The Arab Spring is the most significant event in Arab history since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and liberation from foreign colonialism. Since the Arab Spring began at the onset of 2011 and struck five Arab states, the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) kept a close eye on its effects in their own countries. The Arab Spring has influenced Gulf states in many ways, including massive protests in Bahrain for political demands that remain unattained; months of protests in Oman about living conditions; harassment and arrest of reform-minded bloggers and activists in the UAE; escalating controversies, political protests and strikes in Kuwait; and finally a wave of protests and demands for reform in Saudi Arabia. Along with these key domestic issues in Gulf states there were two other concerns that the Arab Spring raised as a major menace: Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Neither spectre was born in the Arab Spring or sparked the revolutions for political transformation; both had always existed with a history of varying ties with the Gulf. This article will explore why there is heightened concern portraying these two as the biggest threat to the Gulf today. The MB has a long and diverse history subject to the country where they exist, which also applies to their presence in various Gulf states. They were mostly concentrated in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because when Gulf monarchies were at odds with pan-nationalist Nasserism in the 1960s, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait attracted the MB to counter this tide. Thousands of MB leaders and activists were given teaching, missionary and other positions in state agencies. Saudi Arabia also benefited from their interpretation of religion which is more progressive than prevalent Wahhabism that opposes most aspects of modernising the country. Saudi Arabia embraced them as individual agents, however, not as an organisation. To demonstrate how the organisation's structure adapts to time and place, the most significant transformation of political Islam in the Gulf is the parting of Islamic activism in Saudi Arabia and the MB. Key activist preachers on the Saudi scene declared their position on the Gulf War and deviated from scholars who echoed the government's position supporting US intervention in the region. They were revivalists such as Salman Al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali who were regarded as part of the Sururi movement and originally influenced by the MB. Sururi is a trend that blends the ideology of the MB and Salafism of Sheikh Mohamed bin Abdel-Wahab. In Saudi Arabia, it is more politically active and cohesive than the MB. Thus, after the Gulf War crisis the Saudi authorities imprisoned several leaders of the Sururi movement and the MB objected to the campaign against the Sururis. Saudi Arabia's closed political climate and Salafism only allowed a narrow margin for the MB to operate, therefore they remained under the radar without taking any glaring positions on political events. After the Gulf War came the post-9/11 era and the wars of occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Saudi government battled jihadists carrying out suspicious and extremist activities in the kingdom. The MB did not have a cultural presence or positions in this scene, and even post-Arab Spring when civil activists emerged and made demands for reform, MB leaders were mostly absent from this trend, and the call for political participation and modern civil transition in the country. The Muslim Brothers in Saudi Arabia focussed on education, missionary work and charity, playing a key role in writing education curriculums and had a conspicuous presence in universities. But this does not mean their presence did not worry Saudi Arabia; there were various statements including one in 2002 by Minister of Interior Prince Nayef bin Abdel-Aziz, in which he talked about Saudi Arabia hosting the MB and giving them refuge when they fled persecution in their own countries, but they recruited the people and opposed the kingdom. Harassment of the MB continued to escalate especially by media owned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Meanwhile, the Islamic revolution in Iran raised Gulf concerns about Tehran and political Islam in general because it is a revolution that truly awakened the ambitions of political Islam in the region, most notably within the MB. In Oman, political Islam is still in its early years and although not many talk about this, the country had never seen such clashes other than a wave of arrests of Islamists in 1994 who were accused of belonging to an organisation. They were later pardoned. The MB was flexible in Kuwait and Bahrain after partial political liberalisation there that enabled the group to declare its existence as an organisation. MB presence in the Gulf came in the form of the “Reform Society” in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE, which is an organisation focussed on charity and missionary work. The society first emerged in Bahrain more than 70 years ago but was not active or influential like the one that was founded in Kuwait two decades later. The Reform Society was marginal in the last elections in Bahrain before that experiment collapsed with the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975 because of inexperience and pressure by nationalists. After the king of Bahrain proposed his reform plan in the form of a charter of national action in 