For much of this week, pundits mused about the implications of the tour by US Secretary of State John Kerry of the region and in particular whether it will impact the “Arab Spring” countries in advancing their faltering steps towards democracy and multi-party pluralism. The pundits voiced the fears and reservations of Gulf Arab governments in particular with regards to the growing influence of Iran as a regional power to be reckoned with, and even more ominously for the Arab Gulf states, the very notion that the Islamic Republic has emerged as the champion of Arab Shia Muslims in the Middle East. Arab leaders greeted Kerry, but they had their eyes firmly fixed on Iran. In ‘Kerry at the GCC' published in the pan-Arab London-based daily Al-Hayat, Abdallah Iskandar drew the attention of his readers to the presumed threat that Iran poses to vulnerable oil-rich Arab Gulf countries and their doubts about Washington's true intentions towards Iran. “The first tour by US Secretary of State John Kerry after having assumed his post culminates in meetings with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ministers in Riyadh. It seems clear that Kerry's choice of the Middle East and its issues in his first movement on the international scene means revitalising American policy in this part of the world, after neglect that lasted throughout President Barack Obama's first term in office. The countries of the GCC may well be among those in the region who have felt the absence of a US role the most — or more accurately the absence of responsiveness by the US to what they hope for from a strategic ally and essential partner,” Iskandar mused. “Kerry's meeting with his GCC counterparts will represent an occasion to renew the balance sheet of US-GCC relations, and the extent to which the nature of such relations corresponds to Gulf interests as set by the countries of the GCC,” Iskandar wrote optimistically. In much the same vein, other pundits alluded to Iran's proxy war in Syria. A typical piece was ‘Obama clings to his three No's on the Syrian crisis' by Raghda Dergham in Al-Hayat. “US Secretary of State John Kerry has dispelled some of the ambiguity surrounding the second Obama administration's policy towards Syria during his European tour this week, and his meetings with European foreign ministers as well as with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,” Dergham noted. “In Iraq, it has become clear that the Obama administration does not mind the widespread and deep-rooted influence held by Iran, this after the United States has withdrawn from the country weighed down by the burden of the exorbitant cost of a war that brought regional accomplishments for Iran but not for the United States,” Dergham, a Lebanese-American journalist based in New York. Her fears are of a widely perceived Arab suspicion that Washington's complicity in Iran's recent political gains in the region is either intentional or unsuspecting. The Americans made terrible mistakes in Iraq, Dergham observed. But Washington's lax attitude towards Iran is what alarmed her most. Does the US simply not care about the fate of the region, or are more sinister motives at work? “The Obama administration prefers to overlook the dangers which beset Iraq today, and which Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki described as ones that could turn into a ‘sectarian war' between Sunnis and Shia,” she stressed. Baghdad, where a fifth of Iraq's 33 million people now live, has become a dangerous front-line of the Sunni-Shia de-facto conflict. Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq appears not only a nation divided along sectarian lines, but also one that is more sympathetic to Tehran than to Arab Sunni-dominated capitals. “The second Obama administration seems as if it sees in these sectarian wars between Muslims the mutual exhaustion of others, a matter unconnected to the major interests of the United States, or as if it is fleeing to the front, out of fear of being held responsible for the outcome of its policies in Syria in particular. At this stage, Obama still clings to his three No's: no direct or indirect American military intervention; no direct or indirect military support of the Syrian opposition; and no to a military solution or settlement in Syria,” Dergham admonished the Americans. “All this while the humanitarian catastrophe worsens, extremism grows and sectarian wars warn of terrible dark days ahead.” Abdel-Rahman Al-Shamrani, writing in the Saudi daily Okaz, reiterated the GCC's apprehension of Iranian ambitions in the region. “The GCC countries call on Iran to respect the principle of good neighbourliness and urges Tehran to support a peaceful transition of power in Syria,” Al-Shamrani reported. Tarek Al-Homayed embarked on a stinging critique of Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki entitled ‘Yes. He is a Shia Saddam' in the London-based, pan-Arab daily Asharq Al-Awsat. The restless predominantly Sunni Muslim province of Al-Anbar is in open rebellion against the Shia-dominated government of Al-Maliki. The writer sees the Iraqi Shia premier as intent on advancing Shia interests and ensuring