A government whose mandate will last for only three or four months has taken Lebanon nearly 10 months to put together. But such is the tenuous balance of power in this nation rocked by factional mistrust that many have hailed the new cabinet as a triumph of realpolitik. The new government, a coalition of the Future Current of Saad Al-Hariri and the pro-Iranian Shiite Hizbullah group led by Tamam Sallam as prime minister, is due to resign upon the election of a new president in May. Even so, it has taken tact, skill and unprecedented concessions on the part of Lebanon's main players to get to this point. Saad Al-Hariri, who had just come back from a session of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating the assassination of his father, former prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, by Hizbullah suspects, stunned many when he announced his willingness to go into a coalition with Hizbullah. Hizbullah immediately agreed, and its 8 March Alliance even waived a former condition to have one-third plus one of the government's portfolio, or what is known as the “controlling third,” awarded to it, giving it virtual veto power over government action. The mutual concessions were motivated more by realpolitik than by goodwill. The Future Current will have calculated that unless it returns to government it may compromise the interests of the Sunni community and the cohesion of the 14 March Alliance. Hizbullah, for its part, needed a break from the escalating tensions spawned by its controversial role in Syria's civil war. To smooth the government's formation, Hizbullah had to make major concessions, giving up the Defence Ministry, which went to ally Michel Aoun, and allowing its rivals in the Future Current to take control of the interior ministry. Hizbullah still has strong bonds with the Lebanese army and police, which routinely turn a blind eye to its activities, some of which have been branded as terrorism. Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reassured supporters that the Future Current's control of the interior and justice ministries would not compromise the group's policies. Hizbullah also had to placate its ally Aoun, who had wanted his son-in-law Gebran Bassil to stay in charge of the Ministry of Energy. At one point, the deal almost fell apart, with Hizbullah blocking the nomination by the Future Current of Ashraf Rifi, a former director of the internal security forces, as interior minister. Rifi, known for his frequent criticisms of Hizbullah and Syria, was given the Ministry of Justice instead. Following intensive horse-trading, the deal was done and most Lebanese parties got something of what they wanted. Only the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Jaajaa stayed away from the deal, saying it could not partner with Hizbullah in government. Jaajaa, however, will continue to exert influence on the government through his partners in the 14 March Alliance. The new government still has a few hoops to jump through, however. One is the formulation of a government programme, which will lead to controversy over the arms possessed by Hizbullah and the Syrian crisis. But even if the new government fails to win parliamentary endorsement, there is every possibility that it will stay in place as a care-taking government pending elections. Neither Hizbullah nor the Future Current were party to the 15-year old civil war in Lebanon that only ended with a Saudi-brokered peace deal that left Rafiq Al-Hariri in power as a consensus prime minister. Various Lebanese parties are acutely aware of what may happen if the Future Current and Hizbullah decide to lock horns over issues ranging from the outcome of the trial of suspects accused of the assassination of Al-Hariri at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to Hizbullah's status as the country's largest militia, the power-sharing formula, and sectarian tensions arising from the Syrian civil war. For now, the spectre of escalation in Lebanon seems to have been put to rest, but observers fear that the new coalition may be too tenuous to last.