Upcoming parliamentary elections are the third major milestone in Egypt's political roadmap. The importance of these elections transcends the fact that it will mark the end of the post-3 July 2013 interim period. It is will be a marker of the country's ability to build a strong political system and create a modern democratic state. An analysis of events since 25 January 2011 and their impact on political activity and the electoral process is necessary to predict the outcome of the elections and their long-term impact on the shape and identity of the Egyptian state. The current environment is laden with considerable anxiety and fear, but there is also hope. The interim phase is coming to an end and a building process is beginning. Many of the required elements for building are weak or lacking. It should be borne in mind that in order to alleviate the potential costs and boost the political process it is essential to address a number of challenging questions, most notably the relationship between state and society, the degree of social evolution, the prevailing social culture, and the fragmentation of the Egyptian polity. Many analysts and commentators have begun to predict the outcome of the election, the composition of the forthcoming parliament and the post-electoral political map well before the campaign process has even begun. Some have even outlined scenarios regarding the relationship of the parliament with the president. This is because of the powers that parliament now holds, such as the power to form a government and hold it accountable. Several major issues have been the focus of political debate. Most are related to the rules and environment of the electoral process. One subject of concern is that the rules of the electoral game have remained largely unchanged, and that traditional social bases and culture will continue to dominate. This has already become apparent in some of the actions of political forces, signalling an electoral environment that is largely shaped by money, the use of religion, weak political parties and feeble alliances, a sharp polarisation between the “Islamists” and “secularists”, and reliance on family/kin connections and organic affiliations. A second concern is raised by attempts to forge political alliances and coalitions to offset social and political uncertainty. For the most part, these scenes betray a considerable political immaturity and the limited ability of political parties and institutions to absorb a broad range of social and political forces. They also reflect the inability of the electoral system to reflect political diversity in practical ways, and to remedy the problem of sociopolitical representation. There is a lack of coordination between political and social building processes. This weakness needs to be remedied so that stability improves and the country can move forward economically. The third issue pertains to the delay in the promulgation of the law governing the boundaries of electoral districts. Campaigning has already begun and President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has issued Presidential Decree 231 of 2014 calling for the creation of a Supreme Electoral Commission on 15 July, which is to say before the end of the constitutionally stipulated six-month period, for this purpose. Public discussion over the electoral districts law has taken various directions. Some suggest that this delay is linked to the government's desire to delay parliamentary elections as a whole. Others suggest that it is linked to the delay in making changes to the boundaries of governorates and the creation of three new governorates. The delay in passing the electoral districts law, in spite of the assurances from the government and the president, has angered many political forces that find it difficult to prepare for the elections without knowing the electoral district boundaries. In this regard, it is useful to highlight a number of questions that the debate has brought forward and that the law should take into account. These include demographic equality. District boundaries should take into account population densities to ensure equal representation of the inhabitants of each district. Another question surrounds administrative continuity. District boundaries should observe existing administrative boundaries so that a single district does not overlap two governorates. There is also the matter of geographic continuity. District boundaries should be in tune with the distribution of villages and district capitals. A fourth major issue that has been the focus of political debate surrounding the upcoming parliamentary elections is whether “religious political parties” — which is to say religious parties based on religious affiliation and a religious ideological platform — should be allowed to take part. Indeed, the controversy over whether these parties should even be allowed to continue to exist has had repercussions on the electoral process, potential voting patterns and the general “civil versus religious” political polarisation surrounding the polls. This issue acquired a greater space of public discussion following the Supreme Administrative Court ruling that ordered the dissolution of the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Many believe that religious political parties should be banned, in accordance with Article 74 of the 2014 Constitution, which prohibits “the exercise of any political activity or the creation of political parties on a religious basis or in a manner that discriminates on the basis of gender, origin or sectarian or geographic affiliation.” Accordingly, some religious parties could meet the same fate as the FJP, especially in light of the court ruling that found that the party had “deviated from the principles and goals to which it should have adhered as a popular and democratic national organisation” and that its members had “violated national unity and worked to create division and instability by spreading chaos and violence instead of democratic dialogue.” Such a ruling might be found to apply to the Islah (Reform) Party, Salafist Fadila (Virtue) Party, Salafist Al-Raya (Banner) Party, Islamic Party (the political wing of the Egyptian Jihad Organisation), Arab Tawhid Party, New Labour Party and Construction and Development Party (the political wing of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya). All of these parties supported Morsi and the FJP following its dissolution. On the other hand, there are parties to which the court's justification of banning the FJP would not apply. These are the Nour Party, Watan (Homeland) Party, and Wasat (Centre) Party, which either did not engage in violence at all or withdrew from the pro-Morsi alliance and officially renounced violence. The question of “religious political parties” is likely to remain controversial, even though, generally speaking, it is not easy to brand a political party as “religious”, especially if there is nothing in its charter or articles of association to support this. Also, the Administrative Court, in its ruling, drew a distinction between the term “on a religious basis” and the term “religious frame of reference.” A party that defines itself accordingly would theoretically be acceptable as long as there was nothing in its form or activities that involved mixing religion with politics, or that entailed discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation. The fifth controversial issue is whether the Muslim Brothers, as individuals, should be allowed to take part in the elections directly or indirectly (especially since there are no explicit political, legal or social restrictions that would apply to them as individuals). A related question involves the boundaries of cooperation and coordination between them and other Islamist groups and factions. If Muslim Brotherhood members do participate in the elections, they may do so in different ways. First, they might ally with the parties that make up the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (NASL), an group of 30 parties that opposed the 30 June Revolution and back the Muslim Brotherhood. Among these parties are the Construction and Development Party, New Labour, Virtue, Reform, Arab Tawhid, Islamic Party and Salafist Front. An electoral coalition between these and others could include unknown Muslim Brotherhood members in their lists. A second possibility would be for Muslim Brotherhood candidates to ally with parties that have withdrawn from NASL, namely the Centre Party and Salafist Watan (Homeland) Party. Third, Muslim Brotherhood members might strike an agreement with members of a coalition that could include Abdel-Moneim Abul-Futouh's Strong Egypt Party, dissident Muslim Brothers, Ghad Al-Thawra (Tomorrow of the Revolution) Party, Hadara (Civilisation) Party, Youth Against the Coup movement, or 6 April Movement. These parties and movements are working to create a coalition called the “Front to Save 25 January”, the declared aim of which is to revive and realise the aims of the 25 January Revolution. A fourth avenue would be for Muslim Brotherhood candidates to ally with figures who have no record of connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, or who are ideologically affiliated with it. Some youth movements or blocs, for example, could serve as the Muslim Brotherhood's back door into parliament. While the four alternatives above may offer surreptitious routes for the Muslim Brothers to re-enter parliament, all ignore the dynamics of electoral rivalry between the Islamist parties, whether in the districts allocated for the individual ticket system or those in which lists will be contending. This will apply in particular to the districts where they will be fielding 15 individual candidates (as will be the case in a segment of the western Delta that includes the Alexandria, Baheira and Matrouh governorates and the eastern Delta governorates of Ismailiya, Port Said, Suez and North and South Sinai). All of these districts are known for the heavy and diverse presence of Islamist trends. These groups will be hoping to win the greatest number of parliamentary seats. The foregoing issues underscore the sensitivity of the current moment and the difficulties of the processes of democratic transformation. Political elites are weak, there is a general lack of faith in democratic causes, and a range of political, social, economic and moral dilemmas weigh heavily on the political and electoral climates. Still, there is hope that the upcoming elections will provide sufficient momentum to drive the reform and development process forward. The writer is editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Ahwal Masriya.