Shia hegemony over Iraq at all costs. Abdel-Rahman Al-Rashed, general manger of the Dubai-based Saudi-owned pan-Arab satellite television channel Al-Arabiya and former editor-in-chief of Al-Hayat, writing in Asharq Al-Awsat an article entitled ‘For the first time since Saddam, Iraqi troops cross the country's borders' concurred with Al-Homayed referring to Iraqi troops penetration of Syria recently. Mashari Al-Zaydi begged to differ on the question of Al-Maliki. In an article in Asharq Al-Awsat entitled ‘Al-Maliki is sincere, but wrong' Al-Zaydi observed that Al-Maliki was the inevitable fruit of Iraq's violent history. “I don't believe that there is any need to reiterate the criticisms of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's performance, not to mention the huge number of opportunities that he has missed to lead Iraq to safety. However, to be objective, we must not blame all of Iraq's current mistakes and misfortunes on the man,” Al-Zaydi asserted in Asharq Al-Awsat. The writer insists that Iraq's current confessional and political problems and challenges are a direct result of its bloody history. “These can be dated back to the era during which the country was under British mandate, not to mention independence from British rule, the monarchist era, the republican era, and later the harsh Baathist era. This included both the reign of Abdel-Salam Arif and later Saddam Hussein, which encompassed the invasion of Kuwait, international isolation, and then the occupation of Iraq itself and execution of Saddam Hussein. Following this, we saw the establishment of a political system based on sectarianism as a result of the stupidity of the Americans, the cunning of Tehran, and the disunity of Iraq's Arab neighbours. Nuri Al-Maliki can therefore be viewed as the natural product of Iraq's history, with all its ills. His discourse and actions are also a prime result of this. In spite of all this, a fair and impartial observer cannot help but acknowledge that Al-Maliki demonstrates determination and possesses a clear vision,” Al-Zaydi insisted. But the blame game is not restricted to Iraq, Iran and the Shia of the region. The Sunnis, too, are equally guilty of fomenting trouble in the eyes of several pundits. Violence in the name of religion is not the prerogative of Shia Islam. The leading Sunni movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, has historically been responsible for acts of violence in the name of Islam. In a most provocative and poignant piece in Asharq Al-Awsat entitled ‘Militant Islam and political Islam' Abdallah Al-Oteibi lambasts individuals and groups that advocate violence in the name of Islam. “Militant Islam is a term used to cover those groups, currents, symbols, and individuals who use Islam as a pretext for armament, fighting and violence. It is a term that covers various methods and styles, ranging from radical theorising and the issuance of provocative fatwas, to planned and organised operations, to simple cold-blooded murder,” Al-Oteibi noted. “From the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood — the oldest and most prominent representatives of political Islam — cultivated militant Islam from within through secret organisations and specialist groups. It is well known that the Brotherhood carried out many bombings, assassinations, and acts of violence under the eyes of their founder, Hassan Al-Banna,” Al-Oteibi asserted. For the writer, the Muslim Brotherhood was the mother of all militants. “The trail can also be traced back to Sayed Qutb, who was executed following a state crackdown on the Brotherhood in the 1960s. Indeed, we can assert that the violent religious organisations of the 1970s emerged from the womb of Qutb's rhetoric,” Al-Oteibi expounded. “In the 1990s armed Islamic movements returned strongly to the Arab scene, especially in Egypt. They were based — in terms of their rhetoric and stances towards the state and society — on the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood. Here some may contend that a fatwa actually acquits the Brotherhood's discourse from the consequences of these militant groups, but this is only a small part of the truth. The fatwa may isolate the radical discourse of those groups, but their organisation and infrastructure still owe themselves to the Brotherhood,” he concluded. “We have recently seen news reports about the Qataris wanting to buy the Pyramids from the Egyptians. Prior to this, there were claims that they had also made an offer to Egyptian businessmen and Deputy Guide Muslim Brotherhood Khairat Al-Shater to buy the Suez Canal,” Al-Rashid wrote in Asharq Al-Awsat. “Although such claims have been denied and said to be nothing more than unsubstantiated rumours, there can be no doubt that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood government is now facing a financial crisis to the point that it is now looking at any and all means of saving money, including reconciliation with businessmen imprisoned on corruption charges,” he pontificated. “In principle, there is nothing strange about such bids, particularly in this era of globalisation,” Al-Rashid concluded in Asharq Al-Awsat.
