The news of the abduction in Sinai of Egyptian soldiers, in the wake of last year's killing of other soldiers in Sinai, fell hard on the nation. Suddenly, we were jolted into recognising the problem of the jihadist presence in Sinai. We were forced into acknowledging that, over the last decade or so, militant jihadists with past connections to Afghanistan or Iran returned to Sinai, where they apparently managed to recruit dozens of disgruntled youths, mostly but not exclusively from Sinai. Sinai is a convenient locale if one is up to no good. Because of its geographic location, its mountainous terrain, and the nature of development on its coasts, the peninsula offers outlaws a safe haven. Sinai is under-policed and difficult to patrol. And it is endowed with a lot of soft targets that can be attacked with ease, as well as extensive borders with Israel. The terrorist attacks of the past 10 years in Sinai were born out of this reality. The bloody history of jihadists in Sinai started with the attack on Taba in 2004, which was followed by other attacks on tourist spots in Sharm El-Sheikh and Dahab. Then came the firing of rockets across Egyptian borders in 2011, which triggered an Israeli retaliation in which Egyptian soldiers were killed. Israel apologised for the killings, but its embassy in Cairo was ransacked in response. The rise of Islamist groups to power following the 25 January Revolution has added a curious twist to the already complex situation. To understand the jihadists, one has to go back to the history of religious-motivated terrorism in this country, a phenomenon that became widespread in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the Luxor massacre of 1997. Let's consider a few points in this regard: - The 25 January Revolution, somewhat unexpectedly, catapulted the Islamists into power. The biggest surprise, one may say, was that the Salafis won nearly one-fourth of the seats in all legislative councils. Since then, they have been given a fixed share in any policymaking forum in the country. They had a strong presence in the Constituent Assembly and in various advisory councils. And they are constantly being invited for meetings in the presidential palace. The Salafis, it must be noted, have close ties with the jihadists of Sinai. It is interesting that just as the Muslim Brotherhood spawned various types of jihadists since the 1960s, the Salafist current is also giving birth to a lot of jihadists. To grasp the full implications of the country's changing face of terrorism, one has to keep the Salafist-jihadist connection in mind. - Following the 25 January Revolution, members of Islamist groups became a fixture in talk shows. The irony is that the revolution was a peaceful one, far from the violent aspirations of such groups. And yet it is the Islamists, and the most extremist among them, that reaped its fruits. To add insult to the injury, some former jihadists, such as Abboud Al-Zomor, who was convicted of killing president Anwar Al-Sadat, were hailed as heroes by the ruling party. Well-known jihadists are being invited regularly to the presidential palace on the pretext of consultations with politicians and advisers._- Several of the jihadists who were in prison during the 25 January Revolution were freed, having broken out of prison or received a presidential pardon from Mohamed Morsi, on the grounds that all Islamists were ill-treated by the old regime. -Many of the jihadists have become active in political life, and some have even formed parties such as the Construction and Development Party and the Civilisation Party. They won seats in legislative elections, and campaigned for Morsi in some of the southern cities, in which he ended up winning as much as 75 per cent of the vote. - The flags of Al-Qaeda appeared for the first time in the one-million man demonstration of July 2011, also known as the Battle of Kandahar, due to the predominance of Afghani dress code among the protesters. The same thing happened again in the Abbasiya demonstrations in late 2011, during which the Ministry of Defence came under siege. It is only sensible to acknowledge the various ties between the jihadists, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and Al-Qaeda. Under the ousted regime, the lines of battle were clear. The Egyptian state had zero tolerance for terrorism, showed them no mercy, and even forced them to “renounce” their murderous views. Now, the political scene is quite different. The new head of state is a member of an organisation that has spawned terrorist groups in the past. Symbolic and organisational — let alone religious — links exist between the government and certain individuals with a known record of terrorism. We see this in the way the presidency keeps releasing the jihadists. We see it in the manner the president addressed them in his speeches. Such ties between the government and jihadists complicate the matter of imposing law and order. When it comes to imposing security, the presidency often finds itself at odds with the army and the police, as when soldiers were killed in Rafah a year or so ago. In the case of the recent abductions, it was clear that the army and the police were literally up in arms, their own dignity at stake. The army in particular was adamant that it had to act. Let's now consider the question of how the state plans to reintegrate the jihadists, including those who have been convicted in courts of law. One has to make a distinction here between the inclusion of Islamists in political life and the need to uphold justice. It is shameful, if you ask me, to glamorise those who are responsible for the murder of innocent people — either through action, instigation, or through their hatred-infested discourse. It is fine to integrate Islamists, and to hold dialogue with them, but not at the expense of justice. The law has to be upheld no matter what. A murder is murder no matter what, just as theft is theft no matter what. No one can argue that a man who kills without religious motivation must be punished, whereas another who kills because of religious motivation should be set free. There is nothing wrong with repenting, or even in murderers being freed after serving their term. But even if the law has taken its course, a former murderer must not become a public figure or receive any honours. The social stigma of murder must not be erased. If you honour a murderer, then you are honouring his crime, and giving it your stamp of approval. And this is exactly what our new government is doing. It is a serious problem. It is such conduct on the part of the government that led to the recent rise of jihadist crimes and jihadists in general. The very men who claimed to have repented from the murders of the past are now threatening to kill anyone who opposes President Morsi. When the Muslim Brotherhood gives a wide berth to jihadists, one has to assume that it is doing so in case it needs them in the future — to intimidate or bully its adversaries, the army included. Or perhaps it is just the Muslim Brotherhood's persistent disregard for the law that is emboldening outlaws in general? When the state negotiates with terrorists for no obvious reason, one has to take note. This, I believe, is not the last you'll hear of the jihadists — their story has just begun.
The writer is managing editor of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya published by Al-Ahram.
