The alliance between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood, which took shape after the January 2011 Revolution, is coming to an end. For months, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis managed to suppress their differences, but now their conflict is coming out into the open. Following the January Revolution, Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood overcame three decades of rivalry to forge a tactical alliance in defence of what they commonly describe as the “Islamist project”. Their first show of unity took place during the 19 March 2011 referendum. Since then, the Muslim Brotherhood, better at organisation and more at ease with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), alienated Salafis with its unabashed power grab. Instead of forging harmonious relations with other political groups in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood wasn't keen on power sharing, neither with the opposition at large or even with its loyal allies in the Salafist movement. The 19 March referendum on constitutional amendments, most likely the outcome of a secret deal between the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF, paved the way not to democracy but to a debilitating power struggle — one that the Muslim Brotherhood has been determined to win with little regard for the nuances of partisan politics. The referendum divided the nation between those who wanted the constitution written first and those who wanted elections to come first. In general, the seculars favoured an early writing of the constitution whereas Islamists, hoping to assert their power, wanted elections first. According to the constitutional amendments, passed by the referendum, the future parliament was to nominate the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly, the body assigned to write a new constitution. In hindsight, this arrangement was responsible for much of the political wrangling in the country ever since. A chance was missed. Instead of a well-balanced Constituent Assembly writing a modern constitution appealing to the country's wide spectrum of opinion and ideologies, the Islamist-dominated assembly came up with a constitution that split the country instead of bringing it together. Salafis took their cue from the Muslim Brotherhood throughout this entire ordeal, first backing the constitutional amendments and then putting their weight in favour of the Islamist-flavoured constitution. Due to their unfamiliarity with the political scene, which they only joined after the revolution, Salafis failed to grasp the full implications of the ongoing political game, which they erroneously imagined to be a clash between supporters and detractors of Islamic law, or Sharia. Amr Al-Shobaki, former parliamentarian and a prominent researcher of Islamist groups, says that the Muslim Brotherhood managed to attract large sections of the Salafist movement by casting the power struggle as a fight for Sharia. “The one-million man protest in front of Cairo University claimed to be in defence of legitimacy, and there is nothing wrong with that. But then it also claimed to be defending Sharia, which was never under assault,” Al-Shobaki notes. Because of Salafist support, nearly 77 of voters said “yes” to the constitutional amendments, which paved the way for the current Muslim Brotherhood dominance of political life. From then on, Salafis expected to be rewarded, but the Muslim Brotherhood gave them nothing but the crumbs of power. Ali Bakr, a specialist in Islamist movements, says that differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis proved to be too much to reconcile. This is why the two factions failed to merge into one party, and why they often supported rival candidates in elections. For example, the Salafis wanted Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh for president, not Mohamed Morsi. They only supported Morsi in the second round of the elections as they couldn't possibly support Ahmed Shafik. In the parliamentary elections, the Salafist Nour Party gained 24 per cent of the (now disbanded) People's Assembly, much less than the Muslim Brotherhood's impressive 47 per cent of the vote, but still more than anyone had expected for such a newly-formed party. From then on, the Salafis expected to have a say in the country's politics. Their expectations, even after the election of President Morsi, were dashed. Morsi turned his back on the Salafis, leaving them out of the government of Hisham Kandil, denying them leading posts in local government, and only grudgingly appointing three of their leaders in his team of advisers: Emad Abdel-Ghafour, Bassam Al-Zarka and Khaled Alameddin. The writing of the constitution proved to be a tedious and erratic process. But throughout the court challenges and the boycott by the seculars, the Salafis stood loyally by their Muslim Brotherhood friends. They also fully backed Morsi's constitutional declaration of 22 November 2012, which many argue is the main reason for the country's current turmoil. The constitutional declaration was indeed a curious move. It lacked not only political sensitivity but also any legal justification. Indeed, it conflicts with the constitutional amendments on which basis the elections that brought Morsi to power were held. Supporters of President Morsi would argue that his aim was to block judicial interference with both the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council, the latter having been oddly promoted to full parliamentary powers. Ultimately, the move safeguarded the writing of a constitution, leading to an Islamist-leaning constitution that further deepened the power struggle in the country. The ripples of discontent sent by the constitutional declaration across the country are still taking their toll on political life, blocking any attempt for consensual decision-making or for conciliation between the opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated presidency and government. In the words of one analyst, it was the “biggest constitutional reversal in Egypt's history”. The deadlock that followed the constitutional declaration, coupled with the Muslim Brotherhood reluctance to share power with foe or friend, brought a change of heart in the Salafist movement. Over the past few months, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, who once spoke in the same voice, had trouble agreeing on anything. The IMF loan, which the Muslim Brotherhood is desperate to obtain, was thoroughly denounced by Salafis. The rapprochement with Iran, portrayed as a foreign policy coup by the Muslim Brotherhood, drove hard-line Sunni Salafis to distraction. Then the Nour Party split and everyone started suspecting the Muslim Brotherhood of plotting against the biggest Salafist party in the hope of dividing the Islamist opposition. As Abdel-Ghafour announced the formation of a new Salafist party, named Al-Watan (Homeland), top Salafi officials blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, if not for plotting against the Nour, for fomenting differences in the Salafist camp. “I cannot say that the Muslim Brotherhood plotted to bring about the split, but they had a hand in what happened,” said Nader Bakkar, the Nour's official spokesman. It was around that time that the Nour Party came up with its “stop the violence” initiative. The party that was once content to march to the tune of the Muslim Brotherhood was now blowing its own bugle. When the National Salvation Front (NSF) leaders accepted the call by the Nour Party for dialogue, the Muslim Brotherhood was furious. As it turned out, the Nour's initiative validated most of the NSF's criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood: that a non-partisan government was needed, that the public prosecutor should resign, and that the constitution should be amended. “The Nour Party decided to think outside the box. Instead of posing as a guardian of Sharia in the face of liberal and civil parties, it has come to the conclusion that the current rift between the government and the opposition is less about Sharia than about politics,” says Al-Shobaki. The “stop the violence” initiative won the reputation of being a good basis for a broad-based dialogue to end the crisis triggered by the 22 November constitutional declaration. The Muslim Brotherhood's reaction to the initiative was ugly. Alameddin, a senior Salafist official, was fired from his position as presidential adviser for environmental affairs for no good reason and even accused of “abusing” his post — a charge that was never backed with evidence. In protest, another Nour leader, Al-Zarka, walked out of the presidential team. The rift widened when the Nour claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood placed 13,000 of its members in key government posts. From then on, there was no going back: the honeymoon between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis was over. Political analyst Makram Mohamed Ahmed says that differences have been simmering between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis for months before the dispute came to public notice. One reason for the particular intensity of the current conflict is political rivalry. As the elections draw near, both the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood — who compete for the same chunk of the vote — are shedding the pretence of former solidarity. It is unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis would mend their differences anytime soon, says Bakr. “I expect the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis to drift further apart in the near future. It is impossible for them to resume cooperation even for reasons of transient common interests,” Bakr points out. Nageh Ibrahim of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, sees the Salafist-Muslim Brotherhood conflict in apocalyptic terms. In 10 to 15 years, the Muslim Brotherhood will either crush the Salafis or force them to join its ranks, he predicts.
