The unfortunate event that happened last week in Libya, where seven Egyptian Copts were brutally murdered, was an alarming development in the relations between Egypt and Libya. The fact that those seven Egyptians were Copts, and the fact that their religious orientation was the main reason why they were killed, makes this specific incident a lot more ugly and unimaginable. Both Egypt and Libya have been through a series of social and political transformations since 2011. The bundle of changes that took place in both countries remains incomplete until today. Egypt got rid of an inefficient Muslim Brotherhood oriented regime in the summer of 2013 and Libya remains facing the same problem for the past three years — multiple sovereignties. Neither Egypt managed to legitimise a new regime yet, nor was Libya capable at any time to apply state monopoly over the use of force. The very nature of the state in both countries is a major cause of the ongoing dilemmas. On the one hand, Egypt cannot get rid of the deep institutional influence of its old state, and on the other, Libya failed more than once to effectively institutionalise the different state structures that exist since Gaddafi's era. While such incomplete transformations are a common phase in democratisation processes, the range of Egyptian interests in Libya must be protected despite the partial, unfinished democratic change. Egypt is bound to economic, political and border security interests in Libya. Economically, there are Libyan investments in Egypt that are close to $1 billion ($864 million in 2008). What's more crucial than the Libyan investments in Egypt is the enormous Egyptian workforce in Libya. As usual, the Egyptian state does not have an accurate number for Egyptian workers in Libya, but unofficial figures indicate that there are almost 1.5 million Egyptians working in Libya, a number that's close to two thirds of the labour force in Libya. Border security is another issue of grave importance. The Egyptian-Libyan border extends to more than 1000 kilometres long, mainly in areas of low population density in both countries. The border is a major route used in human, drug and arms trafficking. Politically, both countries are more or less in the same shoes, in the sense of the ongoing conflict between a fragmented civil bloc and a more radical Islamic one. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the more institutional entity, the Egyptian state in this case, to ensure the existence of a framework that safeguards Egyptian interests in Libya despite the ongoing regime change and the frequent shifting of power centres in Libya. However, the real dilemma is not a matter of political will or ideological position, it is actually a matter of communication. Since the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt has been ruled by a network of state institutions, mainly security institutions, which deal with the institutionalised aspects of the Libyan state. But the problem is how unreliable the institutional state in Libya is. State institutions in Libya are neither stable nor representative of actual power centres in the country. The militias, some tribes and radical Jihadist movements are equally important power centres. While the Egyptian state is clearly supportive of the Libyan civil political bloc and the institutional entity, which the Ali Zeidan government represents, it lacks efficient communication with non-institutional entities, although they are considerably influential political actors in Libya at the moment. Egypt, however, is out of real options in this dilemma. Its interests in Libya, whether the lives and income of more than one million Egyptians or the national security issues related to border protection, oblige it to support the rise of a non-radical, civil and institutional state. But Egypt's mere support of Zeidan's government reduces the efficiency of communication with other non-institutional actors. It is clearly not an easy job for Egyptian official state institutions to hold political dialogue with Libyan militias or radical movements. Therefore, Egypt must politically support institutional actors in Libya, and at the same time, empower and help institutionalise the Libyan official military. Reaching a framework that safeguards Egypt's interests in Libya is directly related to the extent of influence of the Libyan institutional state, which clearly requires expansion in military capacities and restructuring of law enforcement organisations. The situation in Libya is undoubtedly bleak, but if the Egyptian state cannot ensure that tangible steps are being taken to safeguard Egypt's citizens and interests in Libya, then it should officially inform more than a million Egyptians of its inability to protect them in Libya's politically contentious and possibly violent state. The writer is a senior researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
