If there is a pure image of the Arab spirit of magnanimity it is to be found in the telegram sent by King Abdullah Ben Abdel-Aziz to President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi congratulating him on his recent electoral victory. Not only did the message reflect the historic strategic relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, their Islamic and Arab bonds, the collective sacrifices in oil and blood in the October 1973 War and the war to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and the fact that more than a million Egyptians live and work in Saudi Arabia and more than half a million Saudis have chosen Egypt as a second place of residence, as a place to study or as a favourite tourist destination. It also embodies the nobility and chivalry evoked by the term “authentic Arab values”. These values were also clearly and abundantly evident in the congratulatory telegrams from UAE President His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Ben Zayed as well as those from the heads of state of Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria. The space here is insufficient to fully express one's gratitude to all those who moved to demonstrate their support for Egypt at a critical historic moment, especially at a time when the Western press and Western leaders drip poison into their honey-worded congratulatory messages. In all events, what concerns us here is that the Arab telegrams all contained an essential idea, which is that it is necessary to help Egypt through collective Arab and international efforts. In addition to the values mentioned above, this idea rests on three highly strategic premises. First, to these Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait, the Egyptian experience led by President Al-Sisi cannot be allowed to fail. Second, the success of the Egyptian experience will be the natural prelude to the revival of stability and development in the Arab region after three years of upheaval, violence and terrorism. Third, the success in Egypt will also herald the defeat of the project of political terrorism in Islamic guise that propelled Arab countries and the Middle East as a whole towards disasters that destroyed nations, divided others and laid the foundations for racial discrimination, the suppression of rights and freedoms and the horrors of religious fascism. Egypt's battle is, ultimately, a battle for the future. If we have learned anything from the history of the past two centuries it is that change in Egypt has always precipitated other changes — whether for better or worse — elsewhere in the region. Arab efforts to help Egypt seek to win this battle, which is now spearheaded by a new leadership that has arrived after years of leadership drought, whether due to lack of the ability to lead and inspire or, more recently, due to the travesty in which the reins of government fell into the hands of a secret organisation that only knew how to work underground even when it was in power. This time, the leadership was ushered in by an unprecedented level of grassroots support. Moreover, and more importantly, President Al-Sisi also brought with him a clear programme for realising national development. It is founded on the pillars of hard work, major investment, incorporating the whole of Egypt (especially the southern provinces) from the Nile Valley to the Red Sea and Mediterranean into the development vision, and the rule of law. Another crucial pillar is the creation of a regional security order with Egyptian-Gulf relations as its backbone. In addition to its strategic/military aspects, this system also features an economic dimension that entails helping Egypt to recover its economic health and, hence, its ability to participate effectively in this order free from the blackmail of Western nations and international financial institutions. We should note that this is not a new experience in Egyptian-Gulf relations. In the late 1980s, the Egyptian economy took a dangerous plunge against a political backdrop charged by Central Security Forces conscript riots. National reserves reached an unprecedented low, the Egyptian pound plummeted against the dollar and the national debt soared to $50 billion. However, following the war to liberate Kuwait, Egypt and the countries that offered to help it agreed that Cairo would undertake a number of radical economic reforms so as to deregulate the economy. In exchange it would have half its national debt written off and it would receive a large bundle of aid and grants. The Egyptian economy was thus able to enter a period of growth, which averaged five per cent over the next two decades. National reserves climbed to $52 billion by 2010, 30 new cities were constructed, foreign investment in Egypt surpassed $46 billion during the last five years of Mubarak's rule, and in the last year of that regime the country hosted more than 14 million tourists. The experience that followed the war to liberate Kuwait was an unmitigated success. Nor was Egypt the only country to benefit, as Arab investment accounted for over 22 per cent of the total investment made in Egypt in that period. Today, we can repeat that experience, albeit with some essential modifications that essentially involve contributing to the implementation of President Al-Sisi's programme, which furnishes the ingredients for comprehensive economic and social development while averting those failures and shortcomings in reforms that occurred during the Mubarak era. As was the case in the past, Egypt still has the duty to further liberate the economy from the grips of bureaucratic restrictions and outdated regulations, and from wasteful subsidies. It must simultaneously assist the poor through development, especially in Upper Egypt and the border governorates in Sinai and on the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts. This will require excellent organisational capacities and the ability to sustain the drive towards the realisation of these goals. More importantly, the drive in the long term will rest on investment that can assure a good level of interest and profit to investing parties. Aid and grants might be necessary in emergencies or to solve problems in the short term, but they do not generate a stable economic relationship or sustained development in the middle and long terms. The Arab countries have much to offer Egypt based on their own areas of expertise in development. For example, the expertise that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait have acquired in large-scale water desalinisation could be perfectly suited to Egypt's coastal regions in Sinai and along the Mediterranean and Red Sea. We already have a practical example of Gulf-assisted urban development: the city of Marsa Alam that was founded with Kuwaiti investment. This model can be duplicated on a broader scale in the cities of Safaga on the Red Sea, Al-Alamein on the Mediterranean and Al-Arish in Sinai. The age has passed in which Egyptians can rely on the Nile alone as their source of water and life. Arab countries can help us, through joint Egyptian-Arab projects, to repeat the experiences of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Al-Jubail and Yanbu in the development of industry, services and tourism. In a word, “investment” sums up the way to help Egypt. However, such help can only have lasting and sustainable effects if it promotes the welfare and financial interests of all parties involved.
