While Egypt's state and society has become the target of crimes committed by the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist organisation, Egypt's two ousted presidents have remained safe, held away from any actual or potential threat posed by the ongoing wave of terrorism. Mubarak and Morsi have been major contributors to the prevailing bloody landscape, and at least politically they should be held accountable for the ongoing terrorism espoused by the Brotherhood, its cadres, affiliates and supporters. The two ousted presidents participated in the developments that have been conducive to the emergence of a sustained scene of bloody events. It is axiomatic that Morsi is politically — if not criminally— responsible, among others, for the escalation of terrorism. Yet Mubarak took a different path of embroilment. Mubarak's policies, particularly socioeconomic ones, constituted the right environment for the growth of religious fundamentalism and social violence. Within the same context, Mubarak's political option of full reliance on the US as the major patron of his regime compromised Egypt's national interests, paving the way for American intervention in Egypt's internal affairs, including identifying and supporting the post-Mubarak regime. Both Mubarak and Morsi are responsible for the escalating terrorism. Mubarak's inattention to its expansion and Morsi's unconditioned reliance on Brotherhood cadres and resources added much impetus to the group's intrinsic, genetic drive towards terrorism. In his endless endeavours to maintain his tenure in office, including grooming his son as the only successor, Mubarak unintentionally — yet sometimes intentionally — paved the way for the Muslim Brotherhood to expand on the local, regional and global levels. Locally, the Muslim Brotherhood, a supposedly outlawed association, was left to dominate professional syndicates and universities, and to infiltrate many of the state's institutions. Hossam Tamam has highlighted a very important point pertinent to the group's success in organising itself as a parallel state ahead of its goal of “empowerment”. Wickham adds that the group “developed a vast infrastructure of branch offices, charitable associations, health clinics and businesses that gave it a large stake in the existing order.” No less important has been the establishment of the International Muslim Brotherhood — a development that has had far-reaching political repercussions. All such developments took place under the so-called omnipotent “police state”. Many have erroneously overestimated the security capabilities of Mubarak's regime. Obviously, it had not been such a formidable police state that could have addressed, if not eradicated, the threats posed by the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood. On the contrary, the regime's security leadership became embroiled in forging secret deals with the then-outlawed association. Such deals gave the Muslim Brotherhood a growing sense of power, as well as a de facto legality. Evidently the regime's repeated crackdowns on the Brotherhood's leaders and cadres were not effective in containing the risks inherent in the association's existence and continuation. On the contrary, the crackdowns on the association had many results that impacted the evolution of the association as counter-force to the regime. First, the regime's attacks on Brotherhood leaders give the association its preferred story of victimisation. Many such leaders emerged as if they had been national heroes with a record of struggle. Second, the crackdowns were effectively utilised by the Brotherhood in stigmatising the regime's resort to exceptional measures, like emergency law and the referral of civilians to military tribunals. Third, the crackdowns and their related exceptional measures gave a further impetus to the evolution of the nascent trend of human rights groups who took a major role in January's Revolution and its aftermath. Fourth, the increasing role of human rights activists encouraged many Western NGOs to augment their activities in Egypt. During Mubarak's rule, the Muslim Brotherhood socially, politically and economically mushroomed, reaching a critical mass that was beyond the capacity of the regime to contain. Such overgrowth happened while the regime was quite aware of the dangers posed by the association. For example, Mubarak in a public interview in 2007 stated: “The Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt, is dangerous to security because it adopts a clear religious path… Should the association come to power, Egypt will be irrevocably isolated from the world.” In fact, Mubarak opportunistically marketed his continuation in office as the only guarantee against the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Paradoxically, the guarantee promoted by Mubarak encouraged the US to probe the Muslim Brotherhood option. Definitely many other reasons at the global level — the war on terrorism — and on the regional level — the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict— pushed the US to further explore reliance on the Muslim Brotherhood in its regional and global strategies. In effect, this bolstered the fortunes of the Muslim Brotherhood as the events of January Revolution unfolded. Morsi's direct and indirect responsibility for the terrorist crimes of his parent association has been pervasive. Unleashing terrorists' energies has been the outcome of Morsi's one-year tenure in office. Even before the announcement of his narrow victory, Morsi supporters warned state institutions against declaring any other winner but Morsi. In many of Morsi's supposedly presidential decrees, he asked the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilise in rallies of support. Yet the most serious event representative of Morsi's reliance on his own association was his call for Brotherhood loyalists to disperse the opposition sit-in around the presidential palace. All Morsi's speeches in June were highly inflammatory, preparing the stage for a final and bloody confrontation between his supporters and the rest of Egyptian society. Morsi and his association set the stage for an Armageddon-like battle with their supposed co-patriots while capitalising on the religious fervour and zeal of thousands of fanatics. And it could not be accepted the claim that he had been a puppet governor and that the association was behind the scenes ruler. Even such a status does not preclude Morsi's accountability for the tragic fate he and his association pushed via their followers. In safe havens both Mubarak and Morsi have been resting. History, as ever, will have its verdict on the ousted presidents. Yet Egyptians have made up their minds; that at any cost they will turn the bloody page on the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood. The writer is a political analyst.
