Like all the trials of politicians belonging to ousted regimes, the trial of former president Hosni Mubarak and his sons has stirred intense public debate and even a split within the so-called political elites. Regardless of the type of judiciary, regular or exceptional, these kinds of trials have always resulted in the polarisation, if not distortion, of public opinion. In Egypt, this distortion is not new. Beginning from the referendum of March 2011, such debates, owing to their characteristically divisive nature, have impacted the body politic. Certain media forums, particularly some talk shows, have purposively distorted public opinion through carefully planned campaigns to shape public opinion on certain issues or a given politician. Mubarak's trial falls within a unique form of national debate that seeks to reframe our understanding of the Mubarak regime, as well as the entire era. Some Egyptians, under the hardship of the current status quo, have been pushed to revisit their thoughts about the Mubarak period. They are now questioning their earlier views about the revolutionary events of January 2011. As a result, the trial has posed two interrelated questions and reignited the debate over the origins of the revolution. Many people have questioned whether they were better off under Mubarak than in the aftermath of the 25 January Revolution. There have also been questions about the exact nature of the youth vanguard and its effects on Egypt's state and society. These two questions are reflective of the current clouded atmosphere, with its grim socioeconomic realities and future uncertainties. Egypt has been passing through what commentator Labri Sadiki has described as a “liminal moment,” a moment of becoming and unbecoming. In other words, the current political scene is a grey area of confusion that resembles what has been described as in-betweenness, where two different worlds — an old, dying regime and an ill-defined emerging order — are casting their shadows. The trial and its debates are part of this grey area, with the defendants and their lawyers maximising their efforts to negate the revolution. They have described it as a catastrophic event that has led to the current crossroads and claim that it is part of a global foreign conspiracy. The trial has deliberately sought to compare the Mubarak era and the three years that have passed since his ousting in February 2011. But such a comparison ignores Mubarak's responsibility for the social and political upheavals that led to the January revolution. In other words, the Mubarak years of misrule were the major factor that drove society to the unprecedented popular revolution of 2011. What Egypt has witnessed since the revolution is, in fact, the legacy of the Mubarak era. This includes the Muslim Brotherhood's assumption of power. The rise of the group was a logical outcome of the ousted regime's flawed paths of development, both socially and economically. The allegation of a foreign conspiracy should be seen as an indictment of the failed state institutions that had lost their ability to identify the extent of society's penetration by foreign forces. The defendants' testimonies have revealed their inability to effectively address any such threats. That infiltrators from Hamas and Hezbollah participated in the events of the revolution was a clear indication of the failure of the security apparatus to undertake the necessary measures to safeguard the state borders, despite intelligence warnings. In fact, their testimonies have shown how the leadership of the security apparatus failed to fulfil its functions, and had lost its power to protect the country in the last days of the old regime. The declining security conditions in the aftermath of the January revolution are a continuation of the ousted regime's failure to contain the rising anger of the masses and its failure to respond to the increasing societal violence, sectarian conflicts, corruption and other problems. The January uprising, however, was not a liberal revolution, as some have wishfully thought, or even claimed. Equally important, it was not the food or hunger uprising that some had predicted during the last years of Mubarak's rule. Nor was it a religious revolution pursuing the implementation of Sharia law, even though some tried to make this its major thrust. As well, it was not an exclusively youthful event, as all generations participated in the revolutionary events. The revolution was not any of the above. Rather, it was a popular revolt triggered by a youthful vanguard of protestors who offered neither ideology nor leadership. By the end of Mubarak's rule, a critical mass of angry people had come to the forefront of the political scene. All that was needed was a catalyst, an event that would trigger a wider response. This critical mass reclaimed the people's revolution in June 2013. In the light of Mubarak's trial, some analysts have now started to revisit their early description of the 25 January Revolution as a genuinely spontaneous one. For some people, the testimonies of the defendants have strengthened their views on the nature of the popular uprising in January 2011. Half-hearted sympathisers of the revolution have reached their own conclusions, seeing it as a foreign conspiracy that was planned by foreign intelligence agencies and executed by local agents. This group of commentators has also claimed that the revolution ruined the Egyptian state and society. For this set of commentators, Mubarak's trial has turned into a straightforward indictment of the revolution. The trial and its related public debates have claimed that the political activists of the time were part of a global conspiracy to establish Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt as an initial phase in the American project of the Greater Middle East. But besmirching some of the so-called revolutionaries by accusing them of having controversial connections or links with foreign institutions should not discredit the millions of Egyptians who participated in the revolution and successfully toppled the Mubarak regime. In other words, the defamatory campaign against some activists should not touch upon the revolution itself, as these activists were not the leaders of the revolution. The January revolution was leaderless. The activists, among other actors both inside and outside Egypt, were stunned by the unprecedented popular participation that they had not expected or even dreamed of. It was the masses that made the 25 January Revolution as part of a thirst for a real change in the futures of the vast majority of people in this country. It should perhaps be mentioned here that the historian Timothy Tackett has highlighted that the spread of conspiracy theories also characterised the French Revolution, and has been associated with other revolutionary periods in world history. As Tackett writes, “It seems clear that in a time of revolution substantial numbers of people commonly come to believe in the reality of great webs of secret concerted action perpetrated by small groups of conspirators, threatening their lives and their political goals.” Conspiracy fears have been prevalent across Egypt's political landscape since January 2011. Mubarak was tried on 25 January 2011: the masses judged him when they shouted for the end of his regime. Some have opportunistically exploited the trial sessions to try to ruin the revolution of January 2011. This is the sort of behaviour that the Mubarak regime itself might have committed. What made the masses revolt against the ousted regime was a long array of reasons that history will record and judge. The people have had their say, and the only question regarding Mubarak's rule that remains is why he stayed in power for so long. The writer is a political analyst.
