The political storm for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is not yet over, reports Khaled Amayreh from Ramallah Whether the newly-formed Palestinian government in Ramallah will be able to function efficiently and fulfill its obligations and responsibilities according to a political agenda, even if it has one, remains to be seen. Due to the speed with which the new government was established, it has been dubbed a "knee-jerk" government by some. This followed Hamas' dramatic take-over of Gaza. The fledgeling government has already gained regional and international support and recognition, with the US, EU and Israel all pledging to lift the economic embargo imposed on the Palestinians following Hamas' election victory in 2006. However, recognition and foreign aid alone won't guarantee success. Salam Fayyad, the Ramallah-based Prime Minister has described his government's mission as "very hard but not impossible." This is a more or less accurate prognosis. Fayyad, a former World Bank official, is a favourite of the US and EU (but not necessarily Israel). He is not a member of Fatah and doesn't have a power base or a strong following in the Palestinian street. Hence, his ability to effect real change on the ground is very limited. Indeed, the success or failure of the new government, e.g. in maintaining security and reestablishing the rule of law, depends to a very large degree on the extent to which the Fatah movement, the backbone of the PA political and security apparatus in the West Bank, will be willing to cooperate and abide by its decisions. Unfortunately, experience shows that Fatah, particularly its largely undisciplined and numerous militias and gangs, has a record of refusing to acknowledge the authority of previous Palestinian governments whether in Ramallah or in Gaza. The organisation may prove to be even more at odds with a government led by a "Western-oriented' prime minister who believes that all militia men and security agencies ought to be answerable to his office. If Fayyad fails to deliver, namely by ending the rampant anarchy and chaos in the West Bank (Hamas by contrast seems to have succeeded in restoring a semblance of calm back on the streets of Gaza), he could very soon find himself overwhelmed by frustration and helplessness. In this case, he would have no choico but to resign. At present, the prospects don't look very encouraging. On Monday, masked men, ostensibly affiliated with Mohamed Dahlan's faction, broke into and burned down the Ramallah home of Aziz Deweik, the Speaker of the Palestinian Parliament, who is presently in an Israeli jail for being a member of a political party backed by Hamas. This arson appears to be part of a widespread campaign of vandalism and intimidation carried out by Dahlan's supporters against Hamas followers and their property in retaliation for the events in Gaza last week. Fayyad also faces other daunting responsibilities. He seems to be uncertain as to what can or should be done to restore "central authority" in Gaza where Hamas is consolidating its authority. When questioned as to what he would do with the Hamas government in Gaza, Abdul-Razzaq al Yahya, the aging and newly appointed Minister of Interior answered, "I swear by God I don't know." He was being honest. A government under Israeli occupation can't claim or even pretend that it is able to do much under the circumstances. Needless to say, such pretensions to the opposite, rhetorical and void of substance, have brought one disaster after the another on the Palestinians, ever since the creation of the PA nearly 15 years ago. Predictably, the new government in Ramallah will try to compensate "the loss of Gaza" by controlling and manipulating the erstwhile empty, but soon- to-be replenished coffers, the money faucet. Some short-sighted Fatah and PLO officials erroneously assume that Palestinians will bow their heads and cease their support for Hamas on the grounds that he who pays the piper calls the tune. However, this is an assumption, that is only partially true, especially in the Gaza Strip. Many Gazans there will continue, for many months to come, to appreciate Hamas' success in restoring some normalicy to a people long tormented and terrorised by armed thugs operating under a plethora of titles according to family, factional and ideological affiliations. Naturally, Palestinians desire both economic and physical security. But very few would agree to exchange physical security for a regular income as many in Ramallah may be thinking. In the final analysis, financial security for any Palestinian government, especially in Ramallah where the noose of the occupation encircles the neck of each and every Palestinian, depends almost completely on Israeli whims and those of their backers in Washington. But both Washington and Tel Aviv will be expecting major returns for the support of any Palestinian government. After all, there is no such a thing as a free lunch as the old adage goes. Any Palestinian government will have to make major political concessions to the occupying power in order just to to survive, let alone prosper. And the concessions coveted by Israel, as it is known, must include paramount issues which the Palestinians regard as sacred. These include East Jerusalem as their future capital and the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, who either fled, or were driven out of their homeland at gunpoint by Israeli soldiers when Israel was established in 1948. Furthermore, it is well known that in the American-Israeli lexicon, terms such as "moderates" and "pro-peace Palestinians" are nearly always euphemisms for "quislings" and "collaborators" who are willing to appease Israeli arrogance while accommodating its territorial ambitions. This is probably the reasoning behind the refusal of so many Gazans to take to the streets in support of Muhammed Dahlan and his men as Hamas hounded them out of Gaza. The Fayyad government also faces a real problem pertaining to its legitimacy and constitutionality. According to PA legislation (incomplete due to the absence of statehood), the establishment of any emergency government would have to obtain the approval of the Legislative Council in order to extend its term for another thirty days. However, the Palestinian parliament is controlled by Hamas and the bulk of Islamic lawmakers (more than 40 of them) are imprisoned in Israel "for associating with an illegal organisation." Hence, to secure a quorum would be nigh impossible, let alone get Hamas to vote "Yes" for the Fayyadh government. This looming deadlock (this is if Abbas chooses to adhere to the basics of Palestinin law), could eventually prompt the Ramallah-based leadership to call for early general elections in the hope of reversing the outcome of the 2006 elections. But elections, are unlikely to solve the problem for Abbas and Fatah unless there is a real breakthrough in the political process, which is unlikely to happen until at least the end of George Bush's term in the White House. Especially in light of the current Israeli government's anti-peace stance. Moreover, it is unlikely that the US, Israel, the EU and their allies in the Arab world wish to repeat the mistake they made in 2006 when they pushed for free and fair democratic elections without considering whether the resulting winner would be to their liking. Theoretically, Abbas could outlaw Hamas altogether as he has outlawed its military wing, the Izzedin al Qassam Brigades. But such a largely symbolic decision would have little impact on the ground, especially in the Gaza Strip where the Hamas presence is a reality. In the final analysis, Abbas will have to seek a modus vivendi with Hamas. However,the important question is whether the US and its influential men within Fatah, e.g. the Dahlan group, will allow Abbas to rebuild bridges with Hamas.
