community to their side, will later feel the pain of international community pressure. The war will continue. And if more than air strikes follow, including direct military intervention on the ground or naval clashes at sea, that would create a new twist in the situation. Escalation would become unavoidable. This is the worst-case scenario and hopefully it will not happen. The writer is chairman of the Arab Organisation for Freedom of the Press.
