Khaled Amayreh in the West Bank and Emad Gad in Cairo agree that the Winograd report's implications for peace are bleak, but each for different reasons Retired judge Eliyahu Winograd has submitted the findings of his committee on the war waged by Israel on Lebanon in July and August 2006. The report uses the word "failure" repeatedly, to describe the performances of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz, and former chief of staff Dan Halutz. It concludes that the leadership, the army, and the entire country failed to accomplish their goals in that war. So what does this entail? The report says that Olmert bears the main responsibility for the failure of the Israeli army. "The decisions taken at the beginning of the war, and the method of decision-making, involved very serious flaws. The main responsibility for this rests with the prime minister, the minister of defence, and chief of staff. The trio had a personal and decisive role in taking and implementing these decisions." The report adds that, "the decision to stage an immediate and violent reaction was not based on a detailed plan." Olmert, the findings say, bears primary responsibility for the government decisions and army operations. His responsibility stems from his post as well as his performance. He made all the decisions, the report alleges, while failing to consider alternative courses of action. In particular, Olmert refused to hold regular consultations with experts although he has little experience in military matters. Furthermore, he failed to establish a connection between the country's goals and military operations. The Winograd report also bemoans Peretz's lack of military experience underscoring the fact that he, too, never examined alternative courses of action. He was also unable to connect military force to political objectives, failing to consult military strategists. The report describes Halutz, who resigned as chief of staff, as a reckless individual. Although the prime minister and defence minister were inexperienced, the report says, the chief of staff should have kept them informed of the complications emerging on the battlefield. Halutz should have offered his superiors alternative courses of action, but he didn't. Interestingly, the findings don't ask Olmert and Peretz to resign, nor do they suggest that the two are incapable of carrying out their duties. Had the report done that, the two men would have had to resign. This is something which Olmert anticipated and countered by saying that he had no intention to resign. He did, however, promise to implement the recommendations of the committee. The full impact of the report could take some time to be felt. But the future already looks grim for both Olmert, the leader of Kadima, and Peretz, the leader of the Labour Party. Peretz is likely to lose the Labour Party elections, due at the end of the month. Right now, he is trailing behind his rivals in opinion polls. His likely successor could be Ehud Barak, who has better qualifications as defence minister, having served as chief of staff in the past. Olmert is in a fix. He inherited Kadima's top post after Sharon's sudden illness and does not enjoy solid support, even within his own party. Others in his party such as Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, are likely to challenge him for the leadership of both party and government. So what is going to happen next? One possibility is early elections. But this is not very likely, since the last elections took place only a year ago. A large number of the country's parties are already in the cabinet, and therefore unmotivated to call for early elections. Another possibility is that the ruling coalition could collapse under the weight of the report. For example, the prime minister may resign, or several parties may pull out of the current coalition. Should this happen, the government would face a vote of no confidence in the Knesset. But this is improbable. For one thing, Olmert doesn't want to go without a fight. Should he accept defeat now, his future would be sealed. The parties participating in the current coalition are, moreover, comfortable with the way things are. However, a coup within Kadima may force Olmert out of the leadership. Again, Livni, who is greatly admired abroad, may be tempted to stage that coup. A third possibility is that nothing will change, aside from an attempt to improve the performance of the government and implement the Winograd recommendations. This course of action is already underway, as Halutz's resignation suggests. For coalition partners, this is the path of least resistance. Still, the current situation will not continue much longer. Within a year or two, Israel is likely to hold early elections. In the meantime, Peretz is likely to lose both his cabinet post and his leadership of Labour. Olmert is likely to disappear from the scene as well, unless he does something to revive his political fortunes. One thing he can do is to stage another military adventure. This would restore confidence to the army and help the prime minister regain some popularity. There have been some hints of late about an all-out invasion of Gaza or a strike against Syria. As things stand, the outlook for peace is less than encouraging. In its current form, the Israeli government is incapable of putting together a peace deal, not even on the Palestinian front. Bereft of political credentials, it is not in a position to rally the public support needed for a diplomatic breakthrough. So the peace initiative the Arabs have been working on so hard is unlikely to get any favourable response, for the time being. In brief, the Winograd report hobbled an already lame government, diminished the chances for peace, and increased the possibility of further military adventures.
