The possibility of armed militias and vigilante groups run by the Muslim Brotherhood and other hard-line Islamist groupshasraised the spectre of a possible confrontation between suchmilitiasand the military. Already the “power-of-attorney” drive calling on the army toreplace theMuslim Brotherhood government, conductedagainstabackdrop of sharply escalating political tension, police strikes, rioting and angry protest demonstrations in many cities, fuelshortages, rising prices and the clear inability of the current government to cope withon-going criseshave caused strains between the army and Islamist groups. AstheMinister of Defence headed to the podium to deliver a speech duringMilitaryAcademy graduation ceremonies several days agohe was visibly surprised by the number ofbearded faces and niqabs inthe audience. Perhaps this is what prompted General Abdel FattahEl-Sisitospeak at length on how difficult it would be to “Brotherhoodise” the military andinsist thatanyone who entered military service best forget any allegiances they may haveother than theirprimary allegiance to the nation. Conveying a similar message,other military sources insistedthat the chances of ideological infiltration are minimal. Not thatitwas the first time GeneralEl-Sisiissued such remarks. Two weeks early he voiced similar comments, adding thatrumours circulating that he would be dismissed as minister of defence were precisely that–rumours. Military officials also felt compelled to deliver a firm response toa decision madeby the office of the prosecutor-general this week-which was laterrevised - giving a green light tocitizens makingarrests. Regarded as a trial balloon, the decision wasssenby observers as an invitation to vigilante groups to take over police duties. Speaking toAl-Ahram Weekly, a military source vehemently condemned “attempts to drag the nation intoacivil war by promoting the creation of militias working parallel to the official security agencies. The armed forces will neverpermit this. Itconstitutes a threat to national security and socialequilibrium.” After President Mohamed Morsi assumed office the Muslim Brotherhoodwas keen toplayupthe close relationship betweenEl-Sisiand the presidency, going so far as to circulate a rumour to the effect thatEl-Sisiwas a memberof a Brotherhood “sleeping cell”.The army laid this rumour to rest, as it hasother rumours and trial balloons, a case in point being firm statements by military authorities in response to rumours that Qatar was seeking to obtain a franchise for a project to expand and develop a portion of the Suez Canal. The statements confirmed the importancethe canalto Egyptian national security,and that there was nopossibility it would be allowed to move beyondEgypt's control. Muslim Brotherhood officials, for their part, have strenuously deniedthere have been anyattempts to penetrate the armed forces.Observerssaythe group's history tells otherwise.They allege thatnot only has it sought to infiltrate its members into the army, it attempted tocreate an army within the army, the so-calledUnits Organisation. According to a Muslim Brotherhood official, former MB Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef was the last commander of these units. Mohamed Habib a former MB leader and member of the Guidance Bureau puts the end of these units much earlier. In an interview withAl-Ahram Weeklyhe said that General Salah Shadi was the last person responsible for theorganisation which wasended in1954 byGamal Abdel Nasser. “Therewas certainly noattempt to revivethe units up to2010,” he said, adding that the Muslim Brotherhood has no connection with the military establishment whatsoever. Military Intelligence was able to eliminate any Brotherhood member or anyone associated with the Muslim Brotherhood from its ranks, he said. There have been several phases in the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian security and intelligence agencies. The first endedin the Nasser period, as noted above. The second phase was one that combined containment with political co-optation. The government continued its clampdowns on Muslim Brotherhood members andadopted additionalmeasures to keep the organisation under control without eliminating it entirely.Pactswere concludedwith Muslim Brotherhood leaders, the best known being the Sadat government's deal with Supreme Guide OmarEl-Telmisanywhich aimedto eliminate the Egyptian political left. UnderMubarak there were numerous government-Muslim Brotherhood accommodations. Someinvolved allowingtheBrotherhood to expandits influence inprofessional syndicatesin return for curbingitspolitical activism and confining is activitiesto proselytisingandsocial work. Negotiations in this area were handled by General Intelligence, headed by Omar Soleiman. Ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections negotiationsbetween the regime and the Muslim Brotherhoodwere conducted bythenGIS chief Hassan Abdel Rahman and various MB leaders,notably KhairatEl-Shater. Mohamed Habib stresses that the Muslim Brotherhood had no connection withtheEgyptian security services even if there were “understandings” betweenthemfrom time to time.Yeteven if he was a member of the Guidance Bureauhe would not have beenthat wellinformed on security matters. It wasEl-Shater who concluded the deal in 2005 that ceded the parliamentary seats the Habib and his fellow Muslim Brotherhood candidateAbdel Moneim Abdel Futtouh were contending to the then ruling NDP, which helps explain why these two eventually turned againstEl-Shater andEl-Shater's protege, Mohamed Morsi. There is one person fewmentionin connection with Muslim Brotherhood military or paramilitary activities. Deputy Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ezzat, sometimes referred to as the MB's “black box,” is reported to have headed a secret paramilitary wing called the Hawks. The group made its first appearance in 2006 in the form of a military display by MB studentsat Al-Azhar University. Ali Bakr, an expert on Islamist groups who spent eight years in prison in the company of MB leaders, told theWeeklythat from the knowledge he gained through his meetings with former and current leaders the MB could call on some 5,000 combatants andquicklyretrain elements of its “special wing”.Nor would funding be likely to cause a problem as the MB could draw on considerable resources at home and abroad. The question has also been raised as to whethermembers ofHamas militiaswould come to the support of the Muslim Brotherhood in the event of a showdown with the army. In a telephone interview with theWeekly, Hamas official MahmoudAl-Zahar dismissedthe suggestion out of hand, saying it was no more thananattempt to marHamas'simage. Former deputy director of GIS Hossam Khairallah alsopoured water on the suggestion. “The armed forces, General Intelligenceandthe police wouldnotallow this.... The tunnels will be closed. They'll be shut down. The army will not hesitate to doeverythingin its power to forestall such a scenario,” he told theWeekly. But if notHamas, what about the International Muslim Brotherhood organisation? Would it step in to help? KemalEl-Halbawi, a former member of theorganisation,thinks not. “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was not involved in foreign funding or creating militias abroad until the JanuaryRevolution, which is when I ended my connection with the organisation, although it might have happened afterwards,” he said. Meanwhile, the relationship between the MB and the national security agenciesis another source of concern. Communications between the MB and the agencies have operated through various channels. Habib describes individuals who act as messengersbetween security officials in the governoratesand the MB Guidance Bureau which, alone, knows the identity of these messengers. Security officials in the countryside treat them as ordinary political party representatives. More significantly, President Morsi recently called in on the GIS. According to General Khairallah it was a long visit during which the president met withmanysenior intelligence officers. In Khairallah's opinion the meetingdid not leave a good impression, which is typical ofmeetings between MB and GIS officials. El-Shaterhasheld several meetings with former intelligencedirector Mourad Mawafi, at the request of the former head of SCAF Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. However, when the Muslim Brotherhood did an about face and began to attack SCAF, Tantawi instructed Mawafi to refuseanyfurther meetings. Khairallah pointed out that while there are MB sympathisers in the intelligence organisation these do not occupy sensitive posts. In addition, he said, the agency has the right to dismiss a staff member on the grounds of a political affiliation, regardless of what this may be.
