At last, the Arab Spring has been officially pronounced dead by the same “band” that acclaimed its birth two years ago. The “band leader” on this occasion is Thomas Friedman who once rhapsodised on what was sometimes called “spring”, at other times “awakening” and at all times “revolution”. The columnist for The New York Times had rejoiced at what was happening in Arab countries because it affirmed his long-proclaimed views on “globalisation” and the benevolent effects it wrought through the transmission of expertise on change to other peoples and nations, and the transfer of new technologies with their capacities to strengthen ties between nations and to draw different classes of society within a single nation closer together. The Arab Spring was a pure and ideal moment of change in our world, and it had to happen according to Friedman, who was not just an observer and analyst, but also a theorist on change and transition. Now he is singing a different tune. In a recent op-ed in the New York Times, Friedman admits that he — and others — were wrong about the power of our spring's fresh flowers and the amount of awakening that had occurred after a long, deep slumber. It has turned out that the Arab Spring could not be likened to the Prague Spring of 1968 or the spring in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, or any other spring that was brought to countries elsewhere in the world by spirited youth who came to power carrying democracy in one hand and capitalism in the other. Instead, in his current opinion, the upheaval in Arab countries is reminiscent of 17th century Europe at the time of the Thirty Years' War. What he means is that the new Arabs are sliding backwards into religious conflict, sectarian strife, ideological rigidity, oppression of women and minorities, and deep suspicion of everything alien in form and essence to the current belief system. It would probably take much more time than the past two years to either corroborate or refute this new theory. After all, the story is not even half way through yet. So far, all we have is a series of dynamics that, I believe, have more in common with Europe of the 19th century following the tsunami of the French Revolution. That revolution, too, did not live up to the expectations raised by its original principles and slogans that fired aspirations and imaginations throughout the rest of Europe and the world. Anarchy and vindictiveness came to prevail over ideals, “populism” became an alternative to construction and progress, and even the newly found civic freedoms were soon submerged beneath the surge of “Napoleonism”. In short, there was no longer an ideal that was tangibly graspable, a model that could be emulated. In the US, which had its revolution just over a decade before the French, Americans initially applauded the French Revolution. However, it was not long before President Washington issued the Alien and Sedition Acts, which essentially meant prison for anyone who reiterated the ideas of the French Revolution and all Frenchmen or other Europeans that infiltrated US shores with the purpose of spreading anarchistic ideas or French revolutionary zeal. In all events, the French Revolution breathed its last not long afterwards. Napoleon was defeated and the French state sank to a degree of feebleness that left it a “sick man of Europe” for the next century and a half, until Charles de Gaulle came to power in 1958 and revived some of country's erstwhile prestige and status. Nevertheless, the French Revolution and its ideals precipitated another reaction in Europe that may have a counterpart in the Arab region today. The revolution drove a deep cleft through Europe, placing “revolution” on one side and what became known as the Concert of Europe on the other. Emerging from the Congress of Vienna in 1915, the Concert of Europe established the European order that would last from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Its founding powers were Austria, Prussia, the Russian Empire and the United Kingdom. The arrangement is most commonly associated with the notion of a European balance of power that maintained stability in the continent in spite of shifting alliances and counter-alliances. However, perhaps more important is the fact that it contained a grouping that was conservative but nevertheless determined to promote change consistent with the core principles of the French Revolution. It sought to promote civil rights and duties, and minority rights, and to respond to the social consequences of the first industrial revolution. Aversion to the violence, brutality and lawlessness of revolution was not cause to reject the call for reform and the need to accommodate to the demands of the age, of new technologies, and of profound demographic and economic change. Something of this sort is happening today in the Arab world where we also see a divide between the countries of the Arab Spring (or Arab awakening or Arab revolutions) and the other countries — mostly monarchies — that took another path. In the first, the political, economic, security and ideological conditions are now as far removed from the romantic ideals of the revolution as earth is from heaven. In the second, reforms began to be implemented in carefully measured increments (or so their architects believed). Some of the changes were constitutional, leading to restrictions on the powers of the head-of-state and the expansion of the powers of the elected authority. Other reforms were socio-political and aimed to lay the groundwork for broader public participation, and especially the participation of women and minorities. The third major realm of reform was economic. Of course, such reforms were hardly sufficient. But when we consider what these countries have accomplished and look at where the countries of the Arab Spring currently stand, the latter pale in comparison. In fact, one might say that their people have lost the universal admiration that they had inspired in 2011 when it was thought that this region was experiencing the dawn of a new historical epoch. A revolution in Syria is pretty much all that is left of “Spring”. There, the end of the Bashar Al-Assad regime would crown the greatest achievement of the Arab revolutions: the popular toppling of corrupt and fascistic regimes. Unfortunately, the revolutionary camp there has already — even before victory has been won — reproduced the phenomena we have seen in all previous Arab revolutions. Moreover, there the question is not just whether or not the Syrian revolution will usher in a democratic civil state that respects the rights of minorities, or whether or not the Syrian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood will respect the rules and principles of the democratic game. The tragedy of the Syrian spring is that the ugly face of Al-Qaeda has reared its head and, with the link it seeks to create between Iraq and Syria, it menaces a major calamity not just for Syria but also for the entire Arab east. When the Al-Assad and Baathist regime falls, that will be the judgement that history passes on all tyrants. But if Al-Qaeda takes its place, that could only be the judgment of fools. Clearly we need a “Concert of Arabia” in order to address this dilemma that directly affects the security and welfare of the Arab region. There is no other solution.
