The Egyptian peaceful youth revolution of 25 January 2011, which led to the downfall of former president Hosni Mubarak, and the assumption of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), was universally acclaimed by the world, especially by the United States. President Barack Obama declared on 11 February, the eve of this momentous event, his admiration, commendation and support for the Egyptian people. Regardless of age, income, gender or origin, Egyptians celebrated their unprecedented triumph in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in Egypt's cities, and unanimously proclaimed to the world their peaceful objectives of freedom, dignity, bread and social justice. The universe skipped a beat, in awe, respect and admiration. The US supported and cooperated fully with SCAF, sending emissaries to Cairo, including the US secretary of state, in addition to significant visits by US military generals and key US senators and congressmen, who met with SCAF, and also visited the Muslim Brotherhood leadership at their headquarters in Cairo. From the outset, it was plain to all that there was a strong Muslim Brotherhood alliance and cooperation with SCAF. Strategic meetings had been held between Brotherhood emissaries and US officials in Washington several years earlier, a matter that was clearly reflected later in the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood sympathetic judiciary committee that authored amendments to the 1971 Constitution, readily adopted in late March in a national referendum after the Brotherhood propaganda machine cast that those who would reject the amendments as “anti-Islamic”. This was an early warning of things to come. Their adopted policy has been branding liberals as “anti-Islam”, hence igniting divisive forces and polarisation in Egyptian society: Islamist parties on the one side confronting liberal parties across the divide. The honeymoon of national unity was soon over and the stream of events, hopes, confrontations, clashes and strikes resulted in costly, painful repercussions, especially in the hundreds of martyrs and thousands of casualties, a heavy toll that inflamed Egypt during nearly 28 months of pain, despair, animosity, volatility, insecurity, instability and chaos. This in addition to 5,000 missing — until now — in the revolution. The economic crisis mushroomed with a sharp decline in foreign reserves, large budget deficits, spiralling inflation, petrol, gas and bread shortages, lack of productivity, loss of exports, increased imports and a sharp decline of tourism. Terrorist attacks in Sinai and across the borders with Israel undermined the tranquillity that prevailed during the 30-year Peace Treaty, a matter that prompted vocal concern from Tel Aviv and Washington. Signs of erosion in US Congress support were unmistakable. It appeared to all that the 25 January Revolution was kidnapped without ransom, with almost none of its noble goals realised, thus doubling the feeling of confusion, anger, repulsion, mistrust, uncertainty, pain and despair, as if the bloodshed and lives were lost in vain. This tragic human, material and time loss has been too large to swallow, tolerate or accept. All along it was evident that there was collusion between SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood with tacit US support, a matter that was evidenced in the Brotherhood's absence during confrontations with security forces in Tahrir Square, Mohamed Mahmoud Street, the cabinet clashes in 2011, in the 2012 Abbasiya clashes with the army, and elsewhere. The election of the parliament's upper and lower houses, during 2011 led to the domination of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis. Later on, the selection of the Constituent Assembly echoed a similar composition in order to ensure that the new constitution would reflect the religious parties' agendas, as was evidenced later in the adoption of several key articles curtailing personal freedoms, women involvement and youth participation. Delegations from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis made several trips to the US to assure Washington of their determination, and commitment, in maintaining their cooperation with and the interests of the US, especially the peace treaty with Israel, which is particularly vital to Washington. The presidential elections, held one year ago, in May 2012, resulted in the election of Mohamed Morsi as the first civilian president after nearly 60 years of military rule. He wasted no time in assuring Washington emphatically of his support for all Egypt's treaty obligations, especially honouring the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and of maintaining the status quo. The first 100 days in office passed uneventfully, though void of any tangible accomplishments that Morsi had promised during his campaign. The abandonment of pledges was truly disappointing to most Egyptians, particularly to non-Muslim Brotherhood voters who elected Morsi lest their vote for his opponent, General Ahmed Shafik be tantamount to re-electing Mubarak again. Morsi wasted no time in firing SCAF members and appointing his own loyalists to key armed forces posts, thus proving his disloyalty to those who handed him power as promised. That was early evidence of mistrust and betrayal. This disappointment was doubled after his lack of action against those who massacred 16 Egyptian army soldiers near the border in Sinai during Ramadan, especially that Hamas in Gaza, who are loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood hierarchy in Cairo, were accused of executing this hideous act. Although the allegations were vehemently denied by Hamas and Morsi, it was clear to all that official statements were empty and untrue. Moreover, the supply of needed Egyptian gas and electricity to Gaza caused frequent