No one can claim there is an expected scenario for what will happen in Egypt on 30 June. Political and economic developments post-January 2011 give credibility to all expectations. One scenario is that the day will be similar to many previous days when liberal and civil movements mobilised people to Egypt's squares for specific demands, like cancelling Morsi's November 2012 constitutional declaration. According to this scenario, some clashes and deaths are expected and protesters may stay in the streets for days before the situation returns back to normal. Another scenario is that the ruling group and the opposition are in a real battle with the country veering towards civil war. According to this scenario, this war may ruin the state or the military may step in. There is no guarantee under this bloody scenario that any of the amassed political powers will be able to win the battle, or that the military will be able to control the country, given the deteriorating security situation and the current weakness of the police. A third scenario is a last moment solution. The president may undertake some actions to calm the street down. These actions could include changing the cabinet or organising a referendum on the choice of early presidential elections. Also, the military may be able to play a mediating rule between the presidency and the opposition to reach some sort of compromise. Whatever the scenario that Egypt will experience 30 June, we should be aware of what are the driving forces behind the situation we reached today. Political developments in Egypt after the revolution put the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in a position that is very similar to that faced by the now dissolved National Democratic Party. Supported by other Islamist political parties and movements, the FJP controls the legislative and executive authorities at the central and local levels. This control was not associated with any serious and credible attempt from the ruling power to include the opposition in the decision-making process, even for macro political issues like the new constitution. Secular political powers and movements, especially liberal ones, meanwhile failed to reach consensus regarding the future of the political regime in Egypt. This was reflected in their failure to manage their involvement in formulating the 2012 constitution and in formulating a strong political coalition against the FJP. The establishment of the National Salvation Front (NSF) in 2012 can be considered as a key step in creating such consensus. However, the NSF has been perceived as a weak political movement that has very limited influence in the street. Youth movements, like the April 6 Youth Movement, the Rebel campaign and football “Ultras” have the ability to mobilise the street outside of the sphere of NSF influence — the latter barely able to keep pace with these movements. Although youth groups in Egypt could not organise themselves in a political coalition, they have considerable political power. This was clear from the voting behaviour of the youth during the elections that Egypt witnessed since the 2011 revolution. They voted for candidates who do not belong to any of the traditional political powers in Egypt. The performance of the executive authority during the transition period is very weak as a result of the high turnover of the cabinet and the criteria implemented to select ministers and senior governmental officials. In just two years after the revolution, Egypt had four different prime ministers and dramatic changes in the leadership of strategic ministries, like the Finance Ministry and main service ministries, including the Interior Ministry. Egyptians' suffering from problems like a lack of energy and subsidised food items has increased. At the same time, security conditions deteriorated and illegal weapons trade flourished. Protests and strikes dramatically increased as a result of the failure of successive governments in dealing with day-to-day living problems and the desire of considerable segments of the population to see some material benefit come from the revolution. The performance of Egypt's economy after the revolution was negative. The economic growth rate decreased to almost two per cent after two years. Egypt's foreign reserves decreased from almost $36 billion to reach almost $16 billion in two years. This deterioration was reflected in the performance of the Egyptian stock market and its main two indexes, the EGX30 and EGX70, which lost almost one third of their points. During the same time period, the state budget deficit as a percentage of GDP increased by 42.5 per cent, the net domestic government public debt increased by 70 per cent, the net foreign government public debt increased by 15 per cent, and bailout cases increased by 23.7 per cent. Net FDI (foreign direct investment) decreased and showed a trend of continuous decrease over the two years of transition, and the overall budget balance of payments showed a deficit of $8.42 billion in fiscal year 2012/13. This is in addition to continuous rising inflation and unemployment rates. The Egyptian pound lost around 13 per cent of its power against the US dollar in two years. Egypt's ranking on the Global Competitiveness Index dropped from 70th to 81st in two years. The abovementioned political and economic developments indicate that Egypt is struggling to achieve the objectives of the 2011 revolution. This conclusion should be the only explanation for 30 June and its expected scenarios, and should be the entry point for any proposed compromise among political actors in the new Egypt. The way to understand the crisis of June 2013 starts by reconsidering the real causes of the January 2011 Revolution.
The writer is an associate professor in the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University.
