The rise of the Islamic State (IS) terror group which has been accompanied by its seizure of large chunks of territory in the Sunni provinces in Iraq has plunged the country into deep instability and redefined ethno-sectarian border lines. IS's summer advances have left Iraq in turmoil and its main communities of the Kurds, Shias and Sunnis geographically segregated. But while it remains to be seen if the Muslim Shias and Sunnis will stick together when the dust of the war settles, the ethnic Kurds seem to have made the choice to go it alone. Iraq's Kurds who have been benefiting from the mess created by the 2003 US-led invasion, have seized upon the opportunity created by the IS crisis to start writing the last chapter of their lifetime dream of independence. Immediately after the IS advance, Kurdish forces, known as Peshmergas, overran Iraqi army positions and captured large swathes of territory, including the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, and declared them part of their self-ruled region. Since the IS onslaught in mid-June, the Kurds have been taking drastic steps to consolidate their gains, provoking angry reactions from many Iraqi Arabs and other minorities. Last week the Kurdistan regional parliament authorised the sending of the Peshmergas to the embattled town of Kobane in Syria, which is under siege by IS militants. The Kurdish Government said the force would “defend Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan”. Erbil was trying to take advantage of the Kobane standoff to boost its stature with Syrian Kurds, but the move sent shock waves through Arab-controlled Iraq as politicians and lawmakers considered it to be unconstitutional and provocative. Iraq's post-Saddam constitution states that the Peshmerga is “a local defence force” funded by the Iraqi central government. It also stipulates that the federal Baghdad government maintains responsibility for the country's security and foreign policies. The decision has come at a time when Iraqi Arab politicians are criticising the Kurdish Government for not doing enough to help the Iraqi security forces in retaking territories now under IS control, despite huge weapons and other supplies provided to the Kurds by Western nations. They also note that since the war against IS started, Kurdish forces backed by US air forces have captured key strategic areas, such the Mosul Dam, raising the prospect that the Kurds are seeking to hold control over water into the southern parts of Iraq. Among some of the most disturbing signs that the Kurds want to maintain control of the newly acquired territories has been growing evidence that the Peshmergas are blocking the return of the Arab population to their homes in areas the force has regained from IS. In multiple episodes, the international media have been reporting accounts of the “Kurdification”, or systematic ethnic cleansing of Arabs, in towns and villages seized by the Kurds after fighting with IS. Other Arabs who have remained in their towns have complained of mistreatment by Kurdish forces, including living in fear of retribution for staying in their homes during the terrorist group's short-lived control of their areas. While the Arabs accuse the Kurdish authorities of deliberately forcing them to leave their areas to take control of what they call disputed regions, Kurdish officials say the Arabs aren't to be trusted and that the mixed villages actually belong to them. This month the Kurdish government also unveiled plans to find funds through foreign loans, a move apparently intended to achieve independent financial institutions that lie beyond the reach of regulators in Baghdad and bolsters separation. Some reports have also suggested that the Kurdish Government has already started negotiations with foreign banks to apply for international loans against future oil revenues. Though the Government justifies the move as an attempt to deal with financial difficulties created by the blocking of the Kurdistan Region's budget by the government of former Iraqi prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki, Iraqi Arabs consider the measure as in breach of Iraq's constitution. It will also further complicate the resolution of a dispute with the central government over selling Kurdistan's oil independently, which prompted Al-Maliki to halt the Kurds' share in the federal budget. In recent months Kurdistan has received hundreds of millions of US dollars for shipments of oil piped through Turkey to international markets. Moreover, the Kurds have also declared an intention to allow the United States to build an air base in their enclave. According to several reports, the Kurdish Government sanctioned the construction of the air base in a Saddam Hussein-era air strip in Harir outside Erbil. The Kurdish Government has not reacted to the reports, but Bayan Dakhil, a prominent Kurdish MP, acknowledged this week that it had been in contact with foreign “diplomatic missions in Iraq to open bases in the region”. She told the state-owned Iraqi Media Network that the bases would be constructed “to protect the Kurds against IS”. Iraq's post-Saddam constitution enshrines the nation's unity under a federal system which gives the right to autonomy. Under Article 140 of the constitution, however, the fate of disputed territories should be decided in a referendum by their population. Following the seizure of Kirkuk and other areas, Kurdish officials insisted that the decision to annex the areas was irreversible. The Kurdish President and head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Massoud Barzani has declared that the Kurds no longer feel bound by the Iraqi constitution and has asked Kurdish MPs to start preparations for a vote on the right of self-determination. Since the ouster of Saddam's regime following the US-led invasion of Iraq, the Kurds have turned their autonomous region into a semi-independent entity. Now the region has its own president, prime minister and parliament, and it also has its own army, security forces, intelligence services and operates its airports and the region's border points. Most Iraqi Kurds believe that breaking away from Iraq is inevitable. But many in the Kurdish community, including Barzani's allies, have been critical of what they describe as his “stage-burning” policy which they deem as provocative. Last week Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed, a senior member of the Kurdistan Patriotic Union, the main KDP partner in the Kurdish Government, made scathing criticisms against Barzani's government for the way it was handling the IS crisis. “Kurdish independence as a dream of every Kurd should not be compromised and used as a bargaining chip without providing real requirements to achieve independence,” she was quoted as saying. In a rare criticism of the leadership of Barzani, Ahmed, a sister-in-law of the former Iraqi president and head of the PUK Jalal Talabani, also criticised the KDP's alliance with Turkey which she said was undermining Iraqi Kurdish interests. Ibrahim blasted the Kurdish Government for the way it was dealing with the Western military assistance in the war against IS and the lack of transparency in distributing humanitarian aid. “No one knows where the weapons go and if training has already started,” she said. The row could seem to be a split over tactics to put pressure on Baghdad, but in reality it reflects a deeper division among the Kurds about the Kurdish Government's policy since IS's rise. The conflict has divided Kurds among themselves because of its geostrategic ramifications in Iraqi and neighbouring countries. While it has brought opportunities for Iraqi Kurds' independence by breaking down the Iraqi state, it has also alerted Iraq's two key neighbours, Iran and Turkey, which have large ethnic Kurdish communities, to the dangers of having an independent Kurdish state on their borders. The PUK, which controls the eastern Kurdish province of Sulaimaniya on the border with Iran, historically has had good relations with Tehran and does not want to undermine these by encouraging Kurdish separatism or getting closer to Ankara. The crisis has also unveiled a deep division between Iraqi and Syrian Kurds over relations with Turkey. While Turkey maintains tacitly friendly relations with Barzani's government, it also considers the Syrian Kurdish movement to be a terrorist group. Balancing the mix of pan-Kurdish solidarity with the Syrian Kurds and appeasing Ankara is forcing the Iraqi Kurds to walk a tightrope in order to avoid compromising relations with both. It is possible, therefore, for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region to take advantage of the consequences of IS's rise and its tearing apart of Iraq. But it remains unlikely that the Kurds will be better off with an independent state in such a troubled region and at such turbulent time.