2001, the group began political activism by forming the Islamic Forum Society (ISF). It won seven out of 40 parliamentary seats in 2002 and 2006, but even in parliament observers believe it was less interested in reform, expanding political participation or even supporting the opposition sometimes. Instead, it focussed on issues of lifestyle, banning alcohol, etc. ISF made progress with ease and reached senior positions in Bahrain because politicians trusted the movement can discipline its followers and kept it close to power in case there is a clash with political Shia forces. For decades, the movement never clashed with politicians. In Kuwait which began on the path of democracy nearly 50 years ago, the Arab Spring coincided with activism on the political scene there as democracy is almost always shifting and in flux, as parliament often challenges the regime. Reform-minded political activism in Kuwait is not due to the MB although they are a strong organised political bloc, but activism is among a blend of various political forces. The opposition led by Islamists clenched a sweeping victory in the last elections of the Kuwaiti National Assembly in February 2011 by winning 34 of 50 seats. Of these, Islamists won 23 seats, but the majority of them were not MB but Salafist — although they are not a uniform bloc like the MB. The Reform Society in Kuwait had a stronger presence and better organisation than its counterparts in other Gulf states in terms of foreign support and links to Islamists outside the region. They benefit from more freedom in Kuwait in comparison to the rest of the Gulf. MB activism in Kuwait, however, is not the result of foreign support and assistance because the Reform Society established the Islamic Constitutional Movement after political emancipation followed the occupation of Iraq. At the same time, it froze its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood Global Organisation because the latter supported Saddam Hussein's decision to invade. Meanwhile, the MB continued to actively participate in Kuwait's political debates. In Qatar, the MB dissolved their group in 1999 not because of a political clash or pressure or arrests, but as a result of internal contemplation and understanding within the group, according to Kuwaiti thinker Abdallah Al-Nafisi in an article published online titled “The Islamic condition in Qatar”. Qatari writer Abdel-Aziz Al-Mahmoud said in another article titled “The Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar… Who are they?” that not everyone agreed on this decision, leaving other groups led by young leaders connected to general discourse trying to sustain the same activities. On the Arab plane, Qatar is closely linked with the MB especially since the Arab Spring and active Qatari political and media backing of Arab revolutions which in turn helped Islamists to reach power. But there is no evidence of systematic MB political activism in Qatar itself as much as there is a higher ceiling of freedom there than in other Gulf states, which contributed to the presence of many groups such as Tabligh (Conveyors), Salafis, MB and liberals. There are also independent Arab and Western societies with a variety of agendas. The MBs were at the fore of this stage because of their good organisation skills and work as a group, unlike others, and are benefiting from it. For example, one can see the influence of Sheikh Youssef Al-Qaradawi from Qatar and the influence of Jassem Al-Sultan on the youth. The worst confrontations with the MB occurred in the UAE although the group emerged relatively later there, because foreign workers started coming later. By the mid-1970s, the MB masses that left Egypt had settled down in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. In the beginning, relations with the government were warm and some MB members were given senior positions, including ministries and advisors to senior officials in the country. These included Ezzeddin Ibrahim, a leading MB figure, who became the president of Emirates University and advisor to the late UAE president Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan. Despite the small number of MB members from abroad, the local group quickly organised as the Reform Society in 1974 and published Reform magazine four years later. The status of the MB in the UAE was unclear and the group began to suffer. There was no partial political opening to enable them to manoeuvre like in Bahrain and Kuwait. Neither did the group withdraw and lay low like in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. MB members continued to demand to be reinstated in their jobs and academic posts, and regain control of their society's branches and Reform instead of government cronies. The MB featured prominently in the petition submitted by 133 activists and human rights advocates from the UAE in March 2011 to President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The petition demanded that all seats in parliament should be chosen by direct ballot, and that parliament should be given oversight and a legislative mandate. It gathered signatures from across the political spectrum, including nationalists, Islamists and others, and is not considered an MB endeavour because signatories endorsed the petition in their name not as an organisation — similar to petitions in Saudi Arabia. The MB in the UAE have a clear and known structure that include academics and public figures in the country who admit to having close ties with the MB and a pledge of allegiance they said they