Throughout its contemporary history, Egypt's successive constitutions have never barred retired military officers from standing in legislative or presidential elections. Procedurally, there have been no prerequisites prohibiting retired offices from running for office. Similarly, the well-established democracies, specifically the US, have not had legal and /or constitutional impediments to ex-military officers standing in elections either. In fact, the US has offered a clear example of presidents having military background, since 21 of the first 25 men to hold the office of president had military experience. The US political and historical context is different from that of Egypt, yet the right to stand for elected assemblies or general posts has been essentially the same. In Egypt, some activists and so-called revolutionaries have tried to argue against the candidacy of former defence minister Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, however, on the grounds that he is a former military officer. Presumably none of these defenders of human rights have stopped to ask themselves whether this negative reaction to the announcement of Al-Sisi's intention to stand in the presidential elections constitutes an incursion of his rights. Instead, their negative perspective on Al-Sisi's candidacy is an act of discrimination diametrically opposed to their declared mission of safeguarding human rights and liberties.
Long before his candidacy, Al-Sisi's words and deeds were subject to extensive analysis, with harsh comments being made that had a tacit connotation of straightforward discrimination. Central to this was the insinuation of bias among the state institutions towards Al-Sisi, though in fact it would be fairer to say that the state institutions as a whole have been neutral towards Al-Sisi's candidacy.
At the popular level, there has been growing enthusiasm for Al-Sisi, yet this has not been reflected in the state institutions. Even the formal campaign for Al-Sisi started later than that of his main rival, Hamdeen Sabahi, who informally started his campaign before the due date. Moreover, Al-Sisi professionally managed the uncertainties that prevailed prior to his declaration of candidacy. He was cautious about his steps before launching his formal campaign, endeavouring to avoid any potential conflict of interest. In contrast, the US historian William B. Pickett has stressed that Eisenhower “planned his [US] presidential campaign from his office outside Paris while serving as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.” Nothing similar can be imputed to Al-Sisi.
Some have criticised Al-Sisi's candidacy announcement speech, particularly his wearing of military uniform on the last day of his service. The main point of such criticisms has been that Al-Sisi deliberately implied that he was the army's candidate by doing so. Once more US history gives a precedent, since Ulysses S. Grant retired from the US army on 4 March, 1869, the day of his inauguration as president.
The negative attitude expressed by some revolutionaries against Al-Sisi has been multi-dimensional in terms of its origins and impacts. Many of the revolutionaries and /or human rights activists have had misperceptions about the Egyptian army and its role. The same could be said about the socialist revolutionaries who have a dogmatic mistrust of the army. Influenced by the transition period literature with its sweeping generalisations about the alleged negative role of the military in the democratisation process, such young revolutionaries have immaturely stereotyped the military, and, consequently, Al-Sisi.
This demonisation of the army may even have been inevitable from a conceptual perspective. Ironically, many of the revolutionaries called upon the army to put an end to the rule of ousted former president Mohammed Morsi. Yet, this call was later changed to an almost hostile attitude towards the army's presence across a highly uncertain political landscape.
Another dimension pertains to the missteps of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) during its rule after the ousting of former president Hosni Mubarak that alienated a sizeable portion of the revolutionaries. As a result, many of the latter have directed their grievances against the army and its role in the transition period. Even the army's supportive role in the 30 June Revolution did not resolve such deeply held misperceptions of this group of revolutionaries. On the contrary, many even started to distance themselves from the revolution, creating an unnecessary as well as incorrect division between the two revolutions of January 2011 and June 2013. By doing so, many of them lost their popular base, which was behind their success as the vanguard of the 25 January Revolution.
Many of the young revolutionaries now need to re-evaluate their negative identification of the army and its role in Egypt's revolutions. This reassessment should transcend narrow ideological dogmas as well as parochial interests. If such a reassessment is not carried out, many of the revolutionaries will remain captive to their present misperceptions, while at the same time losing contact with reality and with the masses that originally gave them the enhanced role of revolutionaries and not just of protestors.
It is not too late for the revolutionaries to do so. The writer is a political analyst.