blackouts and gas shortages in Egypt, which further infuriated Egyptians. To the US, the continued support of Hamas, the suspense of army mop-up operations to flush out terrorists in Sinai after the massacre and the cessation of army actions in sealing more than 1,000 tunnels across the Egypt-Gaza border were a clear signal of the Muslim Brotherhood's modus operandi. They are now de facto in charge of the presidency, and are in real control of most government posts. Furthermore, they have infiltrated most key ministries, particularly those that directly influence the daily life of most Egyptians, in public services, supplies, and agrarian activities, especially the ministries of interior, supply, local government, education, health, agriculture, irrigation, information and housing. Accordingly, since the employees of these ministries staff polling stations, they become more effective in influencing, and even shaping, election results. The decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court in June 2012 to dissolve the lower house of parliament was criticised and later cancelled by Morsi, which reflected his impulsiveness and stubbornness. The court was surrounded by Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators who forced the suspension of its sessions when it faced making a similar decision about the Constituent Assembly. This was followed by Morsi issuing a constitutional decree to fire the prosecutor general and replace him with a Brotherhood sympathiser. The Muslim Brotherhood's determination to hastily convene the Constituent Assembly in order to draft a new constitution favourable to its agenda was followed by quick action to hold a national referendum to have it adopted without discussion or delay. Thus it has become a fait accompli, despite public demonstrations in Tahrir Square and at the presidential palace, and persistent protests by jurists, liberal parties, women's groups, and various high courts. Relations between the United States and Egypt were maintained almost flawlessly during the first few months of Morsi's rule, culminating in warm recognition of Morsi's intervention in November 2012 to reinstitute calm after 10 days of Israeli air bombardment of Gaza and Hamas rocket barrages fired into Israel. Morsi worked on halting hostilities on both sides and on consolidating quiet fronts, with Egypt playing the role of guarantor. Both the US and Hamas acknowledged Morsi's mediation. However, subsequent events in Egypt turned relations sour: - Weekly demonstrations in Tahrir against Morsi and his inept cabinet have been met by harsh and violent confrontations with the police, causing weekly casualties during the last few months. This was criticised by Washington time and again. - The curtailment of women in public affairs and the sexual harassment of women to scare them from involvement in public demonstrations were on the rise. This was rebuked by Washington repeatedly. - The disregard for human rights and the continuing imprisonment of key leaders of the youth revolution, coupled with reported acts of torture, imprisonment and killing, was condemned by human rights groups and echoed in Washington. - Despite sanctions on Iran by the US and the UN Security Council, together with the condemnation of Tehran's nuclear programme, which could lead soon to the production of Iranian nuclear weapons, the Egyptian government's hosting of high Iranian officials, delegations and tourists left Washington uneasy. In addition, an Egyptian presidential delegation flew to Tehran last week to discuss matters of mutual interest. This was received with suspicion in Washington, NATO and Israel, for they have gotten accustomed to suspect and mistrust Muslim Brotherhood public statements, which belie true intentions and actual performance. - The Egyptian media also viewed the warm reception of Iranians as encouraging the future spread of Shiism in Egypt (which is predominantly Sunni and is the home of Al-Azhar, the centre for tolerant Islam worldwide). This situation triggered uneasy reflections in Gulf States and in Washington. - After several months of no confrontations between the Muslim majority and the Coptic minority, numerous incidents of deadly sectarian clashes in Cairo and in Upper Egypt erupted, igniting dormant animosities and causing terrible losses of life and property. This culminated last month in violent clashes in Cairo leading to the killing of several Copts, attacks on churches and the regrettable confrontation with riot police during funerals at the Coptic Cathedral in Abbasiya, which resulted in more bloodshed and agonies. The Coptic Pope was unusually critical and apprehensive. Washington spared no effort in expressing indignation at this appalling incident. - The media in general, and non-government newspapers and TV channels in particular, continued to criticise the policies, practices, inefficiencies and incompetence of the Muslim Brotherhood cabinet. Morsi continues to ignore protests and persistent public demands to institute change and needed reform. This massive criticism was met by rebuke, harassment and investigations of key critics of Morsi, together with his inept premier, despite their lack of accomplishments. This Muslim Brotherhood government's aggressive attitude to curtail criticism was met by resistance on the part of the leaders of liberal parties as well as by public rebuke from Washington. Bassem Youssef, who used to criticise Morsi in his widely viewed TV show, magnified his satirical approach in making fun of Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood personalities and was heralded by Time magazine recently as among the 100 most influential media personalities worldwide. Moreover, the minister of information continues to criticise and harass anti-government media personalities. This unacceptable attitude