The turmoil in Libya since the fall of the Gaddafi regime has posed a mounting threat to Egyptian national security in the fullest sense of the term, as defined by the need to protect the state's existence and vital interests from all potential and existing threats at home and abroad. The risk is all the greater in light of an environment conducive to the transmission of threats, such as common borders and social, historical and economic ties, factors that increase the priority the Libyan situation has for the new Egyptian administration following the election of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi and the drive to recover the stability that has been “lost” since the 25 January Revolution. The following are the most salient threats to Egyptian national security from the situation in Libya: - The transformation of eastern Libya into a regional incubator for jihadist groups. Due to the fragility of the post-revolutionary interim authority and its inability to disarm the militias, develop new and efficient military and security agencies, and to establish its control over all parts of the country, militant jihadist groups proliferated, especially in eastern Libya. These were made up primarily of the second generation of Libyan jihadists who refused to engage in the post-revolutionary political process and who resurfaced as militia brigade commanders in Benghazi, Derna and other eastern cities. The Martyrs of Abu Salim, Ansar Al-Sharia, the Marty Omar Abdel-Rahman and the Tawhid and Jihad are among the most prominent militia groups. Ideologically and organisationally inspired by Al-Qaeda, they seek to impose Sharia law by force. They are also accused of assassinating figures associated with the former Gaddafi regime, attacking Western interests in Libya (most notably the US Consulate in Benghazi), training volunteers to fight in Syria and collaborating with jihadist groups in the Maghreb and northern Mali. Eastern Libya has thus become both a “tributary and estuary” for jihadist movements in the region, which has worked to generate a hostile environment towards Egypt across the border. There have been frequent indicators that eastern Libya has become a safe transit point for some Islamists wanted by the police who fled Egypt after 30 June, such as the Egyptian Islamist leader Assem Abdel-Maged who fled to Qatar via Libya and Safwat Hegazi who was arrested in Marsa Matrouh before he could escape to Libya. In addition, jihadist groups in eastern Libya staged a military muscle-flexing parade against Egypt in response to the breakup of Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins in August 2013 in Giza and Cairo. - The rise of organised crime in eastern Libya. Due to the laxity of the Egyptian security agencies following the Egyptian revolution and the splintering of the Libyan security establishment into militias following the fall of Gaddafi, there arose a serious lapse in joint control over the border between the two countries. This was instrumental in the growth in various types of organised crime, such as arms smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal immigration which, in turn, generated an economic infrastructure for jihadist groups both in Egypt and Libya. The smuggling of arms and materials used in suicide bombings is the most dangerous form of organised crime across the border from Libya to Egypt. The huge weapons' supplies that remained in Libya following the fall of Gaddafi were assured a thriving market in a “turbulent” region. That market covered at least 12 countries, according to UN sources. Among these was Egypt into which flowed some 10 million pieces of weaponry, according to official estimates, most of which came from Libya and Sudan. - The rise in attacks against Egyptian workers and commercial interests in Libya. Against the backdrop of the security breakdown in eastern Libya, in particular, Egyptian workers have increasingly become victims of kidnappings and murder by jihadist militia groups. Egyptian trade into Libya was also targeted by such groups, which on number of occasions forced Egyptian trucks to stop and held their drivers captive. In the context of Egyptian labour and trade, the instability in Libya following the revolution affected Egypt in two other ways. Firstly, according to unofficial estimates, between 300,000 and 600,000 Egyptian workers in Libya were forced to return to Egypt, compounding domestic economic pressures during the post-revolutionary period. The majority of Egyptian labour in Libya is semi-skilled workers from the poorest governorates in Upper Egypt and the Delta. Their return aggravated the dire economic straits in the country and, hence, contributed to instability. Secondly, trade and investment between the two countries suffered. The volume of trade between Libya and Egypt plunged to nearly a half of its pre-revolutionary levels while the rates of Libyan investment in Egypt were affected by the issue of the Libyan authorities' demands for the handover of former Gaddafi regime figures who reside in Egypt. 4- The prospect of the secession of eastern Libya. A rising federalist movement in the east and militia-backed secessionist trends there are both reflections of anger at the marginalisation of the east in the distribution of power and wealth in the country. Although the eastern federalist drives were initially peaceful, they became increasingly militant following their call to boycott the general elections in July 2012. Libyan oil resources and revenues were a central focus of the mounting political tensions and military flare-ups between political forces in the east and the central government in the west. In June 2013, the pro-federalist Cyrenaica army seized control over the oil ports in the northeast part of the country, bringing oil exports to a halt. The central government has so far failed to end the blockade. In spite of many signs suggesting the possibility of a secession scenario, there are numerous impediments. For one, Cyrenaica, like Libya's other two provinces (Fezzan and Tripoli), is far from homogeneous in terms of demography and political/economic interests. Also, if secessionist tendencies prevail over decentralisation trends, the independence of Cyrenaica would be heavily contingent on international balances that would, firstly, ensure the flow of Libyan oil (of which Cyrenaica possesses the most) and, secondly, prevent it from turning into a militant jihadist entity, which would present numerous problems and threats to Libya's neighbours and Egypt in particular. EGYPTIAN MANAGEMENT OF THREATS FROM LIBYA: As with other foreign policy matters in the post-25 January period, there has been an element of confusion in Egyptian management of the threats emanating from its Libyan neighbour. Cairo was “uncomfortable” with the foreign intervention in Libya in support of the armed opposition in its revolution against Gaddafi. Egyptian authorities were aware of the grave strategic consequences of this development for the region as a whole, which was why the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was reluctant to recognise the Libyan Revolution at the time. The rise and subsequent fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt precipitated a new gulf between