Anyone whose interests and experiences span the worlds of academia and diplomacy must give pause to the many individuals whose careers combined both an academic foundation and diplomatic work. There are many to choose from both at home and abroad, but to me two stand out — one American and the other Egyptian. The first is Henry Kissinger who established his name in the academic world in the field of geopolitical strategy, particularly with the publication of his seminal work, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. The rise of his star coincided with the 1968 presidential elections in which the candidate for the Republican Party and eventual winner was Richard Nixon. Ironically, Kissinger had supported Nixon's rival, Nelson Rockefeller, as the Republican Party candidate that year. He even warned that if Nixon became president it would bring disaster. This did not prevent Nixon from appointing Kissinger as his national security adviser. Then, the two men worked together to redesign and reorient US foreign policy, especially in regards to the rival pole in the world order at the time — the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger were the architects of the policy of “détente” between Washington and Moscow, the aim of which was to shift the relationship between the two superpowers from Cold War antagonism and conflict to dialogue and cooperation on mutual regional and international concerns. During the Nixon era, Kissinger became an international diplomatic superstar. It was he who engineered the American withdrawal from the quagmire of Vietnam and who devised the policy of “rapprochement” that would end a quarter of a century's hostility between the US and the People's Republic of China. It was also Kissinger who steered US diplomacy towards the Middle East following the 1973 war, and who shifted the Arab-Israeli conflict from a war footing to negotiations. In the process, he was instrumental in the decline of the influence, presence and status of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Kissinger came under harsh criticism at virtually every turn. He was accused of opportunism to unwarranted secretiveness. His response to his critics was that the essence of his work was a moral calling to avert the recurrence of massively destructive wars such as World War I and II. The Egyptian academic-come-diplomat who I have in mind is Boutros Boutros-Ghali. After obtaining his PhD in Paris, Boutros-Ghali worked as a professor of international law and foreign relations at Cairo University. From this base, he broadened his relations with universities abroad, in many of which he would serve as a visiting lecturer. Meanwhile, at home he began to extend his sights beyond the university campus and the scholastic environment. He became a frequent foreign affairs commentator in the Egyptian press and he founded various periodicals, most notably Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi, modelled on the British Economist, and Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya which focussed on international relations and political issues. Boutros-Ghali's time to shine came with the rise to power of president Anwar Al-Sadat and, specifically, with Sadat's decision to reorient Egyptian foreign policy following his famous visits to Israel. With his appointment by Sadat as minister of state, and then minister of state for foreign affairs, Boutros-Ghali embarked on a 12-year-long career as the architect and director of Egyptian foreign policy. During this period, he tried to bring to life many of the ideas he had espoused during his academic career, especially towards Africa. However, his greatest contributions were in the conduct of Egyptian foreign policy following the Camp David Accords. In view of the broad network of relations that he built up during these 12 years, especially in Africa, it was not surprising that the African heads-of-state would nominate him as their candidate for the post of UN secretary-general. Both Kissinger and Boutros-Ghali returned to scholarship following their luminous careers in international diplomacy. Kissinger began with his three-volume memoirs — The White House Years, The Years of Upheaval and The Years of Renewal — which, together, offer a detailed history of a critical era in international relations from the perspective of one of the key diplomatic figures involved. Among the many works that followed were his encyclopedic Diplomacy and On China. In like-manner Boutros-Ghali recorded his memoirs of the Camp David negotiations in Egypt's Road to Jerusalem and his memoirs as UN secretary-general in Five Years in a Glass House. More recently, he has penned his impressions and thoughts on Egyptian policy and diplomacy in Between the Nile and Jerusalem: Memoirs of an Egyptian diplomat. Also, just as Kissinger had courted controversy during his active years in diplomacy, so too did Boutros-Ghali, sparking sharp opinions over his handling of relations with the US during his term as UN secretary-general. Were his differences — some would say confrontations — with the US, which prevented him from obtaining a second term in that international post, a wise or practical course of action in view of the status and influence that the US asserts in the international organisation? Or was he correct to act on principle in an attempt to emulate his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, who tried to preserve the substance and spirit of the UN Charter and adopt decisions independently from the superpowers?
The writer is managing director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
