David Dumke analyses Egypt-US relations through the prism of the US Congress There has been much discussion about what the US Congress will do about the Egyptian assistance package this year. Led by staunchly pro-Israel Representative Tom Lantos (D- California), Senator Mitch McConnell (R- Kentucky), and, more recently, Representative David Obey (D-Wisconsin), Congress has held increasingly acrimonious debates over the last several years about both the level and terms of US aid to Egypt. Thus far, funding to Cairo has not been substantially reduced, but Congress has attached more strings as to how economic aid to Egypt is spent -- requiring more money to be allocated to democracy and governance programmes and education. With its recent emphasis on promoting Arab democracy and human rights, George Bush's administration is seemingly on the same page as Congress. However, this belies the fact that Congress -- which is growing increasingly independent and assertive -- is motivated by numerous factors which in many cases do not coincide with the White House. Within Congress itself, at least five factions have emerged in the Egypt debate: the realists; the peace process faction; the democracy advocates; the pro-Likud cabal; and the Bush administration critics. Often, their interests overlap -- forming two loose coalitions pitting realists and peace process advocates against the latter three groups. Thus far, the former coalition -- which supports the continuation of the Egyptian economic and military assistance package with minimal change -- has constituted a majority. These two groups advocate traditional regional alliances akin to the policies of former US presidents Bill Clinton and George H W Bush. The peace process faction includes a sizable number of Jewish members of Congress who are loath to alienate Egypt, which has been a pivotal player in the peace process. The other coalition includes members who, influenced by NGOs and activist groups like Human Rights Watch, strongly support the notion that the US must promote regional democracy -- even if it risks weakening relationships with allied Arab nations such as Egypt and Tunisia in the short term. The Likud group is motivated by the fear that closer Egyptian-US relations, and relations with other influential Arab nations, namely Saudi Arabia, will eventually threaten Israel's position in Washington. Lastly, there are the Bush administration critics who use Egypt as a test as to whether the White House's support of democracy promotion is sincere. They are particularly angered by what they see as the administration's failure to clearly explain its regional policy priorities to Congress. The anti-Egypt element minimises the importance of Egyptian-US defence and security ties -- one of the pillars of the bilateral relationship. By contrast, strategic analysts, military officials, diplomats and key members of the US House and Senate -- including veteran legislators such as Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan) and Senator Ted Stevens (R- Alaska) along with a majority of members of the powerful Armed Service and Appropriations Committees -- believe coordination with the Egyptian armed forces and intelligence service is crucial in protecting the US regional interests and maintaining its regional military posture. They note that Egyptian- US cooperation on defence and security matters -- via direct resource sharing, intelligence gathering, diplomatic coordination, training and facilitating military transportation -- also saves American lives and is crucial to waging the war on terror. Off Capitol Hill, Egypt enjoys considerable support from the American defence and intelligence community, particularly among uniformed officers and CIA officials who have directly worked with Egypt. These officials, who are by necessity realists in the realm of international relations, generally do not support recent emphasis on democracy and human rights in the Arab world. They fear the Bush administration's focus on these issues, coupled with Congress' increased scrutiny of Egypt, could eventually cool relations with Cairo on all levels. This would result in a catastrophic loss of regional access and support at a profoundly difficult time for the US. Some American decision-makers, motivated by realistic strategic assessments, also consider business interest. Egypt was the largest worldwide purchaser (through arms agreements and deliveries) of US defence articles between 2002-2005. During that period, Egypt agreed to purchase $5.2 billion in US equipment; $5.8 billion in equipment was delivered to Egypt. Opponents of the Egyptian aid package generally believe there is little cost in bludgeoning the Egyptian government to induce domestic reforms. These individuals see the annual economic and military assistance package as little more than a handout to a regime they would like to see more compliant on regional and domestic matters. Accordingly, believing the Egyptian government is dependent upon US largesse, they feel they can cut or alter either economic or military assistance to force Cairo's hand. Most recently, they used Egypt's treatment of jailed opposition figure Ayman Nour as a litmus test as to whether the Egyptian government is committed to democratic reform or not. Specific facts mean little in this or other debates over peripheral issues. Negative perceptions currently shape the Washington debate about Egypt, which risks eroding the latter's support in Congress and threatens both the ESF (economic) and FMF (military) assistance programmes. With the exception of recent efforts by US Ambassador to Egypt Francis Ricciardone and other senior diplomats, Congress overwhelmingly opines that the State Department's efforts to uphold the current level of US assistance to Egypt are minimal. Only the Department of Defence has consistently warned Congress of the dangers of cutting or placing restrictions on Egyptian aid. In part, Egypt's problems with Congress are attributable to the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy and human rights. Congress believes democracy promotion has been selectively adapted across the region. As a result, otherwise staunch American allies such as Egypt have been cast in an unfavourable light in comparison to Qatar, Jordan and even Libya. While the State Department suggests that this is due to the fact that it expects more from Cairo, Congress feels it has not clearly explained its rationale. Congress and the media -- especially the Washington Post 's Jackson Diehl -- have responded by increasing criticism of Egypt. They have done so because they believe direct pressure on Cairo will force change, and out of scepticism of the Bush administration's long- term commitment to democracy promotion. Again, by threatening Egypt, they are trying to force the White House to clearly explain its regional priorities. "We can't see the forest for the trees," said one member of a recent congressional delegation to Tunisia, when describing current US policy towards both Tunis and Cairo. The deep concern among realists in Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, is that the Bush administration's focus on democratisation and human rights, and Congress' response to it, is causing the US to lose perspective on the big picture. While there are legitimate grievances on democracy and human rights with both nations, they fear that continual complaints, and the very public manner in which they are made, will weaken key bilateral relationships at a time the US can ill-afford to do so. Indeed, a very interesting debate is expected in Congress.