by the Egyptian government was publicly criticised by Washington. - The constant harassment and condemnation by Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood supporters of prominent figures of the National Salvation Front (NSF), which includes Nobel Prize laureate Mohamed Al-Baradei and Amr Moussa, former secretary general of the Arab League (he recently described the current situation in Egypt as more dangerous than the defeat of the 1967 war), along with Kifaya and April 6 Movement leaders, and the Wafd Party, have continued unabated. Such leaders have been investigated, hassled and accused of being agents of external interests, or as power seekers. This steady attack on the opposition has aimed to discredit them nationally, in order to leave the political scene solely to the Muslim Brotherhood and the one party system, reminiscent of National Democratic Party (NDP) policies and practices in the Mubarak era. This attitude towards the opposition is considered by Washington to be anti-democratic and against the principles of freedom, dignity, openness and transparency that characterised the Arab Spring. - The attack on the judiciary by the Muslim Brotherhood and the current discussion of passing a new law for the judicial authority that will interfere in their independence and lead to the early retirement of nearly 4,000 judges, to be replaced by Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers, is met by public condemnation and viewed as a flagrant violation of the sanctity of the judiciary. This action has been described as the second massacre of the judges and thus sparked national outcry and demonstrations condemning this blatant intervention. Washington has also expressed its disappointment, calling for the independence of the judicial institution to be respected. - Since Washington has strong influence on the IMF, it supported earlier Egypt's application for a badly needed $4.8 billion loan to shore up its economic crisis. However, the statements and practices of Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood government officials, as well as their turning deaf ears on US Secretary of State John Kerry's vocal advice to Morsi to accommodate some of the opposition's demands, to appoint a more able cabinet, and to make necessary changes in the constitution in order to redress opposition and women's grievances, as well as to appoint a new prosecutor general by due process through the High Judiciary Council, has resulted in their reluctance to push the IMF loan to grant the loan. This was compounded by a slowdown of European Union financial support as well as the indifference of most Gulf States in honouring their pledges. - The recent violation of détente between Hamas and Israel through Hamas factions hurtling shells into Israel, and the subsequent Israeli air force raids on Gaza, have threatened the quiet on the eastern front. This again has discredited Morsi's negotiated agreement of five months earlier. Continuing Hamas activities across the porous border with Sinai coupled with the steady smuggling of arms, military equipment, cars and other goods across through the many tunnels, cast Morsi as a placid supporter of Hamas and thus anti-Israel. In retaliation, Israel has recently closed border access points and curtailed the fishing zone in the Mediterranean Sea for Palestinians. However, both the US and Israel need the strong influence of Egypt and Muslim Brotherhood to start meaningful peace negotiations towards a final settlement and the conclusion of the two-state solution, as agreed upon by all concerned. Consequently, it is clear that both the internal scene and the external performance of Morsi's Egypt, and the Muslim Brotherhood, have required the US to place mutual relations under sharp focus and place Morsi under both careful scrutiny and cautious reconsideration in order to plot objectively the roadmap of bilateral relations in the near future. There is no doubt that Egypt needs to muster all the support of its friends that it can get. This is not the time for Egypt to jeopardise strategic relations with Washington, the EU or Gulf States. Egypt must therefore adopt a wiser course of action that will serve best its national interests in the short, medium and longer terms. This strategy is fundamentally important, especially during the current dire and threatening economic situation. It is of paramount importance for Egypt to institute the proper order of national priorities, and to overcome the present serious socio-economic divide, cultural crisis and debilitating animosities. It must overcome the virus of national decline, its weekly human toll, frustration, hatred, confrontation, disparities, disappointments, corruption, apathy and unprecedented national dangers, and embark immediately on a path towards meeting and containing pressing national challenges. To confront these challenges there must be solid will and a firm determination to rise above divisive forces and to institute fundamental reforms through national dialogue with all political parties and factions, no matter who or what. A national strategic plan of action must be adopted in short, medium and long-term phases. The plan must include a political, physical, economic and social and cultural renaissance that is comprehensive, integrated and inclusive of all segments, factions and parties, regardless of origin, religion, gender, colour, occupation or orientation. It must be well synchronised, professionally orchestrated and well balanced in time and place, capitalising on national, material and human resources at home and abroad. Egypt is entitled and deserves to assume its pivotal role in the region and globally. The time is now, for the alternatives are apocalyptic and unthinkable.
The writer is professor emeritus of planning at the University of Alexandria.