retracted in 2003, according to statements by leading UAE MB member and lawyer Mohamed Al-Mansouri. Unlike in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, for example, where hardly any leading figures mention their affiliation with the MB. The UAE government had suspended the activities of the Reform Society in the UAE in 1994 after nearly 21 years of activism. They were cornered further after being accused of being a military organisation in 2001. In 2003, after several attempts at dialogue with the government, 170 MB members were reassigned from education to other government sectors. The height of confrontation came later after the start of the Arab Spring. After the arrest and subsequent release of five signatories of the petition, the government revoked the citizenship of seven members of the MB. The UAE judiciary recently approved the decision in November. Over several months many arrests were made which put 64 Islamists behind bars, many of whom are well known academics and human rights activists in the country. After statements were made that they represent an armed group, many observers are waiting to see how their trials will proceed and how these well-known figures in the fields of academia, education and human rights can be members of armed militias. As well as the Arab Spring and various protests in the region, some attribute these precautionary measures by the UAE government to security advisers from Egypt who are associated with Mubarak's regime. In time, the latter began to worry about the dangers of Gulf funds going to MBs in Egypt and in 2009, Egypt's prosecutor-general published a list of 36 names accused of belonging to the MB global organisation, including three UAE businessmen. As for Iran, it is a big loser in the Arab Spring. First, it always declared its model of Islamic revolution as the one that all Arab people should follow, but found out that once the people were liberated they rejected this model, which is a cultural loss for Iran. A tangible loss is that Tehran sought and indicated it was willing to escalate and demonstrate its financial strength, but when things came to a head and GCC Peninsula Shield forces entered Bahrain during the March 2011 uprising, Iran had nothing to offer. Meanwhile, it lost a major moral and political battle when it supported Bashar Al-Assad's bloodthirsty regime at the expense of the people, and this position strongly tarnished Iran's image in the eyes of the Arab masses. While Iran's superior attitude towards Gulf states and statements continue through the Arab Spring, which is not unusual for Iran even decades before the Islamic revolution, Tehran's stature is in retreat. It has also suffered great economic hardship because of sanctions which could affect the Gulf itself. All this could have resulted in direct and serious talks between Iran and Gulf states that would exclude Western channels that never tried to mediate between the two neighbours. Saudi Arabia announced there is no evidence of complicity of “specific countries” in Al-Qatif incident. In Bahrain, the government's Bassiouni Commission found there was no evidence that Iran played a role in the Iranian uprising. Thus, despite insults and stepped up media campaigns between the Gulf and Iran, the situation did not need to be framed as such a serious threat to the Gulf. Iran is racing to fill any void, as we saw in Iraq after occupation and in Syria during the ongoing revolution. These are very negative positions that only serve Iranian interests at the expense of the people in the region. Apprehension and certainty only play a role in times of crisis or vacuum, not when countries are in control and whose people have aspirations for civil instituionalisation and broadening popular political participation. The MBs are known in the Gulf as charity and missionary groups not as organisations with political demands — except when the arena is open such as in Bahrain and Kuwait. Otherwise, their political demands are only evident in petitions signed with other nationalist forces. The demands of the MB in the UAE, for example, pertained to the privileges they had lost years before the Arab Spring such as their magazine that changed in content and protection against arrest and harassment at work. Islamism is strong in the Gulf but this does not necessarily mean a strong MB because by nature the general public and tribal mood is closer to Salafism, and so is the outlook of the strong politicians in power in those states. Meanwhile, the MB's calm and pragmatic approach distances it from activism and intervention — with the exception of Kuwait since political conditions there allow this. The MB's approach in the Gulf was described by one researcher as very flexible, avoiding confrontation in times of crisis and always ready to capitalise on moments of political breakthrough. Gulf governments have predicted that in times of political opportunity, Iran and the MB would benefit. Tehran would set up its own organisations through legal institutions in the country, the same as in Afghanistan and what it began in Egypt after the revolution. The MB is also organised and pragmatic, waiting for political openings to immediately capitalise on them ahead of anyone else. But these apprehensions are not the main reason for escalation against Iran and the MB by Gulf countries. Today, this hyperbole achieves a more important goal: spreading fear about the democracy route. This is a much closer and more pressing goal for Gulf states today. The writer is a Saudi researcher.
