Iran is seizing the initiative in regard to its nuclear programme and its negotiations with the US, writes Mustafa Al-Labbad Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has monopolised television screens and newspaper headlines again with his formal declaration that, "Iran has joined the club of nuclear countries". Iranian scientists, he said, had completed the laboratory nuclear fuel cycle and enriched sufficient uranium to produce a nuclear power plant. The announcement, delivered at the Natanz nuclear research facility to mark Iran's Nuclear Technology Day, also signals a landmark in Iran's two-pronged strategy towards the West, which is characterised by calculated obstinance pending a breakthrough which would produce a new de facto reality, to be then followed by conciliatory statements and appeals for dialogue. Many had thought that UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, imposing economic sanctions on Iran if it continues to defy the council's ultimatum to halt its uranium enrichment operations, would bring Iran to heel. But that is not Tehran's style. Over the more than four and a half years of the Iranian nuclear crisis, Tehran has fought tenaciously to both initiate and control events and kept its adversaries on the defensive. And, it has largely succeeded, from the time it signed the additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, through to its retraction of this commitment. Its periodic announcements of technological advances and its inauguration of a plant for the production of heavy water, up to its recent proclamation of successfully enriching uranium to the internationally-sanctioned level for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, it has not withdrawn from the NNP and simultaneously, has kept the Russians dangling over their offer to the Iranians to enrich their uranium in Russian plants. No wonder Ahmadinejad appears exultory. With this latest coup, his country is poised to develop the quantities of enriched uranium necessary for 3,000 centrifuges. Last year his government announced they had produced enough enriched uranium for 164 centrifuges, but exactly how many they have is uncertain. Now, in order to reach its target it either has to buy more time or produce more centrifuges. Apparently, it is following both options as evidenced by the president's reassurances that Iran is not bent on developing a nuclear weapons capacity and that it is still open to dialogue, while simultaneously insisting on its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. The Caliph Muawiya said, "If even so much as a hair connects you to your enemy, don't let it break." Iran has long followed this diplomatic tack of keeping diplomatic lines open as it steadfastly continues to inch its way up the nuclear ladder. Whether it will continue to work, however, is another question. Washington has assembled the largest display of military muscle in the region since the invasion of Iraq, with massive aircraft carriers and their accompanying retinue of dozens of destroyers, cruisers and other warships cruising up and down the Gulf. But the Bush administration itself appears to be indecisive towards Tehran. In fact, it seems limited to two alternatives. Either an all out war or the Democratic Party's preference for dialogue. Both options are perilous. Dialogue with Tehran has always gone against the tough black and white ideology of this administration, and to capitulate to this option now -- especially as Iran so brazenly persists with its uranium enrichment programme -- would hand a diplomatic victory to Iran while hobbling the war-mongering neoconservative agenda. Invading Iran, on the other hand, requires a ground offensive demanding forces far in excess of anything Washington already has in place in the region. Iran is a large country with rugged terrain, offering plenty of scope for a long and entrenched resistance that would make the American experiences in Iraq, Somalia and Serbia pale in comparison. Bush's predicament is even more complex because of the situation in Iraq. As long as American forces are bogged down in Iraq, Tehran has little incentive to cooperate and make life easier for Washington. All the more so given that these forces could become potential targets in the event of an outbreak of hostilities with Iran. Indeed, Tehran's best course of action appears to be one of watching and waiting. As for the much rumoured impending aerial strike, it is difficult to imagine that it would produce the desired results. An aerial strike would not create new strategic realities on the ground, as the Israeli aerial bombardment of south Lebanon last summer amply testified. In all events, as American military history itself demonstrates, an American aerial bombardment would only succeed if followed by a massive ground invasion. But here, too, it is important to bear in mind that operation Desert Storm took place in a much smaller battle theatre than Iran and that Iranian military installations are spread over a much vaster territory and buried far deeper underground. Additionally, the Iranian regime, far from crumbling under the assault, could come out politically strengthened. It is little wonder that Washington's sabre rattling was greeted by Iranian brinksmanship. For the moment the two sides are locked in a game of psychological warfare, with Tehran holding the stronger hand because of the actual trouble it can make for the Americans in Iraq versus the hypothetical trouble the Americans could cause Tehran with an air strike. An aerial strike, therefore, belongs more in the realm of the Bush administration's wishful thinking than it does in the realm of feasibility. Washington's problem is that it is facing an adversary that has invested considerable time and money in developing a broad range of strengths that military force alone cannot defeat. The incident of the captured British marines offers a striking example of Iran's deftness at staying one step ahead in the game. When a small British naval craft, according to the Iranians but disputed by the British, allegedly invaded Iran's territorial water, Tehran saw an opportunity and seized it. It held the captives for about two weeks, attracting international attention to this latest development, only to release them on the occasion of the anniversary of the Prophet's birthday thereby bringing a swift end to an episode that could have escalated into a military confrontation. Then before London and Washington could catch their breath, Tehran announced its milestone breakthrough in nuclear technology while simultaneously stressing its wish to negotiate with the West (that this is from a stronger negotiating position is taken as a given). The neoconservatives' approach to Iran is on the verge of bankruptcy. In fact, it was bankrupt from the outset, because any actual use of force would set into motion a chain reaction of unsustainable regional and international political and economic events. Iran can't back down on its drive for uranium enrichment as that would set its nuclear programme back by decades. But the US, which has no intention of letting Iran have its way, cannot rely on the military option alone, because that would certainly backfire. The situation as it stands, therefore, seems to give preponderance to a form of 'historic compromise' whereby the Security Council would settle for Iran's current level of uranium enrichment with a maximum of 3,000 centrifuges in exchange for Iran agreeing to strict international inspections of its nuclear facilities, all of which would bring an end to the Security Council sanctions. Already one can picture the adroit and seasoned cornerstone of the Iranian regime, Hashemi Rafsanjani, emerging from his long silence to help seal the deal. One can see him appealing to the West for more concessions so that he could persuade the hard-liners at home to accept the "international compromise" which would come a long way to satisfying Iran's nuclear ambitions and simultaneously crown its negotiating prowess.