the two countries, intensified by the antagonism towards Egypt on the part of Libyan Islamists following the 30 June Revolution. The question of the options that Egypt has for contending with existing or potential threats from Libya is highly complex and delicate, as the Egyptian administration needs to strike a balance between several considerations. Firstly, it needs to minimise the impact of Libyan domestic affairs on Egypt's domestic situation. Specifically, this entails eliminating the effects of the threats in eastern Libya on Egypt which, since the fall of Muslim Brotherhood rule, has been contending with mounting terrorism and the spread of this phenomenon from Sinai to the Delta in the framework of what appears to be a zero-sum conflict between the state and that group that is bent on obstructing the post-30 June 2013 roadmap. On the other hand, it needs to safeguard the system of Egyptian interests in Libya. This applies to both the large community of Egyptian expatriate workers in Libya and economic and commercial ties. Clearly it is in Egypt's interest for the situation in Libya to stabilise, which will work to secure the wellbeing of Egyptian workers (who generally belong to the poorer segments of society) and to re-stimulate Libyan investments in Egypt, which will help Egypt emerge from its economic straits. Thirdly, Egypt must take into account the international and regional dimensions that interweave closely in the political balances inside Libya. The Libyan Islamist current, in particular, remains closely bound to the Qatari-Turkish axis and its opposition to the pro-Egyptian axis lead by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, although Al-Sisi's victory in the May 2014 presidential elections has sapped some of the impetus of the anti-Egyptian regional axis. In addition to bearing the foregoing factors in mind when formulating Egypt's options, it is also essential to assess the sources of threat and their degree of severity. It is important to distinguish between the Libyan threats the impact of which can be reduced by means of more stringent security measures (organised crime), and threats that could arise from the plans or intent on the part of eastern Libyan militias to invade Egypt (which would require a different type of response). EGYPTIAN APPROACHES: In light of the foregoing, Egypt essentially has two basic approaches for handling the Libyan challenge. - Tightening security and containment. This entails blocking the routes through which threats from Libya enter Egypt, and tightening security in the border areas, especially on the western side of the border. A number of suggestions have been aired in this regard. One was to create a buffer zone along the border. While buffer zones have been observed to be effective ways to reduce or neutralise cross-border threats, it has been noted that the option is generally workable only between countries that have low levels of commercial and social interaction. This does not apply to the case of the Egyptian-Libyan border. The instability in Libya did not prevent the continuing movement of labour and trade between the two countries, even if the levels declined. In addition, there are strong tribal, social and cultural bonds between eastern Libya and western Egypt. Perhaps in light of the foregoing, there have been modified versions of the abovementioned proposal, such as limiting the buffer zone to a specified timeframe until the situations in both Egypt and Libya calm down. Another proposal calls for “multilateral” security arrangements for the border zone to the west of Egypt. In addition to joint measures to tighten security along the borders, this option would also entail promoting political contacts and developmental efforts with the tribes that inhabit the areas near Egypt's western borders. Perhaps greater attention on the part of the Egyptian military establishment to Marsa Matrouh and the tribes in that region would serve efforts to persuade them to hand over their weapons which, in turn, would work to sever the link between them and the network of interests connected with smuggling operations and the militant groups in eastern Libya. This proposal is regarded as the most appropriate to current circumstances in view of the continued instability in Egypt and the fact that the threats from Libya have not reached the level of cross-border invasions. In addition, this option works to reduce tensions with Libya while safeguarding a good level of mutual interests with the neighbour country. - Confrontation. It should be stressed that Egypt has habitually averted the aggressive approach to the management of foreign threats or challenges as it involves complex calculations and high and potentially very costly risks. This said, one of the options voiced, and that remains open, is for Egypt to intervene militarily in the border region in the form of limited surgical strikes targeting known militia strongholds in eastern Libya. Nevertheless, pursuing this risky option would be contingent on the degree of threat or, otherwise put, the existence of corroborated intelligence that those militant groups are planning on invading Egypt, which would necessitate military action. However, such intervention would be considerably more complicated and costly than the confrontations in Sinai, in view of the nature of the armed groups in Libya and, therefore, it would necessitate close coordination with international powers involved in Libya and whose interests have been damaged by the instability there. It is not valid, in this regard, to draw a comparison between this option today and the limited military intervention that the Sadat regime undertook in eastern Libya in response to Gaddafi's attempt to storm our borders in the 1970s. The regional and international climate and circumstances today and then are radically different. Still, this does not refute the notion that any attempt to violate Egyptian borders is a “red line” that compels Egypt to resort, without hesitation, to a military response. It has been argued, in favour of a confrontationist or more proactive approach, that in regaining its political influence in the internal political equations in LibyaEgypt would be working to promote stability by supporting the state and the generation of dynamics conducive to the development of effective national security forces in Libya that would be able to stand on their own against jihadist militias. In this context, it was also suggested that cross-border tribal connections could be used to alleviate tensions and to secure the release of Egyptian hostages in eastern Libya. However, it should be stressed that such possibilities would have to be linked to a solution to the question of old Gaddafi regime figures residing in Cairo. Regardless of the options, they need to be contextualised and assessed within the framework of a clear Egyptian foreign policy vision on Libya, based on the principles of promoting the development of a stable state and government institutions, reducing tensions and enhancing the level of cooperation in preventing the transmission of threats. The writer is a political researcher at the quarterly Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya (International Politics) published by Al-Ahram.
