The war on Gaza combines the characteristic drastic brutality towards Palestinians and Arabs that Israel periodically demonstrates with a lack of effectiveness in achieving its stated goals that those who follow and support the resistance have come to expect, especially since the 2006 war in Lebanon. One can watch the latest Israeli assault on Gaza and become overwhelmed with the enormity of the destruction, the loss of human life, one-third of those killed being children, and the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of asymmetric power by an occupying state against 1.7 million people, most of them refugees, living under siege for several years. On the other hand, one can also watch the latest assault and marvel at the resistance, the human willpower, and the high morale of a steadfast population that is determined to return to its usurped lands. More importantly, one can also be reassured because the people of Gaza are ahead of their leaders, while the resistance is inflicting real damage on the enemy. The latest conflict might be an inflection point in the struggle, especially if its achievements are employed wisely in order to achieve politically strategic goals such as the lifting of the embargo and a halt to the Israeli settlements. Despite the skewed balance of raw power in Israel's favour, how is it that the latter has not been able to win what was (wrongly) projected to be a brief and spectacular skirmish that would boost the political fortunes of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his Minister of Defence Ehud Barak? The Israeli leaders said that the goals of the war were, first, to protect Israeli civilians from rocket and mortar attacks, and, second, to cripple Hamas's ability to launch such attacks. They have failed on both counts, and Israel cannot protect its citizens, whether in the cities or in the settlements. After initially crowing that the Israeli ary had destroyed all the rocket-launching capabilities of Hamas, Uzi Rubin, an Israeli missile expert, admitted that “[t]he Palestinian capabilities, we can assume, have been damaged, but they remain intact as a cycle of fire has been maintained.” Moreover, not only were hundreds of rockets still being launched, but they were also targeting cities and settlements that had never, since the establishment of the Israeli state, been within the reach of Palestinian fighters. As a result, Israeli citizens, as well as government ministers, were forced to take shelter from incoming rockets, factories were shuttered in the south of the country, and flights had to be diverted around Ben-Gurion Airport. The business information company BDI has estimated the losses at about NIS 1.1 billion a week, while the Israeli Manufacturer's Association has put damage to the more than 430 businesses in the south of the country at NIS 120 million. Meanwhile, 80 per cent of all retail and services were shuttered in the south, costing the Israeli economy between NIS 90 and 100 million a day, according to the Israeli Federation of Chambers of Commerce. Of course, none of these estimates count the still unknown costs of the damage to property. Moreover, Israel's much-vaunted Iron Dome missile interception system has only been partially effective, and it is also very expensive. According to Barak, Iron Dome launched more than 350 interceptions, costing some $20 million. Estimates of how much each interceptor missile costs vary between $35,000 and $100,000, the latter figure according to Yossi Drucker, head of the Iron Dome project. The system batteries have cost more than $200 million, much of the money supplied by the United States. In 2010, at US President Barack Obama's request, the US Congress gave Israel $205 million for Iron Dome, in addition to the $3 billion in aid that it receives annually. In 2012, the US approved an additional $680 million in funding over the next three years. Israel is now seeking NIS 750 million more for new batteries, some of which will come from the United States. The cost of deploying the soldiers to operate the system should be added to these figures, estimated at $750,000. In contrast, the Palestinian rockets cost between $100 and $1,000. The math is not in favour of Israel's muscularity, to say the least. Furthermore, the rate of successful interception has been the subject of much debate, with some Israeli sources initially crowing about an 80 per cent success rate, but others saying that this was only 20 per cent. Whatever the case may be, the system is not perfect. In contrast to what the Israeli war machine has been able to accomplish, here is what the Palestinian resistance has achieved up till now. First, the resistance has imposed heavy economic and financial costs on Israel. It has succeeded in reaching areas previously thought impervious to attack. In other words, the costs of the Israeli occupation have now come home to roost. Instead of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and the generous “aid” that it receives, taking care of police actions on behalf of the occupation, the fighters of the resistance, and the larger society that supports them, are acting beyond the rigid confines of the Oslo Peace Process, which has amounted to endless negotiations, quietism, and concessions. Second, the amount and long-range capabilities of the available rockets, especially the Iranian-developed Fajr-5, have been an unexpected and unwelcome surprise to the Israelis. There has been speculation that the resistance possesses shoulder-firing anti-aircraft missiles smuggled in from Libya, which would explain the lack of Israeli Apache helicopters over Gaza's skies. However, such combat helicopters would be needed for the support of foot soldiers should an Israeli ground attack be launched. Third, in the past whenever Israel's aggression was proceeding well most of its Western and Arab government supporters would delay attempts to impose a ceasefire. The opposite has been true this time round, when the Egyptian and Turkish presidents, as well as the Qatari foreign minister, rushed to negotiate a ceasefire that would rescue Israel from its predicament. Ever since the 2006 war, during which Hizbullah rained missiles down on Israel and defeated the invading Israeli forces on the ground in south Lebanon, Israel has been desperate to regain its deterrence capabilities. In fact, if one of the goals behind its latest and largest joint military exercise with the United States, Austere Challenge 2012, was to send a message about Israel's high “state of readiness” to Iran, then there may be a need for a rerun. If Israel's overwhelming military superiority, backed by the United States, is unable to stop the resistance in the 141 square miles of Gaza, how will Israel be able to overcome Iran? Israel's deterrence capability is being perceived to be falling at an accelerated rate. Fourth, the steadfastness exhibited in Gaza and the persistence shown in continuing to fight despite death and destruction once again confirm that resistance is part and parcel of the identity of most Palestinians. This is despite the fact that many Palestinian leaders have been anxious to prove how reasonable (read subservient) they can be as “negotiators”. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the PA, has been anxiously searching for a role, especially after his outrageous comment that he, speaking on behalf of the Palestinians, waived any claim to the right of return to his ancestral hometown of Safad. Abbas is paid handsomely for his role, making a reported $1 million a month and having reported personal Jordanian accounts containing more than $500 million of Palestinian tax-payers' money, according to Inlight Press, in addition to other perks for himself and his family. Finally, the proliferation of resistance factions proves that any group of carefully selected leaders (including some leaders in Hamas) who do not express the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians will be incapable of containing and channeling the overwhelming social forces whose opposition can only grow with the increasingly racist and aggressive actions of the Zionist state. Given that Israel's military barbarity over the past 60 plus years has been unable to banish Palestinian aspirations to have and to return to their homeland, it is unlikely that the powers-that-be can now co-opt the population. What they offer through aid and their designated leaders is not what the people want. Very simply, what is being offered is the transformation of Palestinian identity into something quiescent, submissive, and grateful for the crumbs that those in power deign to throw their way. However, the latest war might prove to be the inflection point at which Israel and its Arab and Western backers realise that the balances have shifted and that crumbs will no longer do. They might then realise that quiescence is not Palestinian, but that resistance is. The writer is a PhD candidate at the School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Arizona.
