Indications of an imminent solution to Lebanon's political crisis do little to assuage Lebanese fears of open conflict, Serene Assir writes from Beirut With diplomatic initiatives, regional and domestic, shuffling at high speed in an apparent bid to resolve Lebanon's political crisis, and with reports of an imminent resolution, there has been a shift in the mood on the ground. No longer qualified as hopeless, the crisis seems set to reap results that both the government and the opposition have been clamouring for ever since the country ground to a political standstill. Images of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visit to Riyadh for talks with Saudi King Abdullah were broadcast on Lebanese television channels across the political spectrum. The apparent amicability, followed by statements from leading opposition figures of a possible reconciliation ahead of the 28 March Arab summit injected some hope into a situation previously nigh impossible to calm. The solution that Saudi Ambassador to Beirut Abdel Aziz Khoja has been working on in liaison with government and opposition leaders involves both the establishment of a national unity government based on the 19-plus-11 formula the opposition has been calling for, and the approval of an international tribunal to try suspects alleged to have been involved in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in February 2005. While the atmosphere has been described as positive, both by the Saudis and members of the opposition, including powerful Amal chief Nabih Berri, government forces have yet to openly accept the formation of a government in which 11 opposition cabinet members would hold veto power over national decisions. Still, statements by Future Movement leader Saad Al-Hariri, son of the assassinated former prime minister, lauding Saudi Arabian efforts no doubt indicate that although the 14 March government is cautious, Saudi-forged reconciliation would likely be accepted. After years of playing a secondary role in Lebanese national politics, former Prime Minister Selim Al-Hoss, who has regularly praised Saudi Arabia's brokering of the Mecca Accord, has re-entered the scene playing a diplomatic role hard to pin as either pro or anti-government. A solution forged in Riyadh could, it has been said in pro-government circles, end up with Hoss taking over from Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora in a new cabinet. Nonetheless, near-daily news of narrowly foiled bomb plots in various residential areas across Beirut brought street tensions to a new high last week. There have been no repeats of the twin bus bombing that killed three on 13 February in Ain Aalaq near Mount Lebanon, but the impression countrywide is that no one -- civilian or politician -- is safe any more. News flashes from the traditional Maronite stronghold Ashrafiyye and from the overwhelmingly Shia southern suburbs of Beirut recounting the discovery of timer bombs in residential districts appear as heralds of trouble to come. There is also a heightened sense that, whatever the recent Saudi-Iranian initiative may augur, it would only be a temporary interim solution. For Siniora's supporters, the prospect of the formation of a new government granting the Hizbullah-led opposition veto power is unconstitutional. They argue that the current government was democratically elected and should therefore remain in place until the next elections. For Hizbullah, the Free Patriotic Movement, Amal and their smaller allies in opposition, the option of calling for a general strike has not yet been completely discarded. No doubt, holding the country together through the coming months will prove incredibly difficult, regardless of whether a new government is formed or not. Unresolved and perhaps more critical issues could be brought to the fore as the summer approaches, particularly as regional and international questions are being decided. It might only take a few more incidents of the kind we have been witnessing -- not least, what began as a student brawl and came to involve snipers and Sunni- Shia-Druze beatings and killings in January at the Beirut Arab University -- for the situation to explode. Deep down, the United States -- and by default client-supreme Saudi Arabia -- has a vested interest in Lebanese political decisions staying as far away from Hizbullah's hands as possible. Talk of the emergence of a so-called "Shia crescent" attests to that, while "concerns" over Israel's security mould it. With Druze strongman Walid Jumblatt MP in the US for talks last week, it is clearer than ever that what is being decided today in Lebanon is not simply a matter of who will govern. Like countless other times in its history, Lebanon appears to constitute a front line where much larger questions of regional and international significance are being fought out. For now, the fight is covert. With oil giants Riyadh and Teheran battling over regional prowess -- like they have for the best part of the 28 years since the Islamic revolution in Iran -- and with the US's demonstrated incapacity to subdue the Iraqi resistance and a much-weakened Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announcing Israel's plans to prepare for possible confrontation this summer with Hizbullah, the question of who will rule Lebanon is all-but-insignificant. In January, US President George W Bush gave permission to proceed with covert operations targeting Hizbullah in cooperation with the Saudis, as Seymour Hersh revealed last week in The New Yorker. However high the civilian and infrastructural toll, the 2006 summer war established that Israel and the US's joint goal of destroying Hizbullah in Lebanon could not be achieved from the sky. No doubt there will be other attempts. Israel cannot abide the affront to its regional hegemony plans of living side-by-side with a well-trained fighting force that has attained military achievements no Arab army in numerous wars since 1948 has attained and which is committed to defending Lebanon. In line with Israeli and Western policy during the 1975-90 civil war in Lebanon, allies in the existential fight for dominance in the Middle East are being picked. Iran and Syria, on the other side of the axis, are doing the same. With the Lebanese busy fighting each other, no doubt it would be much easier to attain otherwise difficult goals in this small- but-volatile country. Just like in Iraq, however, the plan may not work as expected. In some ways, Lebanon has come a long way from its condition up until 1990. Certainly, most of the warlords around at the time of the civil war still control formidable reserves of power and are busy arming themselves further. In interview with the Lebanese Forces-owned LBC television station, Jumblatt went as far as comparing Lebanon to the US, saying that everyone is armed, just like in America. As for a controversial shipment of weapons that Hassan Nasrallah backed during a rally to commemorate the death of Hizbullah former chief Abbas Al-Moussawi 16 February, it has since transpired that they were actually going to Nabih Berri's Amal movement. In more ways than one, the Lebanese would do well to look south and study the results of the Mecca Accord between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine. Sure, Saudi intervention put a stop to street fighting. But the West has continued to refuse to financially support a government that features a group it deems terrorist. New strikes have been launched by Palestinian government workers, who still have no income to support their families. How long the situation there will hold is hard to tell. Even if Nasrallah holds true to his promise to grant his opposition allies the cabinet seats its coalition might gain should a deal be brokered, the minute the US chooses to step up its anti-Hizbullah campaign, Lebanon might find itself steeped in a new, transnational theatre plagued with omens of Palestine. But then again, the game is already underway. The most the Lebanese can hope for now, some say, is global restraint.
