When the first spontaneous explosions of the Arab democratic revolutions erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, many hoped this revolt might usher in a new beginning for the whole region. When Egypt joined Tunisia a few weeks later, hopes mounted and everyone started to think that the long-awaited moment had finally arrived. This feeling further intensified with the Yemeni revolution and the early stages of the revolutions in Libya and Syria. A new order was anticipated. Nevertheless, the trajectory of events took things in a completely different direction. Some choose to see the recent downward spiral as a conspiracy theory, while others see in these events the natural outcome of an ignorance planted by corrupt rulers over decades. In fact, every Arab, except those who were benefiting from toppled regimes, was happy and hopeful about the so-called Arab Spring, and Arab thinkers started to draw optimistic scenarios for the future. On the other hand, despite an initial hesitation and falling into the trap of duality — i.e., interests versus morals — the West ostensibly began to cheer and support these revolts. Even the staunchest critics of the Arab world saw these revolts as bringing the region into the democratic club. Nonetheless, with the beginning of the armed conflict in Libya, the picture became distorted. People started to question how far violence could justify the fulfilment of democratic aspirations. In Syria, violence escalated to an unprecedented level as regional and international actors tried to use the Syrian scene either to counter the influence of other nations or to find a foothold in the region. To that end there were no objections whatsoever about whose hands the money and weapons would fall into, as long as Bashar Al-Assad's regime was weakened and as long as they maintained some sort of leverage in the ongoing action in Syria. This fact refutes, without doubt, the allegations of some states that others were financing and funding jihadists in Syria, because, quite simply, everyone paid and funded everyone and anyone who fought against Al-Assad. The conflict in Syria revealed the divergence and convergence of policies of regional regimes concerning Arab revolts. While the Saudis were in favour of the regional status quo, except for Syria and Libya (nations it did not have good relations with), the Iranians were in favour of revolutionary change in the region, aiming to re-clone their experience, except in Syria, its ally. The Turks, on the other hand, were in favour of a gradual transition in the region in order to maintain their economic interests, but again with the exception of Syria, where they wanted drastic change and the toppling of Al-Assad. With the emergence of Al-Nusra Front, followed by the Islamic State (IS), originally known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the whole Arab Spring was hijacked. In other words, with the number of atrocities committed by these two groups, not one single Arab has the luxury of thinking about democracy or fighting dictatorship, lest they suffer similar troubles. Although there is a consensus on the grave threat IS poses, there has been no real agreement among regional and global powers on fighting or eliminating the group. Some powers see that weakening IS would not only mean that Al-Assad would remain, but would also give him the opportunity to retrieve lost territories in Syria. Other regional powers see that by fighting and weakening IS they can empower other groups, like the Kurdish PKK and Shia guerrillas. Other superpowers recognise that eliminating IS would remove any reason for regional countries to seek support and assistance to fight those radicals. And again, as the notion of US meddling was what provoked many Arabs to revolt against their regimes, which were long accused of being American stooges, the moment the United States launched its air strikes against IS the number of new recruits to IS dramatically increased. It is claimed that more than 6,000 new recruits have joined the organisation since the beginning of the US campaign. With its quick rise and control of a large swath of Iraq and Syria, IS inspired many conspiracy theories surrounding the certain and undoubted role of the US in these events. Although critics of this conclusion refute this, claiming that the US is currently leading a campaign against IS, I tend to see this argument as both erroneous and illogical. Aside from the document revealed by Edward Snowden, the former contractor at the US National Security Agency (NSA), which said British and American intelligence and Mossad worked together to create IS in order to attract all extremists of the world to one place, there are still other signs. First, all observers have concluded that these strikes are not really harming IS. US Senator John McCain told CNN on 7 October that the IS advance shows the “ineffectiveness and fecklessness” of the air strikes. Second, the US's tardy decision to launch air strikes took months, during which time IS was expanding and gaining power day-by-day, despite all the atrocities committed by the group. Third, attacking IS does not necessarily mean that the US has no role in the formation and rise of the group. To illustrate, throughout history US administrations have attacked former allies when their interests conflicted (e.g., Manuel Noriega of Panama). However, one should concede that without the widespread ignorance of the Arab population — due to decades of malevolent policies by corrupt regimes that were allied with the US — such groups would not have found grounds to propagate an austere interpretation of Islam and carry out such violent acts. This fact does not, however, rule out a foreign imprint in the ongoing chaos in the region, and several incidents support this argument. Patriarch Gregorios of Greece wrote a letter to the Czar of Russia at the end of the 18th century. In it he said that abolishing the Islamic Ottoman Empire militarily was impossible. He suggested weakening the empire from within, mainly through ending discipline and morale, and importing Western ideas (from the French Revolution) of liberation and freedom. Tracking ensuing developments, not only during the demise of the Ottoman Empire but also in modern times, one can notice that this policy has been implemented perfectly and used non-Islamic culture as a cover, either by importing the values of liberation and equality from the French Revolution, or the values of US globalisation of human rights and democracy in order to penetrate Arab and Islamic societies. Such foreign infiltration was halted by recalling historical exploits and sometimes adopting radical agendas. Another example is a strategically important document: the 1907 Campbell-Bannerman Report. Although the report was suppressed and has not been officially released due to its gravity, several sources revealed a number of its conclusions, which included that Arab countries and the Muslim-Arab people presented a very real threat. The report recommended promoting disintegration, division and separation in the region; establishing artificial political entities that would be under the authority of imperialist countries; fighting any kind of unity, whether intellectual, religious or historical; and finally a “buffer state” to be established in Palestine, populated by a strong, foreign presence that would be hostile to its neighbours and friendly to European countries and their interests. That said, Ismael Hossein-Zadeh, in his article “Planned Chaos in the Middle East — and Beyond,” which appeared in CounterPunch on 18 July 2014, suggests that the “incoherent”, “illogical” or “contradictory” policies of the United States are in fact chaos that represents the success, not failure, of those policies — policies that are designed by the beneficiaries of war and military adventures in the region, and beyond. Quoting Hossein-Zadeh: “The seeds of the chaos were planted some 25 years ago, when the Berlin Wall collapsed. Since the rationale for the large and growing military apparatus during the Cold War years was the ‘threat of communism', US citizens celebrated the collapse of the Wall as the end of militarism and the dawn of ‘peace dividends' — a reference to the benefits that, it was hoped, many would enjoy in the United States as a result of a reorientation of part of the Pentagon's budget toward non-military social needs.” Unfortunately, with the arrival of new elements to the scene —the Kurds and the ethnic factors — all regional players succumbed to a form of paralysis. They saw few options at hand, and now the whole region is susceptible to further schism and graver ordeals until everyone realises that no one is immune from the ramifications of this scourge. The writer is a counsellor at the embassy of Palestine in Ankara.
