“The regime has lost its validity and has become a corpse awaiting burial. We will bring it down, after the years of suffering it caused the Sudanese people, if it refuses a final initiative that stipulates that President Al-Bashir must agree to dismantle the dictatorial infrastructure of his regime which has broadened the scope of warfare in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions, which has courted the spectre of a comprehensive civil war.” So saying, the Sudanese opposition coalition inaugurated its campaign to overthrow the Al-Bashir regime in 100 days. The campaign was roundly condemned by officials in Khartoum, some of whom described the opposition as a “screen” for foreign forces bent on the destroying Sudan but whose designs “will ultimately meet with disappointment”. As confident as such officials may appear, the recent move of the opposition, combined with more effective actions on the part of the armed movements that make up the “revolutionary front”, do raise a number of questions concerning the future of the Sudanese regime — as successful as it has been so far in thwarting a number of attempts to overthrow it — the most recent being the coup attempt led by the head of intelligence under the former regime, Salah Qush, and several army commanders a few months ago. The relationship between the political opposition — which consists of a collection of political parties and civil forces — and the government may be described as one governed by a “balance of weaknesses”. The opposition is neither unified or well organised. Nor does it have the means or mechanisms that would enable it to achieve its ambitious aim of toppling the regime. In fact, some of its constituent forces not only lack a necessary clarity of vision, but also the unwavering resolve to press ahead with their declared aim. On the other hand, this may strengthen the grit and determination of the more youthful elements and organisations in the opposition to resume the protest demonstrations they began several months ago, before they were brutally quashed. Perhaps this time, they hope, the demonstrations will succeed in acquiring the impetus of similar movements in other countries of the Arab Spring. The regime is also gripped by weaknesses, perhaps deeper and more debilitating than ever since it came to power in 1989. It is riddled with divisions that surfaced in the wake of the attempted coup by Qush and his colleagues. Particularly significant is the resignation — some might say defection — of the former presidential advisor Ghazi Salah Al-Din who enjoys widespread respect and admiration among Sudanese Islamist circles. Perhaps even more telling is the eerie silence on the part of many officials with respect to recent developments. Of greater importance, however, are the military defeats inflicted against the regime by insurgents in Darfur, where tensions have increased sharply. The same applies to the Nuba Mountains and Kordofan, with respect to which presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie was forced to admit that government forces were unable to repel the attacks of rebels in their bids to seize control of other towns and cities. Indeed, the armed opposition has scored significant progress in recent weeks. Rebel forces have succeeded in moving the lines of confrontation to the provinces of North Kordofan and the White Nile, which is to say on the outskirts of Khartoum. Nothing like this had occurred during the war with the South, although a similar precedent is to be found in the Darfur war when the rebel Justice and Equality Movement accomplished similar advances. Khartoum and the northern governorates are currently on alert following the recent battles with rebel forces to the south of the capital. In spite of the setbacks for Khartoum, the opposition revolutionary front still suffers a number of shortcomings. It consists of four — not always like-minded — factions; the Popular Movement of the Northern Sector (PMNS) and the three Darfur movements run, respectively, by Abdel Wahed Mohamed Nour, Minni Arko Minawi and Jibrail Ibrahim. All the movements lack prominent charismatic figures and a large, organised mass following. They have also been accused of racism, even though they count among their members some prominent political figures from the northern parties. The opposition has also come under pressure, some reportedly exerted by South Sudan, to sit at the negotiating table with Khartoum. Many opposition members continue to resist the idea of negotiations which they believe will be futile and will amount to little more than a tactical move on the part of Khartoum in order to gain time and some strategic advantages and, simultaneously, to win the approval of the international community. They also fear that negotiations will create a rift in the revolutionary front. They argue that the regime and the international community are particularly set on luring the PMNS to the negotiating table in order to isolate it from the three Darfur resistance movements. The PMNS is the better-armed and equipped movement. In the recent fighting, the revolutionary front succeeded in downing several government military aircraft, which indicates a qualitative improvement in the type of weaponry available to rebel forces. How Khartoum handles the rebel movements will be a prime determinant of its relations with its new neighbour, South Sudan. These relations are severely strained both by contention over unresolved issues and a long legacy of mistrust and rancour. Khartoum accuses South Sudan of supporting and sheltering the militant insurgent movements. These, and the PMNS in particular, are linked to the South by a range of close relations and a history of common cause during the long years of north-south civil war. Sudan, today, stands on the threshold of sweeping change. Some observers believe that Khartoum could fall even before the 100-day timeframe set by the opposition. The country's economic straits and mounting popular discontent at the soaring costs of living could heighten the likelihood of this scenario. If the regime does not open its eyes to the gravity of the current situation and take a meaningful initiative, it could soon face another “palace coup” attempt or a coup on the part of a segment of the armed forces that resents having been embroiled in problems that could have been resolved in different ways. In the absence of a coup, popular discontent could mount to a level capable of sustaining the force and momentum of a grassroots protest movement seeking to bring down the regime. Or, alternatively, the rebel armies could score further advances and even march on Khartoum. Such scenarios continue to vie with one another against a backdrop of complex circumstances that could work to enhance the prospects of one or more of them and lead them to intertwine or, conversely, to diminish their likelihood and, if Khartoum has its way, defeat them.
